Understanding department - next steps agency relationships. by Gains, Francesca
UNDERSTANDING DEPARTMENT- NEXT STEPS AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Francesca Gains 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Politics, University of Sheffield 
October 1999 
SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the establishment of 'Next Steps' agencies in government and 
how they were intended to allow the delivery of government goals at arm's length. 
The research is concerned with how changes in relationships at the heart of 
Government can be understood. It seeks to address the impact of these changes 
on the policy process. It does so by examining the nature of the relationship 
between departments and agencies and asking why some relationships appeared 
to have worked well and others have not. These questions are not adequately 
addressed in the existing literature on agencies. 
The thesis takes a multiple case study approach and draws on the concepts of 
historical institutionalism, power dependency and policy networks to approach these 
questions. It is argued that the introduction and development of agencies changed 
the formal and informal institutional 'rules of the game', affecting the roles actors 
expected to play and radically altered the distribution of resources in central 
government. The changed distribution of resources led to the development of new 
power dependent networks between departments and agencies. Path dependency 
in the development of the Next Steps concept led to a tension between the idea of 
agencies operating at 'arm's length' with the continuation of traditional 
accountability arrangements. The key argument presented is that, where 
department-agency networks are based on shared values, goals and institutional 
support, they will be able to manage the tension created by the new institutional 
arrangements and are able to successfully deliver government goals. 
In concluding, it is suggested that understanding department-agency relationships 
as power dependent networks presents three implications. Firstly, for the 
applicability of this analytical framework to other 'institutional arrangements', 
secondly for policy making in the core executive and, finally, for insights on 
normative issues of accountability and autonomy in contemporary governance. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Key Questions and Approach 
This thesis examines the establishment of 'Next Steps' agencies into government 
and how they were intended to allow the delivery of government goals at arm's 
length. The research is concerned with how changes in relationships at the heart of 
Government can be understood. It seeks to address the impact of these changes 
on the policy process. It does so by examining the nature of the relationship 
between departments and agencies and asking why some relationships appeared 
to have worked well and others have not. These questions are not adequately 
addressed in the existing literature on agencies. 
The thesis takes a multiple case study approach and draws on the concepts of 
historical institutionalism, power dependency and policy networks to examine these 
questions. It is argued that the introduction and development of agencies changed 
the formal and informal institutional 'rules of the game', affecting the roles actors 
were expected (and expecting) to play and radically altering the distribution of 
resources in central government. The changed distribution of resources led to the 
development of new power dependent networks between departments and 
agencies. Path dependency in the development of the Next Steps concept led to a 
tension between the idea of agencies operating at 'arm's length' with the 
continuation of traditional accountability arrangements through the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility. The key argument presented is that where department- 
agency networks are based on shared values, goals and institutional support they 
will be able to manage the tension created by the new institutional arrangements 
and are able to successfully deliver government goals. 
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Background 
The establishment of Next Steps agencies (NSAs) since 1988 has led to a massive 
change in the organisation and administration of central government. This reform is 
only one aspect of encroaching managerialism in public services which has 
developed alongside wider changes affecting the whole of the public sector 
(Metcalf and Richards, 1989; Pollitt, 1993). Hiving off work to accountable arm's 
length units is said to be one of the features of 'new public management' (NPM) 
(Hood, 1991; Rhodes, 1994; James, 1995). 
The change to agencies has, in principle, led to a shift from pre-existing hierarchical 
structures, and a command relationship between policy makers and policy 
implementers and deliverers, to arm's length control based on contracts in a quasi- 
market relationship (Harden, 1992; Dowding, 1995a). Latterly, some agencies have 
spun off from the public sector altogether and, whilst still providing services to the 
state, operate from the private sector under a fully marketised relationship (Next 
Steps Team, 1996). 
The rationale for agencies stemmed from critiques of existing arrangements. A 
political critique suggested that civil servants had too much power. A management 
critique argued that the senior echelons of the civil service were too focused on the 
provision of policy advice and supporting ministers, and there was too little focus on 
management and policy implementation. The agency concept, borrowed from 
contemporary management theories, sought to introduce a split between the policy 
making arm of government (the preserve of ministers aided by civil servants in 
departments) and operational management in agencies. 
This fundamental institutional transformation did not involve legal or constitutional 
change but was based only on an administrative understanding. The concept did 
not alter accountability arrangements and the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. 
It was based on the premise that ministers set policy to be implemented in 
agencies headed by a Chief Executive who would be accountable for operations to 
the minister. Each arrangement to deliver a government service or function at 
arm's length was underpinned by a framework document drawn up between 
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ministers, the parent department and the agency. This framework document spelt 
out the roles and responsibilities of ministers, agencies and departments. 
There are now 138 agencies of varying sizes which employ over 75% of civil 
servants and providing vastly different functions (Cm 4273 1999). The reform has 
met with general cross-party approval (Treasury and Civil Service Committee 
(TCSC), 1994) and has not been significantly altered with the change of 
government (Cm 3889 1997). 
There are conflicting assessments of the impact of agencies on government. Their 
introduction has raised normative questions concerning the degree of agencies' 
accountability and autonomy. In many cases the new agencies appeared to have 
worked well, for example, the Benefits Agency. However, the agency concept has 
been subject to criticism and has been associated with implementation difficulties 
and problematic relationships, most noticeably in the cases of the Prison Service 
Agency and Child Support Agency. 
Key questions 
The thesis will challenge two often cited beliefs about the agency concept. Firstly, 
that to understand the impact of agencies on the policy process it is necessary to 
focus on the relationship between ministers and agencies (see Massey, 1995 (a) 
and (b)). It will be argued here that it is the relationship between department and 
agency which is crucial (Smith et al, 1993). The report which introduced the agency 
concept was unclear about the formal role which should be played by departments 
(Ibbs Report, 1988) although their role subsequently became the concern of 
departments at the centre, the centre of departments, and in agencies (Efficiency 
Unit, 1991; Trosa Report, 1994). 
The analysis here takes a more 'state centric' approach to analysing the policy 
process. It is argued that the relationship between departments and agencies is of 
key importance in any examination of the agency concept. Departments are said 
to be both the main site and source of policy change (Smith 1993). This is due to 
their informational advantages and comparative longevity (Rose 1989; Gains, 
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1999). The focus upon how 'policy makers' interact with 'policy implementers, 
primarily (although not always) involves examining how departments interact with 
agencies. This research will look at how to understand department-agency 
relationships. 
Secondly, it is argued that political salience is the reason for difficulties arising in 
an 'arm's length' approach (Dudley 1994). This approach suggests that the agency 
concept would prove problematic because of the difficulty of separating policy and 
operational responsibilities in politically salient policy areas. The agency concept 
demanded a 'hands off approach, where policy makers steer and do not row, 
whereas, the retention of the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility 
meant that Ministers be accountable for all the actions of their departments and 
agencies. 
Greer notes, "the first lesson from Next Steps is that public administration theory 
was right and that it is not easy to separate 'policy' and 'operational' issues 
particularly in politically sensitive areas which are close to the core of government" 
(1994,78). Even in apparently non-sensitive areas Massey suggests "[e]ven 
those [agencies] with a genuine arm's length relationship with their ministers, 
however, only retain this for as long as it is in the perceived political interest of 
ministers to sustain it", (1995(b), 85). Further, Hogwood suggests the problems 
experienced by the Child Support Agency illustrate the way implementation itself 
can raise political problems, "fflhe distinction between politics and administration is 
not necessarily the same as that between policy making and execution" (1994,77). 
Thus, because of the maintenance of traditional accountability through ministerial 
responsibility, it was expected that in areas of high political saliency it would prove 
difficult to maintain an 'arm's length' relationship. Ministers would be likely to 
interfere in operational decisions. This would lead to confusion about the roles and 
responsibilities of ministers, departments and agencies resulting in problematic 
relationships and difficulties in delivering government goals. 
This prediction appeared to be dramatically supported by the difficulties faced by 
the Child Support Agency (CSA) and the Prison Service Agency. The first Chief 
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Executive of the CSA, Ros Hepplewhite, resigned following several critical reports 
about the implementation of the Government's child support policies. Derek Lewis, 
the first Chief Executive of the Prison Service Agency was sacked by the Home 
Secretary, Michael Howard, following a critical report on the circumstances which 
led up to escapes from two high security prisons. Howard justified sacking his 
Chief Executive by saying the report indicated operational problems and did not 
criticise his Ministerial policy decisions. 
Both these examples appear to illustrate the difficulty of imposing the agency 
concept on politically contentious areas of government. Both led to a clearly 
identifiable breakdown in relationships between minister, department and agency 
and to problematic implementation. Yet a number of features suggest this analysis, 
although accurate, provides only a partial explanation. The research will suggest a 
more complex approach. Firstly, some areas where a high level of politicisation 
was expected have not produced difficult relationships, for example the Benefits 
Agency. Secondly, politicisation may occur, not because of the policy area, but 
because of the relationships between agencies and departments. 
The theoretical framework used to address these questions is that of power 
dependency and the concept of policy networks within a historical institutionalist 
approach. It is argued that the introduction of agencies was path dependent with 
new rules and roles overlaid on traditional understandings of the rules of the game. 
The new institutional arrangements led to a transfer of resources from departments 
to agencies. The change in the distribution of resources in central government 
caused by the move to agencies in government has altered power dependent 
relationships and has led to the creation of new department-agency networks. The 
research will argue that policy outcomes, the nature of the success or failure of 
agencies in delivering services, depends on the nature of the relationships that exist 
between departments and agencies. 
Relationships between departments and agencies vary greatly. In some, sections 
of departments have been hived-off more or less intact, and very formalised 
relations have been maintained. In others, agencies have been created and the 
nature of the relationship has been much more open to negotiation. Heclo and 
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Wildavsky (1981), and, more recently, Thain and Wright (1995), stress the 
importance on the policy process of strong inter-personal relationships and a sense 
of shared culture in 'intra-state' relationships between central and spending 
Departments. Reports by Fraser (Efficiency Unit 1991), Trosa (1994), and Massey 
(1995) highlight the importance of the relationship between parent departments 
and agencies, note tensions and recommend measures to encourage shared 
culture and values. This thesis will argue that, for the new agency-department 
relationships to work well, there have to be established institutional links, some 
sharing of values and culture and an agreement on goals and outcomes. Where 
this has occurred department-agency networks are able to manage the tension 
caused by the policy operational split in the agency arrangements. 
This research will assess the impact of the development of Next Steps agencies on 
government, the nature of the relationships that have developed between agencies 
and departments and the success of agencies in delivering departments' policy 
goals. The key argument is that it is the nature of the relationships between 
agencies and departments and not the political saliency of the policy area which 
affects the success of the agencies in delivering policy. 
Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter two will review the literature on agencies. Initially the chapter will examine 
the introduction of agencies into government. This highlights how the concept of 
agencies drew on existing constitutional practices (relying on hierarchical 
relationships), and from principal agent theory (introducing an arm's length 
relationship). Next the literature on agencies is surveyed to seek to guage the 
extent and nature of change. This assessment suggests uncertainty as to the 
impact of agencies on government and also indicates gaps in the literature. Firstly, 
a lack of focus on and understanding of department-agency relationships and 
secondly, that existing explanations do not account for why some relationships 
have worked better than others. The final part of the chapter makes an analysis of 
existing approaches in the literature. The chapter will conclude by suggesting 
empirical work to address the questions identified above needs to provide a 
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disaggregated account, to take a state-centric approach and requires a more 
theoretical ly-driven analysis of power. 
Chapter three will outline the chosen analytical anchors for this study. It argues that 
the idea of resource dependency and policy networks are helpful in addressing the 
questions raised in Chapter two. It will discuss how these approaches can be 
applied and how to deal with critiques of the concept of policy networks. This will 
point to the need to link these meso level theories with historical institutionalism at a 
macro level, the use of a multiple case study methodology and the need to address 
empirical material thematically. The chapter concludes by drawing attention to 
questions raised about the theory which empirical work may be able to address. 
Chapter four will look more closely at the context of the introduction of agencies into 
government drawing on the ideas of historical institutionalism. it will examine the 
role of the Next Steps Team, the Treasury and the departmental responses of the 
three departments studied in this research, the Department of Social Security 
(DSS), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Home Office. This 
chapter will examine how dependency between actors in the core executive 
operated in the introduction of agencies. It suggests 'path dependency' in the 
development of the agency concept. Both the existing institutional arrangements 
and departmental contexts influenced the formal and informal arrangements 
established to manage the department-agency relationships. 
Chapter five will examine the agencies chosen for the multiple case study and their 
goals. Before the case study agencies are presented there is a discussion on how 
to identify the goals of an agency and assess their saliency. The seven chosen 
agencies are introduced, setting out their key features (size, and type), their 
organisational history and the saliency of their goals. In concluding, similarities and 
differences between the saliency of the, agencies' goals and the extent to which 
there was goal agreement will be assessed. 
Chapter six will explore the changing distribution of resources introduced through 
the introduction of agency arrangements and the dependency this creates between 
ministers, departments and agencies. Initially the impact of the changed institutional 
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arrangements on the distribution of resources in government is discussed. This 
looks across the case study agencies in general to examine who holds what 
resources and who needs what resources following agencification. This is followed 
by a case by case analysis of each department-agency dependency. This will 
make an assessment of the level of this dependency on a continuum from low to 
high. 
Chapter seven focuses on the processes of exchange between ministers, 
departments and agencies and at how the dependency relationship was managed. 
Initially looking at all the case study agencies it examines the influence of formal 
arrangements set out in the framework documents, of departmental procedures, 
and cross-governmental initiatives. Informal networks and role understanding are 
also examined. Then a case by case analysis examines the way each department 
and agency manage their relationship in practice. 
Chapter eight explores what kind of department-agency networks have been 
established and how these networks impacted on outcomes. It takes information 
from earlier chapters, on agency goals, history, dependency and processes of 
exchange with parent department and links this with the Marsh and Rhodes 
typology of network characteristics, (1 992a, 251). It addresses whether fieldwork in 
the case study agencies supports the expectations of the multiple case study and 
provides support for the idea that network characteristics are linked to successful 
implementation. It concludes by examining in what other ways department-agency 
networks can be seen as impacting on policy outcomes. 
key findings of the research. It addresses the question The conclusion sets out the ke 
of what has been the impact of agencies on government, how can department- 
agency relationships be understood, and why do some work better than others. It 
argues that the introduction of agencies into government must be seen as path 
dependent. New institutional arrangements were superimposed on existing formal 
and informal understandings. This created a tension between the administrative 
goal of agencies operating at arm's length and the continuation of traditional 
accountability arrangements. 
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The new arrangements altered the rules of the game, the roles participants were 
expected to play and the distribution of resources in central government. The 
changed distribution of resources led to the formation of power dependent 
bureaucratic networks between departments and agencies. Where these networks 
were well integrated agencies were successful in implementing government goals 
because they had a shared view of the policy problems faced and how to solve 
them. The final section of this chapter discusses the implications of viewing 
department-agency relationships as networks for using the theoretical framework, 
for policy making in the core executive and for normative questions of agencies' 
governance. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
FROM HIERARCHY TO CONTRACT - CHANGING 
RELATIONSHIPS IN GOVERNMENT 
Introduction 
It is over ten years since the first Next Steps agencies (NSAs), operating at arm's 
length from departments, were set up in government. The introduction of agencies 
has radically altered the structural and cultural geography of central government, 
yet there has been surprisingly little empirical work assessing the impact of 
agencies on government and the policy process. This chapter looks at the 
introduction of agencies into government, at questions raised by the change and at 
how the existing literature on agencies addresses these questions. 
This chapter is in three parts. The first part sets out the context of reform. It begins 
by outlining the pre-existing traditional relationships in Whitehall which were 
underpinned by constitutional theory. It then sets out the agenda for change. Next, 
the chapter looks at how the agency concept was received in Whitehall, and how 
ideas stemming from contemporary management theories were applied to the 
delivery of government goals. 
The second part of the chapter examines the literature on agencies to make an 
assessment of the extent and nature of change. This assessment suggests 
inconclusive evidence about the impact of agencies on relationships in government 
and on the policy process. This section of the chapter highlights two questions not 
addressed in the literature: firstly, how can relationships between departments and 
agencies be understood and secondly, why some of these relationships have 
worked well and others have been problematic, leading to implementation 
diff iculties. 
The final part of the chapter analyses existing approaches in the literature. It 
examines the bureau shaping approach, classifications of agencies and empirical 
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work on agencification. It is argued that there are problems in using existing 
approaches to address the questions above. The chapter concludes by arguing for 
an analysis which takes a disaggregated approach, which acknowledges the state- 
centric nature of relationships and which sees power as relational. 
The Context of Reform 
The British system of government is often described as a centralised unitary state 
(Campbell and Wilson, 1995; Smith, 1999a), involving notions of parliamentary 
sovereignty, cabinet government and a neutral and permanent civil service. In fact 
two (maybe more) differing models are discernible within this overall constitutional 
picture. Before looking at the agenda for reform through the introduction of 
agencies, these models will be outlined, as they illustrate the underlying normative 
principles and practices of traditional relationships in government. These principles 
and practices have been linked to the hierarchical structure of government which 
was said to have existed pre-agencification. 
Traditional relationships in government 
The 'Westminster model" 
The first is what might be called the Westminster model stemming directly from 
constitutional theory (Smith, 1999a; Rhodes, 1997). This places the sovereignty of 
Parliament at the centre of the analysis, acting to legitimise and scrutinise the 
actions of the executive in carrying out the wishes of the electorate expressed 
through the electoral mandate granted to the majority party. This is an idealised 
conception which relies on the unwritten constitution and is strongly normative 
placing a high value on the notion of representative democracy. Broadly, the role of 
Ministers is to carry out manifesto promises under the scrutiny of Parliament and 
supported by a permanent and neutral bureaucracy. The doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility underpins executive accountability to Parliament (Drewry, 1994). The 
role of civil servants is to advise on policy options, to implement and carry out policy 
choices and to facilitate the provision of information to enable Ministers to account 
to Parliament for their actions and for the actions of their departments. Hence, the 
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hierarchical and command nature of the traditional departmental structure. 
Dowding suggests this provides the appropriate structure to fulfil the Weberian ideal 
bureaucracy prioritising the values of equity and accountability (Dowding 1995a). 
Power in this idealised model is seen as a zero sum game, in which ministers have 
the power to control and command bureaucrats implementing their policy choices. 
The accuracy of the Westminster model as a description of how the policy process 
works has been subject to extensive critique. Empirical studies of the policy 
process have indicated that Parliament does not have a powerful role in the policy 
process due to the strength of party whips and the rise in government activity. 
Most accounts locate power as lying with the executive and examine power 
relations between Prime Minister and cabinet (Smith 1999a). Nevertheless, Judge 
argues that the role of Parliament is important, acting as an normative standard and 
having a symbolic importance (Judge 1993). The importance of the 'Westminster 
model' is primarily through legitimation and the authority it lends to the concepts of 
accountability to Parliament and ministerial responsibility. These concepts, it is 
suggested, are important when looking at both more realistic conceptions of how 
central government operates and when making an assessment of the changes 
introduced by Next Steps. 
The 'Whitehall model" 
The Whitehall model presents a more realistic conception of the relationships in 
central government. It suggests a less active understanding of the role of 
Parliament in the policy process and a more interactive relationship between 
ministers and civil servants. This is the view that Rhodes suggests members of the 
executive, senior opposition politicians and senior civil servants hold of themselves 
(Rhodes 1997). It is typified in the accounts of retired civil servants of their role 
(Chipperfield 1994; Kemp 1998,6 - 7). It is the model on which many public 
administration and political science accounts are based, developing out of critiques 
of the 'Westminster model' (Barberis 1995; Wilson and Barker 1993; Foster and 
Plowden 1996). It shares many understandings of the constitutional aspects of the 
Westminster model such as the acceptance of majority party government and of 
ministerial responsibility and accountability to Parliament. Judge argues "The belief 
that a minister alone is in some sense responsible for the performance of an 
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administrative department is the principle around which the British central state has 
been organised and around which the relationship between elected representatives 
and non-elected bureaucrats has been defined" (Judge 1993,135). The Whitehall 
model, however, places less emphasis on the importance of the role of Parliament. 
Greater emphasis placed on the power and responsibilities of government and the 
need for strong government to as the guardian of the national well being. This 
leads to a subtle difference in how the civil service role is perceived. 
The Whitehall model, sees senior civil servants as playing much more of an active 
role in the policy process. Departments and civil servants are seen to be more 
powerful because of their ability to mobilise resources to implement policies, and 
their command over information, given their comparative longevity in office (Rose, 
1991). This permanence means it is the civil servants who transmit the cultural 
rules and norms of behaviour (Chipperfield 1994). Although their role is informed 
by the Haldane principle of neutrality, it is expected they will provide 'highly political' 
if impartial advice (Wilson and Barker 1993). Thus they are described as 'policy 
partners' (Judge 1993,147; Wilson and Barker 1995,132), as being able to speak 
truth to power (Barberis 1995) and as acting as a ballast to the state (Foster and 
Plowden 1997). 
In return for neutrality, confidentiality and loyalty to the serving Government, civil 
servants traditionally demanded anonymity (Pitt and Smith 1981,27; Public Service 
Committee 1996, v). It was ministers, not civil servants, who were accountable to 
Parliament. Thus, in the Whitehall conception, although the role of civil servants in 
the policy process is acknowledged to be more pro-active, an acceptance of the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility is maintained and it is the role of minister to be 
the ultimate policy-maker. Judge suggests, "[a]s long as officials sustain the belief 
in public that they are 'advisers' and ministers alone are the decision-makers 
accountable to Parliament, then the link between Whitehall and Westminster 
continues to flow through the political head of a department" (Judge 1993,153). 
This acceptance of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, as in the Westminster 
model, leads to an understanding of the need for hierarchical relationships to 
facilitate the upward flow of accountability and down-ward flow of command (Pitt 
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and Smith 1981,64). The convention of ministerial responsibility requires 
departments and officials to ensure that information is funnelled through a 
progressively narrowing hierarchy not only to facilitate the provision of information 
to Parliament but also so that problems which might embarrass the Minister or harm 
the Government can be identified and dealt with. 
In this way the constitutional and normative components underpinning the Whitehall 
model have been related to the structures of departments. Although not reflecting 
all departments across Whitehall (Pitt and Smith 1981 64; Hood, Dunsire and 
Thompson 1978), the traditional hierarchical pyramidal structure is said to have 
developed to facilitate a command relationship to support the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility (Dowding 1995a). These components inform understandings of the 
roles to be played by ministers and civil servants and the rules surrounding their 
interactions. As Smith argues "[b]oth the analysis and operation of central 
government has been underpinned by a set of principles that have been reinforced 
by historical practice" (Smith 1999b, 96). However these components of the 
'Whitehall model' also became subject to criticism and challenge (Wilson and 
Barker 1993; Smith 1999a). Questions about the role of bureaucracy, exogenous 
fiscal pressures and the application of management and organisational 
understandings to the study of government contributed to the development of a 
reform agenda. 
The reform agenda 
Next Steps agencies followed on from several initiatives designed to address 
perceived weaknesses in the operation of central government. The antecedents for 
reform, culminating in the establishment of agencies, stemmed from ideological, 
economic, theoretical and circumstantial pressures for change. These will be 
briefly outlined before focussing on the introduction of the agency concept. 
At both ends of the political spectrum, the role of civil servants has been subject to 
criticism which led to attempts to reform the civil service (IPPR 1991; Dowding 
1995a). The diaries of Labour Ministers in the sixties and seventies cast doubt on 
the impartiality and facilitative nature of Whitehall Mandarins. These critiques are 
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said to have influenced the Labour government in setting up the Fulton Committee 
in 1968 (Drewry 199,: 586). The Fulton Report drew attention to the need for 
greater management skills and called for greater flexibility in recruitment (Cmnd 
3638,1968). It also suggested the 'hiving off' of some government functions to 
executive agencies along the Swedish model, and a small number of departmental 
agencies such as the Property Services Agency and the Procurement Executive 
were established. The elitism of officials at the top of the civil service in thwarting 
the proposed reforms (Kellner and Crowther-Hunt 1979) added to ambivalence on 
the left about the existing 'Whitehall model' orthodoxy and the traditional role of civil 
servants operating under the Haldane principles. 
On the right, Mrs Thatcher was said to have been influenced by critiques of 
bureaucrats as budget maximisers (Niskanen 1973; Christoph 1992; Dowding 
1995a). These views, coupled with an ideological commitment to roll back the 
frontiers of the state led to an agenda, following the Conservative Government's 
election in 1979, which sought to curb the public sector and with it the influence of 
civil servants and their vested interests. Throughout the public sector, the discipline 
of the market was brought to bear, and where Government had to deliver (through 
statute or choice) private sector management techniques (such as the Financial 
Management Initiative, FMI) were introduced to improve efficiency (Pollitt 1990). 
Fiscal, economic and demographic pressures during the late seventies and eighties 
added to the pressure to eliminate waste and inefficiency in bureaucracy, 
"manpower reductions were now seen both in terms of economy and in the context 
of re-drawing the boundaries of the state" (Butler 1993,397). 
Following the election of the Conservative administration in 1979, Margaret 
Thatcher appointed Sir Derek Rayner (now Lord Rayner) to undertake efficiency 
scrutinies which illustrated the scope for efficiency savings and ultimately led to a 
White Paper, 'Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service' and the development 
of the Financial Management Initiative (FMI), (Cmnd 8616,1982). The report 
suggested all managers should have a clear view of objectives and measure 
outputs in relation to objectives. They should have responsibility for making the 
best use of resources involving a critical scrutiny of output, value for money and 
information about costs. There should be training and access to expert advice to 
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enable managers to exercise these responsibilities more effectively. The FMI led to 
the introduction of financial management systems so that responsibility for 
operational decisions was matched where possible with authority to commit 
resources. 
At the same time, the public administration and public policy literature, drawing on 
theories about implementation, rationality, organisational and cultural behaviour, 
drew attention to the complexity of bureaucratic activities and the inadequacy of 
hierarchical command as either a mode of operation or as an expression of reality 
(Ham and Hill 1997; Rhodes 1995; Dunsire 1995). The influence of this work, as 
well as increasing familiarity by civil servants with management techniques and 
applications through earlier reforms like Fulton, Management by Objectives (MBO) 
and the FMI, led to an internal constituency for change. The Next Steps reforms 
were welcomed by civil servants because they acknowledged frustration and 
reflected a more realistic way of delivering public services (Goldsworthy 1991,7; 
Dowding 1995a, 105). It is suggested that the juxtaposition of these exogenous 
economic and ideological pressures and internal readiness for change are 
important in understanding the context of the introduction of agencies and, more 
importantly, why agencies became so entrenched in government. 
Introducing the idea of agencies 
The idea of NSAs was proposed in a report to the Prime Minister by the Efficiency 
Unit, most commonly referred to as the Ibbs Report (after the Head of the Unit, Sir 
Robin Ibbs) (Efficiency Unit, 1988). The commissioning of the report was 
reportedly due to the Prime Ministers disappointment that existing measures to 
improve efficiency in central government were not proving fruitful (Hennessey 
1988). The 'Ibbs' Report was written by a small group of officials working within the 
Efficiency Unit following a ninety day scrutiny (Thain and Wright 1995, Goldsworthy 
1991). It was completed and shown to the Prime Minister in March 1987. The 
report, reputed to be critical of the extent of progress in management reform, was 
very sensitive, coming a few weeks before an election. The report was approved 
but ordered to be kept secret by Mrs Thatcher until after the election (Hennessey 
1988). This original version was said to have made radical recommendations 
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proposing extensive devolution of finance and personnel functions and a change in 
constitutional practice to move away from the doctrine of ministerial responsibility 
(Hennessey 1989). These recommendations led to resistance from the Treasury, 
ministers and departments. The final report together with the government's 
intentions was not presented to Parliament until nearly a year later in February 
1988. In the interim the recommendations of the original report had been subject to 
delay, intense negotiation and change. 
The proposed changes to accountability and the doctrine of ministerial responsibility 
alarmed the Prime Minister, a noted parliamentarian, and some ministers 
(Hennessey, 1988,621; Zifcak, 1994,72; Walker, Times, 14 July 1994). Ministers 
had been involved in discussions in October 1987, before final negotiations 
between Sir Peter Middleton and Robin Butler, the incoming Cabinet Secretary, on 
finance and accountability arrangements. Changes to accountability in the final 
version were far less extensive than had been mooted. (Hennessy, 1988). 
The Treasury was deeply suspicious of the potential impact of devolution and its 
consequent effect on public finances (Butler, 1988; Metcalfe and Richards, 1990; 
Chapman, 1997). It felt agencies would push for resources and undermine 
expenditure controls (Zifcak, 1994,71). Departments sought to take advantage of 
the chance to gain more control and Zifcak reports that discussion about the 
devolution of responsibilities was "soon sucked into the vortex of Treasury - 
department relationships" (Zifcak 1994,71). After these negotiations very little 
change in the existing financial arrangements was agreed, Hennessey concluded 
"The centre had not yielded one ounce of real power to the periphery" (1988,62 1). 
The Treasury negotiated to retain its control over the scrutiny of public expenditure 
and demanded the right to scrutinise candidates for agency status and to be 
involved in establishing the policy and resources framework (Zifcak 1994,82). 
The difficulty of winning departments over to the ideas in the Efficiency Units 
original report represented a further hurdle. Departments perceived the Next Steps 
agenda to be tied up with cutting the size of the civil service (Zifcak 1994,71). 
Zifcak's assessment was that departments fought off this agenda and pushed for 
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the Next Steps project to be about management improvement and not fundamental 
structural change to the shape of the civil service. 
After final negotiations between the Efficiency Unit Team, the Treasury and 
departments, the report went to back to a cabinet committee early in February 1988 
and was formally ratified on the morning of the announcement to Parliament (Burch 
and Holliday 1996). The intention to set up executive agencies was announced on 
18 February 1988 when the 'Ibbs Report' and its main recommendations were 
accepted in an announcement by the Prime Minister to the House of Commons 
(Hansard 18 February 1988). 
The lbbs Report 
The Report identified obstacles in the drive to improve management in Government 
relating to structural (i. e. formal organisation and rules) and cultural (i. e. perceptions 
of roles rules and responsibilities) features of the 'Whitehall model' outlined earlier. 
The report argued that the current organisation of the civil service was geared 
towards prioritising its policy responsibilities to Ministers to the neglect of the 
management of service delivery and an emphasis on the outcomes of public 
services. These cultural and structural features arose because the attention of 
those at the top of the hierarchy focused on their policy responsibilities to Ministers 
sending a signal throughout the civil service as a whole. This focus was not 
misplaced, it was the priority that ministers demanded and "the ability of Ministers 
supported by their senior officials to handle politics and political sensitivities 
effectively is a crucial part of any government's credibility" (Efficiency Unit 1988,4). 
However the present framework meant "a proper balance between policy and 
delivery is hard to achieve" (1988,3). 
The scrutiny team identified confusion in the roles of ministers and permanent 
secretaries over responsibility for better management in the civil service suggesting 
that ministers were overloaded and could do no more than set a broad lead in this 
direction. Finally, the report suggested that the civil service could not deliver its 
many and diverse functions under a single (hierarchical) model and recommended 
that, "Agencies should be established to carry out the executive functions of 
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Government within a policy and resource framework set by a Department" 
(Efficiency Unit, 1988 2). The report proposed changes to the roles of actors in 
government and to accountability arrangements. 
Changing roles 
Under the agency arrangements, ministers (guided by their permanent secretaries) 
would remain responsible for making and setting the policy framework and 
accountable to Parliament, enhancing these traditional roles through greater focus 
and clarity on these tasks and a reduction in the distractions of implementation 
management. 
For departments, the arrangements heralded a far greater change in their 
responsibilities (Zifcak, 1994). Departments were to have two roles, the traditional 
policy role offered to ministers (policy development and evaluation) and, "managing 
or influencing the delivery of government services" through the definition of the 
policy and resources framework, (Efficiency Unit, 1988,10). Thus departments' 
current responsibilities for, and oversight of,, policy implementation would transfer to 
agencies. This demanded new and changing roles for civil servants adding skills in 
setting and monitoring the framework within which agencies were to operate to their 
traditional roles of advising Ministers. Sir Peter Kemp, the first Next Steps Project 
Manager described the implication for Departments as a "move from management 
by command to one of management by contract" (Kemp, 1990 28). The report 
stressed however that the successful operation of agencies depended on 
departments ensuring "politically sensitive issues being handled sensitively", 
(Efficiency Unit, 1988,11) in order not to undermine the operational freedom of 
agencies. 
In the new agencies, chief executives were to be responsible for the execution of 
policy, accountable to ministers through responsibilities outlined in the Agency 
Framework Document and annual performance targets. Within this framework, the 
management of the agency should have as much freedom as possible. Like all 
agency staff, chief executives would remain civil servants (Goldsworthy, 1991). 
They would not necessarily be recruited from within the civil service, however, or 
be paid civil service rates, and were to be appointed on fixed term contracts. Unlike 
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traditional civil servants, chief executives were expected to have a higher profile 
and would be given "personal responsibility" for achieving results and "must be 
seen to be accountable for doing so" (Efficiency Unit 1988,10). Thus the role of 
chief executives indicated a fundamental shift from the 'Haldane' principles of 
anonymity and permanence and become one of the most closely observed features 
of the changes introduced by agency status. 
Changes to accountability 
When published, the lbbs Report suggested that the creation of agency chief 
executives with responsibility for operational issues would require an extension of 
accountability arrangements, a diminution of the concept of ministerial responsibility 
and an acceptance of the fact that ministers could not know every operational 
detail. The report argued that these changes might require legislation. The 
proposed changes to accountability conventions were set out in an annex to the 
report, written by Sir Kenneth Stowe who was on secondment to the Cabinet Office. 
Annex A proposed that the extent of changes to accountability arrangements would 
depend upon whether the agency was part of a department or free-standing. For 
agencies which remained part of government departments, ministers would be 
accountable for policy and ultimately operations, but what was required was "the 
establishment of a convention that heads of executive agencies would have 
delegated authority from their Ministers for operations of agencies within the 
framework of policy directives and resource allocations prescribed by Ministers" 
(Efficiency Unit, 1988,17). Agency chief executive heads, just as with existing 
officials, could give evidence to select committees about their operational 
responsibilities. Members of Parliament (MPs) would be asked to write directly to 
agency or local managers on operational matters. Thus this account of how 
accountability would work under the 'convention', required an acceptance of the 
distinction of policy and operational matters upon which the 'Next Steps' philosophy 
relied. Where agencies were formed outside government, appropriate forms of 
accountability would need to be established as was the case in other areas of the 
public sector and this would require legislation. 
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The government's 'Next Steps' policy 
The government's Next Steps policy stated "[t]o the greatest extent practicable, the 
executive functions of Government should be carried out by units clearly designated 
within departments and referred to as agencies, the functions of each agency would 
be carried out within a policy and resources framework set by ministers" (Kemp 
1990(b), 188). At a press conference after the presentation of the lbbs Report to 
Parliament, it was made clear that the idea of setting up Next Steps agencies to 
operate at arm's length would not alter the doctrine of ministerial responsibility 
(Hennessy, 1989,621). Paragraph 23 of the lbbs Report, which suggested an 
across the board legislative change to accountability arrangements, had not been 
accepted by the Government, (Treasury and Civil Service Committee, HC 494, 
1998,13). Accountability through ministerial responsibility would remain 
unchanged, but would be buttressed through a 'conventional understanding' that 
chief executives would have delegated authority from their ministers for agency 
operations (Efficiency Unit, 1988, Annex A). This reflected both politicians' 
concerns about accountability but also battles with departments about the extent to 
which the Next Steps project would lead to agencies outside departments and 
hence new and statutory accountability procedures. 
Burch and Holliday argue the Next Steps policy was driven by a small number of 
officials at the centre backed by the endorsement of the Prime Minister (1995, 
230). Yet at the same time, because of the involvement of cabinet ministers in the 
autumn of 1987, which prompted further protracted and difficult negotiations, Zifcak 
argues the policy process was politically driven (1995,72). The Treasury and 
departments all had a strong influence in the details of the arrangements for 
financing and accountability. The multiple parentage of the policy as it developed 
reflects the complex bargaining which took place over the allocation of resources 
and effect on roles. The collection of ideas that came to be presented as the 'Next 
Steps' concept can be seen to reflect the debates and compromises during this 
gestation period. 
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Key features of the agency concept 
The agency concept is built on two key features 
responsibilities from operational responsibilities. 
Firstly, a separation of policy 
Metcalfe suggests this was to 
emulate the divide between strategic management and operational management in 
contemporary management prescriptions (Metcalfe 1993,361). Greer suggests that 
the premise was drawn from agency theory whereby contracts are introduced in 
order for the principal (or purchaser) to control the agent (or provider) (Greer 1994, 
13). The introduction of quasi-contracts set out in Framework Documents was seen 
as addressing the 'myth' of ministerial responsibility and aimed to make more 
transparent the links in the accountability chain which had previously been quite 
obscure (Davis, 1994). The use of framework documents invoked a move from 
hierarchical relationships to a 'core periphery' model (Metcalfe and Richards 1990), 
or a more federal service (Goldsworthy 1991,3). 
Secondly, however, the arrangements maintained an acceptance of the sovereignty 
of Parliament (Hansard 19 February 1988). Although the new arrangements sought 
an extension of the processes of accountability to encourage chief executives to 
take personal responsibility for the performance of agencies, ultimately it accepted 
that ministers were responsible for policy, and that "[flor agencies which are 
government departments or parts of departments, ultimate accountability for 
operations must also rest with ministers" (Efficiency Unit, 1988, Annex A). Thus the 
existing constitutional principles including that of ministerial responsibility, were to 
be undisturbed. 
For agency protagonists, these two features would improve both the operational 
and policy making functions of government. The creation of agencies under the 
visible leadership of a Chief Executive would enhance the priority given to 
management issues and encourage a more customer-orientated service. At the 
same time, Ministers would be freed to concentrate on policy making yet would 
remain under parliamentary scrutiny. 
This appeal to constitutionality was essential to meet the critique of the 'Whitehall 
model' by parliamentarians on both the left and the right. The reforms offered the 
22 
possibility for more explicit democratic control, satisfying a left agenda, and financial 
control appealing to the right. At the same'time the rationality and transparency of 
the operating arrangements designed to deal with overload appealed to ministers 
and civil servants. It maintained the legitimacy of ministers' involvement at all 
levels whilst stating this should not be necessary. It addressed issues raised by 
academic observers about the problems of implementation which recognised the 
diversity of government functions and the relevance of organisational and 
management theories when seeking to improve delivery. 
The reform sought to introduce a 'quasi-contractual' relationship whilst at the same 
time maintaining the constitutional conventions of ministerial accountability and 
responsibility. This compromise is the reason for the widespread acceptance of 
the Ibbs reforms. The proposals appeared to satisfy each constituency for reform. 
The juxtaposition of the ideas of ministerial accountability and responsibility and the 
separation of policy and operational decisions was, however, seen by many as the 
fault line that ran through the agency concept (Theakston, 1995). It was thought it 
would cause irreconcilable difficulties in implementing the agency concept in 
practice. The accuracy of this analysis is discussed below. 
The Extent and Nature of Change 
The second part of this chapter examines the literature on agencies to try to build 
an assessment of the extent and nature of change introduced by agencification. 
Initially the development of agencies in departments is described. 
The development of agencies in government 
In the summer of 1987 departments were approached and asked to nominate 
candidates and by October 1987 12 candidates had been identified'. At the launch 
of the report in February 1988, Peter Kemp was appointed as the project manager 
1 Vehicle Inspectorate; Driver and Vehicle Licensing; Companies House; Employment 
Service; Meteorological Office; Non-nuclear research Establishments; Passport Office,; 
HMSO; Historic Royal Palaces; Royal Parks; QE 11 Conference Centre; Resettlement Units. 
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working with a small team of officials in the Cabinet Office. At a Treasury and Civil 
Service Committee enquiry into Next Steps in May 1988 Peter Kemp expressed the 
hope that 75% of the Civil Service would be in Agencies in 10 years (Cm 524 1988). 
The first agency, the Vehicle Inspectorate was launched on 1 August 1988, the 
second, Companies House, on 1 October 1988. 
As part of an agency's establishment, a 'prior options process' examines whether 
the function should be abolished, privatised, market tested, contracted out or is 
suitable for agency statuS2. Subsequently the operating arrangements are set out 
in a Framework Document which specifies: the aims and objectives of the agency; 
its relations with Parliament, ministers, the parent department, other Departments 
and other agencies; its financial responsibilities; how performance is to be 
measured; and the extent to which personnel functions such as pay, training and 
industrial relations are delegated (Greer, 1992,89 - 90). 
Hogwood indicates the variety of organisational histories of the agencies and 
argues "Any idea that Next Steps agencies are only about carving up separately 
identifiable executive tasks from previously monolithic departments should be 
abandoned immediately" (Hogwood 1993,6). Departmental structures did not 
reflect the hierarchical and pyramidical structure depicted by the 'Whitehall model'. 
Nationalisation, organisational changes in departments (including 'hiving off' in 
response to the Fulton Report, and the creation of 'departmental agencies' with a 
degree of autonomy in finanacial and management matters) as well as the 
existence of departments not headed by ministers, led to a more complex 
organisational picture pre agencies (Tirvey 1973; Pitt and Smith 1981; Hood, 
Dunsire and Thompson 1978). 
The development of agencies reflected this diversity. Some agencies represented 
pre-existing divisions within departments, such as the Benefits Agency, or the 
Prison Service Agency, others represented smaller or specialist functions, like the 
Laboratories and the Fire and Civil Service Colleges. Only one, the CSA (and its 
Scottish and Northern Irish counterparts) was created from scratch to provide the 
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operational arm to service new legislation undertaking a fundamentally new type of 
operation. Departmental attitudes to the reform process are said to have been 
important in how quickly agencies were established (Flynn et al, 1990,167) and in 
how they formed and developed (Greer 1994; IPPR 1991,29; Gray and Jenkins 
1993). In some cases, for example in the Department of Transport and the DSS, the 
initiative promoted an organisational change already favoured,. Other departments 
were more reluctant (Flynn 1990,167). 
Over the following ten years the number of agencies and the consequent proportion 
of the civil service working in agencies gradually grew3. This was aided by the 
establishment of the three biggest agencies - the Employment Service, the Benefits 
Agency and the Prison Service - in 1990,1991 and 1993 respectively. By 1997, 
the target of 75% of staff working in agencies had been reached and the first 
Agency Review undertaken by the new Labour Administration announced an end to 
the phase of agency establishment (Cm 3889 1998). 
There was concern initially that, as agencies became more autonomous and 
business-like that the possibility for agencies to be a half-way house for privatisation 
was apparent (TCSC 1988, HC 494; TCSC 1989, HC 348). Nigel Lawson's 
memoirs indicate his initial response to the agency proposal was that it could 
provide a vehicle for preparedness to sell functions (Lawson, 1993,393). The prior 
options process undertaken before establ. ishing an agency was said initially to 
signify a decision not to privatise (Cm 542 1988,7; Goldsworthy, 1991 19). 
However, following the election of the Major government in 1992, a shift in direction 
was signalled with the extension of market testing into central government and an 
announcement of an across-the-board intention to consider privatisation 
(Waldegrave Daily Telegraph, 2 June 1992; Dorrell Centre for Policy Studies, 23 
November 1993; Gains, 1999). By the time of the 1997 election however, there 
were 137 agencies in operation and only a further 11 had been privatised (Next 
Steps Unit 1997). Although the new Labour government has changed its pre- 
2 This prior options process is repeated, initially every three years now every five years and 
amalgamation is now included in the options to be considered (Cm 2627,1994; Efficiency 
Unit 1994) 
25. 
election anti-privatisation stance, there are no indications that privatisation is a 
primary policy goal (Foster 1996,19; Cm 3889,1998). 
The impact of reform 
Changes to departments 
The lbbs Report had huge implications for the organisation and work of 
departments and demanded a fundamental change in their role (Zifcak, 1994,87). 
There has been little academic work examining the impact of agencification on 
departments. As Barberis points out, because of the focus on accountability and on 
development in agencies, "core departments have therefore been somewhat 
overshadowed by the twin towers of agencies and ministers" (Barberis 1993). Yet 
departments are the main source of policy and much of the routine day to day 
negotiating will happen between departments and agencies subject only to final 
approval by Ministers (Rose, 1987; Smith, 1999a). 
Although academic attention has been scant, throughout the period of 
agencification, there was concern at the centre of government about how well 
departments were adjusting to the new arrangements and the relationships which 
were developing between departments and agencies. This concern prompted a 
series of official investigations and recommendations (Cm 1263,1990). A follow-up 
report by the Efficiency Unit examined progress and made proposals on the 
relationship between departments and agencies (Efficiency Unit, 1991). The report 
(known as the Fraser Report) argued for greater delegation of responsibilities for 
Chief Executives. It identified the need for different types of relationships between 
departments and agencies depending upon an agency's function. It recommended 
the appointment of a senior focal point in each department for its dealings with 
agencies. This role came to be known as the 'Fraser figure. The Report argued 
for the need for a re-assessment of the staffing requirements of core departments 
and suggested that a 25% cut was necessary given the loss of functions to 
agencies. 
3 Appendix 1 shows the overall number of agencies established in each year, the number of 
agency privatisations and the proportion of civil servants working in agencies and along 
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This reduction in the size of departments was subsequently enforced, beginning 
with the introduction in November 1993 of a three year freeze on running costs and 
the expectation that each department would undertake a Fundamental Expenditure 
Review (FER). This was followed by two White Papers on the future of the Civil 
Service which envisaged a leaner, flatter management structure and required a 
review of management structures (Cm 2627,1994; Cm 2748 1995). This led to a 
Senior Management Review (SMR) in all departments and, together with the FER 
resulted in changes to the structure of departments, a stripping out of grades and 
the creation of a new Senior Civil Service for the top officials at grade five and 
above including ACEs. The SIVIR resulted in staff cuts averaging 23 per cent 
(Parry, Hood and James 1997). 
Over the ten years since the first agencies were established there have 
undoubtedly been enormous changes to the shape and size of departments. This 
effect is not uniform, however, and there are clear departmental differences. There 
are agencies in all departments although the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
has only one, the Wilton Park Conference Centre, which is one of the smallest with 
only 37 staff. In contrast, the DSS has 98% of its staff in agencies including the 
biggest, the Benefits Agency with over 66,000 staff (Cm 4273,1999). The extent of 
agencification within each department varies considerably both in comparison with 
each other and over time due to the effect of new agencies being formed and to 
privatisations and mergers (Cm 3579,1997, Annex b). Given the extent in changes 
to departments since agencification and the importance of departments' roles in the 
policy process, the impact on departments and the differentiated nature of change 
requires further investigation. 
Agency financing 
Agencification has led to changes in the way operations are financed which over 
time have become significant. Agencies are financed in one of three ways (Cm 
914,1989; Cm 1904, - 1993; Chapman, 1997). Agencies which cannot raise their 
own finance are funded through the supply procedure, operating under gross 
expenditure control with running costs fixed. This means they have little more 
financial freedom than that offered in pre-agency status although their accounts 
Next Steps lines. 
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may appear separately in the department's public expenditure survey estimate. 
Some agencies which can raise their own revenue, either from fees or charges, 
also operate as part of the supply procedure, but under 'net costs control'. This 
means the agencies are expected to recover their running costs and receipts and 
savings can be used to fund additional administrative expenditure. 
One of the first tasks Kemp undertook after being appointed Next Steps Project 
Manager was to negotiate with the Treasury over how those agencies which could 
raise their own revenue could move towards 'trading fund' status and so allow far 
greater freedom. Trading funds are taken out of the vote system and are able to 
carry over profits one year with another, to build up reserves and to acquire assets, 
"a very commercial way of going about things but with parliamentary control" (Kemp 
HC 348,1989,13). The Government Trading Act 1990 introduced amendments to 
earlier legislation, permitting agencies to be established as trading funds with the 
agreement of the Treasury. This was the only formal piece of primary legislation 
which applied to the agency concept. 
Pay and Personnel Delegations 
Pay and personnel arrangements have also, over time, significantly changed. One 
of the key intentions of the Next Steps reforms was to move away from national pay 
bargaining (Kessler 1993,334). Kemp argued "the whole object of Next Steps was 
to tailor the whole system better to get the job done and to recruit, reward and retain 
people at the appropriate level to do the job" (TSCS HC 481,1990,52). Since the 
first agencies were established there has been significant change in the extent of 
permitted delegation from virtually none at the outset to extensive currently. As the 
first agencies were established various flexibilities were possible including the use 
of bonus schemes on a group or individual basis. Kessler suggests these were not 
taken advantage of due to union resistance (1993). These flexibilities were 
extended by the Treasury in 1989 and again in 1991 to permit the possibility that 
agencies (and departments) could recruit staff below grade seven (Chapman 1997, 
133). Since 1994 this delegation has not been optional but all departments and 
agencies must take responsibility for their own pay and recruitment for staff below 
grade seven (Cm 2626,1994) 
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Appointment of Chief Executives 
The appointment of ACES through open competition and on fixed term contracts 
was one of the most closely observed features of the new arrangements and one 
which signified a radical break with previous personnel practices. The Next Steps 
Team always provides a breakdown of the number of internally and externally 
appointed ACES in post, for example by 1997, of the 130 agencies in operation, 90 
were appointed through open competition of which 33 were external, 54 internal 
and 3 military candidates. Twenty one others were internal appointments and there 
were 19 armed forces appointments (Next Steps Team, 1997). 
Cultural changes 
The encouragement of cultural change through the introduction of more business- 
like arrangements and the appointment of outsiders on fixed term contracts was 
one of the stated objectives of the Next Steps reforms, (Carter and Greer 1993, 
407; Richards and Rodriques 1993,35; Christoph 1992). Again, empirical work 
presents a variable picture. Some work suggests that a new managerial culture is 
apparent and embedded across the civil service (Mellon TCSC 1990; Metcalfe 
1993,355 - 369; Wilson and Barker 1995 140 - 3; Colville Dalton and Tomkins 
1993,562; Campbell and Wilson 1995,298; Christoph 1992,179). 
Concerns were expressed in the academic literature about the effect of 
fragmentation and managerialism on the traditional ethos of the civil service 
(Greenaway, 1995; Chapman 1988, Barberis, 1995 113). The appointment of high 
profile chief executives both from within and outside the civil service was expected 
to have an impact on the role of the permanent secretary. The visibility of the chief 
executive was in stark contrast to the anonymity and invisibility expected of civil 
servants under the Haldane principles. Permanent secretaries would no longer be 
"monopolisers of channels of advice", but would have to take on a "policy 
orchestration role" facing the possibility of chief executives appealing straight to the 
minister (Barberis, 1995). It was argued this new role could lead to a loss of the 
institutionalised scepticism which characterised the 'Whitehall model' and less 
impartial and critical advice to ministers. Barberis feared that the utilitarianism of 
the Next Steps project "could have as one of its consequences the inculcation 
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among officers of a narrower, self-focussing rationality to replace the detached 
brokers of yesteryear" (Barberis, 1995,114). 
But the extent of cultural change is also questioned, (Barberis, 1995,102: Greer, 
1994,101-- Plowden, 1994,48). Sir Peter Kemp, the sacked first Next Steps 
Manager has suggested that, "[a]t the centre, in Whitehall, old attitudes and the old 
guard prevails", Kemp, 1993). Empirical work with Chief Executives has found 
cultural differences between departments and agencies (Mellon, 1993, Massey, 
1995). This was also identified by a second Government report (Trosa Report, 
1994) examining whether the recommendations of the Fraser Report had been 
implemented. This found a cultural gap between departments and agencies and 
recommended improvements in the governance arrangements between 
departments and agencies. The report suggested for example, the establishment of 
ministerial advisory boards, better use of the Fraser Figure, and organisational 
remedies such as better mobility and networking between Departments and 
Agencies. As with work examining structural changes, the extent and impact of 
cultural changes presents a differentiated picture. 
Changes to accountability and governance 
The new operating arrangements provided for improved accountability through 
greater openness and information (Greer, 1995). Along with the framework 
document, agencies publish annual corporate and/or business plans containing 
their detailed plans for achieving the aims and objectives requested by ministers in 
their Framework Documents. Since 1991 Agencies were also required to produce 
an Annual Report giving information about how far they met their targets, their 
governance and financial arrangements (TSCS, HC 496,1991). 
Nevertheless, concerns were voiced by politicians and those concerned with 
constitutionality who foresaw an 'accountability gap' (Plowden 1994; Drewy 1994; 
TCSC, HC 494,1988; TCSC HC 348 1989; Chapman, 1988). The agency concept 
altered traditional accountability procedures without providing the legal and 
administrative alternatives operating in other countries with 'arm's length' agencies, 
for example Sweden (Fry et al, 1988). The arrangements relied on acceptance of 
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the convention that Chief Executives would be accountable and responsible to the 
minister for their operational activities. In turn, the minister was accountable to 
Parliament under the convention of ministerial responsibility. The Next Steps 
philosophy, however, emphasised that Ministers could not be expected to know 
every administrative detail of the agencies' details - and indeed the point of Next 
Steps was to remove that responsibility, so Ministers could only remain accountable 
in the sense of giving information on agencies but would remain responsible for 
policy issues. This led to the question of how could the legislature hold Chief 
Executives accountable and responsible for their operational activities as a result of 
policy. 
Parliamentary questions 
The original Next Steps arrangements envisaged that MPs' parliamentary questions 
on operational matters would be diverted to Chief Executives for reply, offering an 
improvement in accountability as they would receive fuller, quicker and more 
informed replies (Efficiency Unit, 1988). This was felt unsatisfactory by many 
parliamentarians who used parliamentary Questions (PQs) in a symbolic fashion to 
seek the informal redress of grievance, generate media interest and research 
material (Norton, 1988;, Kaufman 1992, Guardian; Gains, 1990). This criticism 
became most vocal after the two big agencies involving a high level of 
correspondence about individual cases, the Employment Agency and the Benefits 
Agency, began operations in 1990 and 1991 respectively (TCSC 1990). Eventually 
concessions were made - initially a copy of Chief Executives replies to MPs were 
placed in the House of Commons Library (Cm 1263,1990) and then the 
government announced replies would be published in Hansard JCSC HC 390, 
1992 207). 
Agency accounting officers 
The agency concept prompted a change in the accounting officer conventionS4 . The 
permanent secretary of a department is the principal accounting officer, but specific 
4 Accounting Officers carry a personal responsibility for the propriety and regularity of public 
finances for which they are answerable. An Accounting Officer has a duty to sign the 
accounts for which he/she is responsible and to answer questions about those accounts 
raised by the National Audit Officer or the Committee of Public Accounts. If an Accounting 
Officer believes a proposed Ministerial course of action would be improper or irregular or 
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responsibility for a defined area of the department's work can be assigned to an 
additional accounting officer (Chapman, 1998). The TCSC pointed out that if chief 
executives were given delegated responsibility for their budgets they should hold 
the same financial accountability as additional accounting officers (HC 494 1988). 
Their suggestion led to new proposals and subsequent legislation (the Government 
Trading Act), permitting agency chief executives (ACEs) to be appointed either as 
additional accounting officers or agency accounting officers depending upon 
whether the agency had its own vote or was a trading fund (Cm 914 1989). The 
accounting officer role provides ACEs with one mechanism for publicly 
acknowledging a ministerial decision to ignore their advice. 
Chief executives attendance at and evidence to select committees 
Agency arrangements have not changed the rules surrounding civil servants 
attendance at select committee hearings set out in the Osmotherly MemorandUM5 
(HC 496,1991 xxlll; Public Service Committee, HC 67,1996). The TCSC and 
academic critics have argued consistently that the principle of ACEs attending 
select committees and answering for actions on their own behalf was essential to 
close the accountability gap (TCSC 494 1988; IPPR 1991; TCSC HC 390 19933 
TCSC HC 27,1994; Public Service Committee, HC 313,1996). If ministers were 
not responsible for operational activities then who could be held to account? For 
critics, this resulted in a situation where Chief Executives would be unable to defend 
themselves against criticism and ministers could hide behind Chief Executives to 
avoid taking full ministerial responsibility (First Division, TCSC 1988; IPPR, 1991; 
Woodhouse, 1995 261). This was thought unlikely to occur in those agencies 
which were at some distance from the core of Government, such as the first 12 
does not provide an efficient and effective use of resources and that advice is overruled, 
their objections can be set out in an Accounting Officer Minute setting out the reasons for 
the objections and the Accounting Officer's duty to inform the Comptroller and Auditor 
General should their advice be overruled. If the Minister should proceed then a written 
instruction is sought, the Accounting Officer must comply but will notify Treasury and the 
Comptroller and Auditor General. This is recognised by the Committee of Public Accounts 
to absolve the Accounting Officer of their personal responsibility. In giving evidence to the 
Committee on such occasions the Accounting Officer will not disclose the terms of the 
advice given and the Committee would be expected to pursue the matter with the Minister 
(Next Steps Team, 1996, Annex D1 -9). 
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agencies which were specifically picked as already operating at 'arm's length'. 
However all commentators agreed that there would be problems in implementing 
the agency conventions on accountability because of the difficulty of separating 
policy from operational matters in the bigger and more politically sensitive agencies. 
The policy - operational divide. 
There has been little work which looks at how the policy - operational split is 
working and how it has affected policy making. The main evidence comes from a 
follow-up to the Trosa Report which was commissioned by the Office of Public 
Service and Science (OPSS). The 'Massey Report' (Massey 1995(a) ) looked at 
how agencies fed into the policy process. The Report found differential access to 
ministers and varying relationships with departments, related to the type of agency. 
The report, reflecting the dominance of the Westminster model as a normative and 
organising frame of reference, focuses on agencies' relationships with ministers. 
Whilst recommending ways in which relationships could be improved, overall it 
concluded that 
"[t]he agency system has not constructed a false distinction between policy 
and management, however, but rather allowed policy makers a proper 
perspective of the importance of implementation for achieving their aims, 
whilst freeing them of onerous administrative oversight (Massey, 1995 (a), 
35)". 
This positive perspective is not reflected in other work which voiced normative 
concerns about the potential for practical and political problems caused by the 
introduction of a policy operational split drawing on the experience of earlier 
attempts to hive-off services (TCSC HC 494,1988; Hogwood 1994; Jordan 1994; 
Dudley 1994; Chipperfield 1994). An examination of the experience of arm's length 
control of the nationalised industries suggested there had been difficulties in the 
degree of interference by departments with consequent confusion over 
accountability. In giving evidence to the TCSC, Tirvey, an observer of the 
nationalised industries, suggested the problem lay in the belief that "the political or 
governmental level would provide the longer and wider view and the boards of the 
5 The Osmotherly Memorandum stipulates that civil servants must not divulge details of 
advice given to Ministers in order to protect the neutrality and anonymity of civil service 
advice. 
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industries ... 
day to day management. As things turned out, the perspectives were 
often reversed" (HC 494 1988,84). It was argued that ministers would be unable to 
stop interfering in operational areas, particularly in areas of political saliency where 
policy and operational responsibilities are hard to separate and where operational 
matters can become political concerns, "one of the lessons of the past twenty years 
seems to have been that the more politically sensitive a service is, the more difficult 
it is to give it independence or even quasi-independence from ministerial control" 
(Chapman 1988(b) 6). 
Greer's research on the DSS seemed to confirm this caution, "the first lesson from 
Next Steps is that public administration theory was right and that it is not easy to 
separate 'policy' and 'operational' issues particularly in politically sensitive areas 
which are close to the core of government" (Greer 1995 78). In a subsequent 
analysis Massey agrees "Even those [agencies] with a genuine arm's length 
relationship with their ministers, however, only retain this for as long as it is in the 
perceived political interest of ministers to sustain it", (Massey 1995(b), 85). 
It was argued that the impossibility of operational i sing a policy - operational split 
would led to a blurring of roles and responsibilities which would undermine the 
agency concept causing difficulties in implementation (Dudley 1994,38). For nearly 
all commentators this issue was seen as the biggest test of the agency concept. 
Metcalfe and Richards caution "[a]mbiguity is the stock-in-trade of politics and being 
specific about politically sensitive services tests the agency model to its limits and 
perhaps to destruction" (1990,231). One former civil servant wrote, "this attempt 
to find a middle road between privatisation and politically -accountable department 
lacks a firm base in theory that would lead me to look optimistically at its chances of 
survival" (Chipperfield, 1994,12). Most of the literature on agencies foresaw this 
type of problem arising with the establishment of the former operational arm of the 
DSS, the Benefits Agency (TCSC 1989, HC 348; Flynn et al 1990,174; Greer 
1995,90; Woodhouse 1995,252). However, fears about the political saliency of a 
policy area undermining the policy - operational split and causing problematic 
implementation of the agency concept appeared to be borne out by the problems 
faced by the CSA and the Prison Service Agency. 
34 
implementation problems 
The CSA is the only agency to have been established from scratch and designed to 
operate as an agency. It had a very clear operational framework based on new 
legislation which had gone through Parliament with all-party agreement. After only 
a few months of operation the agency was subject to severe and sustained media 
and parliamentary criticism. In particular it was severely censured by the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman for administrative failures (Parliamentary Commissioner 
of the Administration, 1994) and was the subject of a highly critical enquiry by the 
Social Security Select Committee (Social Security Committee 1994, HC 69). After 
only 18 months in post its first Chief Executive, Ros Hepplewhite, left her job. 
Perversely, she was criticised for over-identifying with the policy of her agency and 
thus encroaching on ministerial territory (Pyper 1995,142; Public Service 
Committee, HC 313,1996,60) and at the same time was accused of placing too 
much importance in meeting operational targets and failing to respond to political 
pressures (Select Committee of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Administration, 1995), although the latter was what in theory her Chief Executive 
role demanded. 
A similar confusion of roles and difficulty in separating policy from operational 
decisions was also apparent in the problems facing the Prison Service. Derek 
Lewis, the first Chief Executive was unique in being the only Chief Executive to 
have responsibility for being the Ministers principal policy adviser written into the 
Framework Document, reflecting the need for close consultation. Following two 
high profile escapes of category A prisoners and the subsequent publication of a 
critical inquiry, Derek Lewis was sacked for operational failures, despite having the 
backing of the Prison Board. Michael Howard the Home Secretary argued there 
was no criticism of his policy role in the Inquiry. In retaliation, Lewis argued the 
Minister continually involved himself in operational matters, to the extent that he 
was unable to do the job effectively (Guardian, 17 October 1995). 
These events appeared to confirm the difficulty of delivery through the agency 
concept in politically sensitive areas, "[w]hen operational decisions generate 
political storms or ministerial embarrassment, the Next Steps arrangements will 
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come under immense strain" (Theakston 1995,137). Yet the argument that it is 
the saliency of the policy area which lies behind problematic implementation is 
difficult to sustain. Ros Hepplewhite and Derek Lewis's successors publicly have 
managed their agencies in the face of similar degrees of politicisation of the policy 
area; as have their counterparts in the Northern Ireland and Scottish agencies. 
The experience of the Benefits Agency also casts doubt on the idea that saliency 
undermines the policy operational split. 
The Benefits Agency. was established in 1991 and with over 90,000 staff is the 
biggest agency in government. Like the Prison Service it is a large, politically 
sensitive service, and one in which operational matters were impossible to divorce 
from policy. For example it administered the Social Fund where discretionary 
payments or loans, from a limited budget, were made to those on the lower incomes 
for essential household items. The Agency faced difficulties in the first year of its 
operations over the introduction of the Disability Living Allowance which had led to 
criticism from the Parliamentary Ombudsman and subsequently the Parliamentary 
Committee for Administration. These difficulties were noted by the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman to have been very similar to the problems subsequently faced by the 
Child Support Agency (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Administration, HC 135, 
1994/95). The delay and distress caused to disabled people claiming the new 
benefit also led to a high level of parliamentary concern. 
Its Chief Executive Michael Bichard described the difficulties with this issue as 
representing "a test" for agencies because of the political pressure he faced. 
"Clearly Ministers and the Department were concerned, wanted to be reassured as 
to why this had arisen and certainly wanted to know what we were going to do to 
sort it out" (TCSC, 1994, HC 2711,240). Yet it appears that there was not the same 
confusion over roles and responsibilities as was apparent in the CSA and the PSA. 
Bichard continued "we were then left alone ... 
I did not have the interference that I 
think some people thought that I might have had" (TCSC, 1994, HC 2711,240). 
Bichard went on to become the first ACE, and outside appointment, to be promoted 
to Permanent Secretary. 
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These apparent contradictions suggest that in examining the introduction of the 
agency concept, implementation problems are not solely related to the difficulty of 
separating policy from operational responsibilities in politically salient areas of 
po icy. 
An assessment of change 
Overall, the literature on agencies presents no clear picture on the extent, nature 
and impact of the reform. It is unclear whether the agency concept represents a 
fundamental change in relationships in government or not. For some, Next Steps 
does represent a change in the organisation of central government and of the 
accompanying governance structures. Greer concludes when looking at the DSS 
agencies that the development of agencies creates client-contractor relationships 
replacing traditional civil service hierarchies with vertical arrangements of reporting 
and control (Greer 1994). Lewis sees Next Steps as part of a shift from an older to 
a newer form of governance, a half way house between management by command 
and management by contract (Lewis 1993). For some, the establishment of 
agencies is another way in which the state, has been hollowed out and has lost its 
capacity for action (Rhodes 1995). 
Yet, Zifcak points out, that in the absence of legal or statutory change, the agency 
project relied on 'adjustments of mind' (Zifcak, 1995,87) and for others, the new 
arrangements do not go far enough (Foster and Plowden 1996). At the Public 
Service Committee, Mather and Lewis argued that more contractual or legalistic 
arrangements need to be introduced to ensure radical reform (Public Service 
Committee, 1996, HC 313,124 and 130). 
The inconclusive and contradictory picture presented by an examination of the 
literature indicates a dis-aggregated picture of change. It also highlights two gaps 
in the literature. Firstly, the relative neglect paid to understanding departments 
relationships with agencies, given their prominent role in the policy process. 
Secondly, in accounting for why some relationships appear to have worked well 
whilst others have faced problems. These gaps in the literature are related to 
difficulties with existing approaches to the analysis of agencies in government. 
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Existing Approaches to NSAs 
The third part of this chapter examines existing approaches in the literature to the 
analysis of agencies including attempts to classify agencies into typologies and the 
existing empirical work on agencies. Initially, however, a bureau shaping analysis is 
discussed. 
Bureau shaping 
Bureau shaping approaches developed from a critique of public choice accounts of 
bureaucratic behaviour. Rational choice theorists seek to apply economic models 
to political problems. Their premise is that it is possible to account for political 
phenomena by aggregating the individual preferences of self-maximising actors in 
much the same way as it is possible to model the economic decisions of consumers 
and producers and therefore identify the operation of markets. These preferences 
can be predicted and modeled until a causal relationship is identified. Public choice 
theorists used rational choice approaches to examine bureaucratic behaviour 
suggesting that self-interested bureaucrats sought to maximise their budgets and 
argued this led to the growth of the state (Niskanen 1971). These ideas were said 
to have influenced the Thatcher Governments' economic and administrative policies 
and provided the rationale to seek to curb public sector growth (Greer 1994). 
Attempts have been made to adapt public choice theories to explain changes in 
central government, given controls on public expenditure during the 1980s and 
changes to organisational shape and structure. Dunleavy, in a critique and 
development of public choice arguments, suggested that the development of 'Next 
Steps' agencies was explained because, rather than seeking to maximise their 
budgets, bureaucrats sought to 'bureau shape'. They sought to protect their core 
budgets and a central office location. These preferences provided a better 
explanation of bureaucratic behaviour. (Dunleavy 1991,202 - 3). This explained 
why NPM reforms like 'Next Steps, were accepted in central government. 
Dunleavy's work in developing a more sophisticated account of budget components 
is described as offering a better explanation of bureaucratic response to budgetary 
pressures (Dowding 1995a 87). 
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James developed this work to suggest that the growth of agencies in government is 
due to the bureau shaping activities of senior mandarins wishing to devolve 
responsibility for executive work whilst retaining the preferred policy analysis 
(James 1994). James further suggests that a bureau shaping explanation can be 
developed to explain the behaviour of senior agency officials, suggesting they also 
value "policy work time and high core budget level" (James 1995; 1994: 451). 
Market testing, it is suggested, can be seen as a response by Treasury officials to 
the financial dangers of such agency bureau shaping (James 1995,452). 
The development of a bureau shaping model to explain the development and 
growth of NSAs has some advantages. It improves upon earlier and cruder 
assumptions about bureaucratic behaviour The analysis of budget and agency 
types developed by James to test a bureau shaping approach is a helpful addition 
to various attempts to identify agency type and function (and will be discussed 
below). However there are empirical and methodological problems with the idea of 
bureau shaping. 
Empirically, there are several challenges to the accuracy of a bureau shaping 
explanation. Thain and Wright argue the model is incorrect, as it is not possible for 
senior bureaucrats to seek to protect their core budgets because of Treasury 
controls. The model does not allow "for the complexity of the public expenditure 
planning and control system" (1995,147). Dowding points out that bureau shaping 
did not predict the changes for senior policy making mandarins suggested by the 
proposals in the Continuity and Change White Paper (Dowding 1995a, 92). He also 
doubts the attractions of a central London location (Dowding 1995a, 83). Smith 
suggests it is possible to argue that it was not senior bureaucrats seeking to lose 
responsibility for executive work which accounts for the acceptance of agencies, 
rather it was politicians who sought to devolve responsibility for problematic political 
areas, thus avoiding the blame for policy failures (Smith 1996,162). Finally, 
research by Marsh, Smith and Richards (forthcoming) indicates that, rather than 
passing on management work, as the bureau shaping model expects, senior civil 
servants are more involved in management and less in policy work now than 
previously. In addition they question the assumption that senior civil servants 
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prefer policy work to management work and argue that their empirical work 
indicates some civil servants enjoy management work and find it challenging. 
This latter point links to methodological criticisms of bureau shaping as being 
deterministic and individualistic (Green and Shapiro 1996). Firstly, it is possible to 
be critical of the ontological premise that the values or preferences of civil servants 
are possible to identify, are fixed, and are self-maximising. Lowndes argues the 
preferences outlined are untested and preferences may vary (1996). Marsh, Smith 
and Richards (forthcoming) suggest public officials are motivated by the public 
service ethos and cannot be seen as motivated solely by self-interest. 
Secondly it is possible to challenge the epistemological assumption that the 
preferences of individuals alone are causal factors in understanding events. In 
relation to bureau shaping, the focus at the micro level on one sole determinant of 
change, i. e. the self-maximising desires of bureaucrats, ignores the activities of 
other agents such as politicians. It also disregards structural factors such as the 
institutional, economic and ideological circumstances surrounding agencification. 
Although 'thick' rational choice explanations permit institutional values and norms to 
be included in the institutional rules of the game and thus link structures with 
agency, this questions the validity of simple causal models. If, for example, when 
examining changing relationships in central government, strong ethical and value 
codes or particular w, ork incentives, were built into a causal model, this increases 
the number of variables and questions which are the key determinants of behaviour 
and outcomes. 
There are, therefore, difficulties with the use of bureau shaping, empirically, and 
methodologically. Even if the self-maximising assumptions of the bureau shaping 
analysis were correct, this may not provide the only explanation for the growth of 
agencies. Moreover bureau shaping does not help to explain other features of 
agencification. Whilst bureau shaping can offer an explanation for the acceptance 
of the concept of Next Steps and the resultant growth of agency coverage, there are 
problems in the bureau shaping analysis per se or in using or adapting this 
approach to the questions outlined earlier. A bureau shaping analysis cannot 
explain the relationships which exist and have developed between agencies and 
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departments. It cannot account for differences in these relationships or where they 
work well and where they have not. 
This is most starkly illustrated when looking at how a bureau shaping approach 
would fit with an examination of the Prison Service Agency and the Home Office. A 
bureau shaping approach would begin from the premise that senior mandarins 
would seek to establish the Prison Service Agency to undertake prison 
management whilst retaining prison policy work. Even a very cursory look at the 
circumstances of the establishment of the Agency indicate that senior civil servants 
did not want to see the Prison Service move to agency status but were under 
political pressure from the centre of government as well as pressure from the Home 
Secretary of the time to accept this status. Secondly, having agreed to move to 
agency status, the Framework Document built in a role for the ACE as principal 
adviser on prisons policy thus removing responsibility for prisons policy advice from 
the Home Office entirely. To understand how these decisions came to be taken 
requires a more contextual, historical and complex understanding than bureau 
shaping permits. A bureau shaping approach is therefore not helpful in examining 
the relationships which exist, the variation in relationships or the reasons why some 
relationships work better than others. 
The difficulties of classifying agencies 
A second approach to the analysis of agencies has been in attempts to identify 
agencies into typologies, and to link agency 'type' with: relationship with the parent 
department, (Efficiency Unit 1991; Trosa 1994), current and future development 
(Greer 1992,1994) and (as mentioned above) bureau shaping by senior mandarins 
(James 1994). 
The Fraser Report (Efficiency Unit 1991) suggested a link with agency type and the 
relationship the agency would have with their parent department. Mainstream 
agencies required the closest relationship, regulatory agencies were often self- 
financing, specialist agencies required a custom e r-co ntracto r relationship and 
peripheral agencies were able to be conducted at arm's length. This classification 
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was accurate and descriptive but not explanatory. It does not identify what makes 
an agency mainstream as opposed to peripheral. 
Greer developed a more sophisticated typology extending the list to eight main 
agency types, (welfare services, public service, regulatory, production, consultancy 
to other govemment agencies and outside organisations and leisure). These types 
are then categorised according to whether they have a monopoly over their market 
or not and whether they charge for services or not. She used this typology to 
analyse the first 32 Framework Documents, both for their aspirational statements 
and by the degree to which they have responsibility for personal functions and the 
type of accounting system. Greer suggests the Framework Documents point to the 
"direction and potential impact of the Next Steps Initiative" (Greer 1992,96). She 
found that the self-funded agencies aimed: to become more commercial; to recoup 
a greater proportion of their funding from fees; to expand into existing and new 
markets and to adopt net cost accounting systems or trading fund status. Those 
agencies with specialist staff (mainly self-funded, regulatory, production and 
consultancy agencies) had greater freedoms in recruitment. She concluded that 
what it meant to be an agency is largely dependent on function. 
James (1994) praises Greer's attempt to link agency type with characteristics of 
their structures. However he criticises the Greer typology for conflating key 
differences, for example the category 'revenue raising' includes agencies who raise 
revenue from private markets and from other public sector providers, or ultimately 
the Treasury. Likewise the concept of monopoly refers to the existing not the 
potential circumstances, for example he argues the Benefits Agency is a monopoly, 
but could face competition from banks and building societies. 
Greer's typology is updated by James (1994). He uses a typology based on the 
'tools' available to agencies e. g. information, authority, finance, organisation and 
professional expertise and an analysis of budget components. These combine to 
suggest different types of Agency (delivery, taxing, regulatory, servicing, trading, 
capital intensive delivery, contracts, transfer, control, super-control). The 
advantage of James's typology is that is can be applied to parent departments and 
other non-departmental public bodies. He finds that agencies are examples of 
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servicing, transfer, delivery, regulatory, taxing trading and contract types and that 
departments are control, super-control or contract types. 
The typology sets out to provide a structural analysis of organisations which are 
"fundamental, long lasting and not based on specific individuals or goals" (James, 
1994). There are three problems with this typology. The first is whether it is helpful 
as a classificatory schema. The James typology does permit a greater degree of 
sophistication, but again runs into technical difficulties. The Insolvency Service and 
Companies House are both listed as regulatory agencies using the tools of 
authority and administrative organisation, yet this does not reflect that the 
Insolvency Service has a far greater 'professional' and quasi judicial role, or that 
Companies House has far greater flexibility to raise its own revenue and operate as 
a Trading Fund. 
The second is whether, having provided a typology, it can be used to explain or 
illuminate phenomena. The analysis is used to test a bureau shaping approach. As 
well as the empirical and theoretical problems with bureau shaping outlined above, 
it is difficult to apply this typology to examine what the resulting relationship is 
between departments and agencies or why they may differ. Though not stated, his 
analysis indicates that agencies hold certain types of 'tools' and parent departments 
others. But the typology is not used to explain the relationships between parent 
departments and agencies, or to identify how this allocation of 'tools' affects the 
relationship. 
Finally, in avoiding specific individuals and goals, the typology provides only a 
partial account of the features which define public organisations. For example, 
under the James typology, the Contributions Agency and the Child Support Agency 
are categorised as the same type, a 'taxing' agency. Yet this does not help to 
identify why the CSA had far greater difficulty meeting its goals than the 
uncontentious sister agency, the Contributions Agency. It is argued here that, to 
explain the relationships between departments and agencies and the differences in 
those relationships, it is necessary to identify the goals each party is trying to 
achieve and consider these in a historical and institutional context. 
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The final typology which has been applied was used by the Next Steps team in the 
classification of agencies for the Next Steps Review (1996). This talked of four 
types of agency, those offering service to the public, research establishments, 
regulatory agencies and those offering departmental services. Like the earlier 
Fraser typology this has the advantage of simplicity. It is equally broad brush 
however, for example service to the public covers the Benefits Agency and Wilton 
Park, the tiny conference centre. But the classification does move from the abstract 
back to the central question of what the agency does and who for. Even at this 
level of simplicity there are difficulties. For example the Fire Service College is 
shown as a service to the public agency and the Civil Service College as a 
departmental services agency. They both rely on public sector customers, the 
difference being that the former does not rely directly on fees from central 
government departments. 
Work on classifying agencies into typologies, although helpful heuristically in 
normative, descriptive or analytical settings, can present difficulties with using 
typologies in a predictive or explanatory sense. Contextual and historical 
information is necessary in order to account for differential outcomes and to 
understand the operation of power and decision-making following agencification. 
Empirical work on agencies 
Much of the literature on agencies is speculative and anticipatory. Most empirical 
data stems from parliamentary committee evidence or government reports. 
Considering the scale of the reform there is very little substantive academic work 
relying on empirical data and primary research. The literature on agencies is found 
in the public administration, management and politics fields. Although these fields 
draw from each other (in particular in using insights from organisational literature) 
and some commentators cross disciplines, these different backgrounds are 
discernible in the approach taken to agencies. 
The public administration literature is concerned to understand the changes to the 
structures of central government, with personnel and financial changes and with the 
ethos and the formal rules. (O'Toole and Jordan 1995; Jordan 1994; Barberis 1995, 
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Pyper 1995). Empirical work in this tradition has examined several issues raised by 
agency status. As well as the collection of case studies edited by O'Toole and 
Jordan, Hogwood has looked at the structural changes (1993) and with Judge and 
McVicar at accountability issues (1997). Accountability is also the subject of 
Giddings's edited work (1995). Other work has examined changes in relationships: 
Chapman (1997) examines those between agencies and the Treasury and Greer 
(1994), in the most comprehensive work on agencies to date, looks at the impact of 
their introduction in the DSS. Much of this literature is in a traditional 'institutional' 
vein and is often descriptive, atheoritical and normative (Rhodes, 1997). There is a 
strong commitment to traditional models of accountability, and this literature draws 
on the 'Whitehall model' as a normative and organisational frame of reference 
(Pyper, 1995). 
The management literature, including most government-sponsored research, is less 
concerned with normative questions of accountability and examines the processes 
of introducing and managing change in central government and questions of value 
for money and efficiency (Efficiency Unit 1991; Trosa Report 1994; Brooke and 
Bate 1994; Horton and Jones 1996; Davis 1994). There is also interest in 
understanding the formal and informal rules to appreciate the environment within 
which organisations operate and how this informs the behaviour of the participants. 
Empirical work in this field includes Colville et al's work on the introduction of 
change into HM Customs (1993) and Mellon's work on leadership (1993) as well as 
the government reports listed above. Work in this vein seeks to address whether 
the agency concept, drawing on contemporary management models, is being 
properly applied in the public sector and where there are deviations from its 
application. 
The politics literature is more concerned with the interactions at the centre of 
government between politicians and senior civil servants, with the exercise of power 
and primarily with the effect of the introduction of agencies on the Whitehall model' 
(Wilson and Barker 1995; Theakston 1995; IPPR 1991; Plowden 1994). There is 
very little empirical work in this tradition which solely addresses the changes 
effected by NSAs. Most work looks at their introduction as part of more general 
changes, (for example, Zifcak 1994; Campbell and Wilson 1995; Thain and Wright 
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1995; Smith 1999(a)). Burch and Holliday examined how the idea moved through 
the cabinet system as one of the case studies in their work on the cabinet system 
(1996). 
There are theoretical and empirical problems in existing empirical work on the 
analysis of the impact of NSAs on government. Theoretically, with a few exceptions 
mentioned above (Thain and Wright 1995; Burch and Holiday 1995; Smith 1999 
(a)), all three types of literature draw on descriptive and prescriptive models of how 
relationships should work. These are then used to provide normative standards 
against which to judge the changes which agencies have made or are thought to 
have made. Thus the public administration and politics literature assessed the 
change by how far it deviated from traditional constitutional practices, while the 
more managerialist literature looked at the deviation of the agency concept from the 
kind of private sector models which influenced it. The most comprehensive work 
on the introduction of agencies does both at the same time, concluding that 
agencification both erodes accountability and leads to high transaction costs (Greer, 
1994). Whilst normative questions about the accountability and autonomy of 
agencies are key, there are three difficulties in analysing change in relation to 
descriptive and prescriptive models. 
Firstly, a constitutional understanding (although modified by the Whitehall model) 
and the agency concept both downplay the policy role of departments. The Ibbs 
Report underplayed the policy making role of departments, and instead highlighted 
the constitutional understanding that ministers - aided by their departments - set the 
policy framework. Yet if the role of departments in the policy process is 
acknowledged, it is the relationship between departments and agencies which 
should be the main focus of attention (Smith et al, 1993). Zifcak argues the biggest 
impact of the changes has been on departments (Zifcak, 1994,87). Empirically the 
question of how departments and agencies work together has been an issue 
addressed in government literature (Massey, 1995) but from a very prescriptive 
approach and operating within the normative constructs of the agency model. Apart 
from this work and a short speculative chapter by Barberis in the O'Toole and 
Jordan collection (1993) there has been no other academic work looking at 
department-agency relationships. In asking what has been the impact of agencies 
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on relationships in government any analysis needs to be more state centric. The 
focus should be on asking 'how can department-agency relationships be 
understood? ', and in view of the implementation problems outlined earlier'why have 
some of these worked better than others? '. 
Secondly, the summary earlier indicated a degree of diversity in NSAs. Any 
assessment of the impact of 'Next Steps' cannot view agencies from a fixed 
perspective as having a uniform effect. Hogwood suggests that many critiques 
underplay the differentiated nature of the impact of the reform (Hogwood, 1993). 
Any analysis should to be able to account for the differentiated nature of change, 
i. e. more traditional forms of relationships may be found in one area of government 
and more marketised ones elsewhere. There is too little comparative empirical 
work. Greer's analysis of the DSS is the most comprehensive account of the 
impact of agencies but it still only deals with one department. Although 
classification schemes can be helpful, they cannot account for the differences in the 
relationships between agencies without some analysis of context and history. This 
suggests the need for a multiple case study which looks across departments. 
Finally both the constitutional and managerial models lack the analytical scope to 
examine and account for the impact of agencies on government. Most crucially, 
normative accounts which describe and prescribe 'what ought to be' misjudge the 
operation and understanding of power. Power is seen as an object. Thus ministers 
have power over their civil servants in the 'Whitehall model', and over agencies 
according to the principal agent theory driving the agency model. However Smith 
argues power is not a zero sum game but can led to positive sum outcomes (Smith, 
1999 (a)). Any analysis of understanding department-agency relationships needs to 
be informed by more analytical ly-driven analysis of power relations, particularly in 
accounting for the dis-aggregated nature of change and for a more state centric 
analysis of power. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the context of the introduction of agencies and at the key 
features of the agency concept. It outlined how the idea of a policy operational split, 
linked to contemporary management theories, was overlaid on the traditional 
constitutional understanding of accountability through the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility. 
The literature on agencies was then reviewed which stressed both the differentiated 
nature of change and uncertainty as to the impact of the new arrangements. This 
review highlighted the need for empirical work to look at how departments' 
relationships with agencies can be understood following agencification and to 
explain why some of the relationships have worked better than others. 
Difficulties with addressing these questions were found with existing approaches in 
the literature. A bureau shaping approach cannot explain the nature of the 
relationship between departments and agencies nor why they work well or not. 
Other literature is classificatory which whilst helpful, cannot account for differential 
outcomes. Other approaches are often anticipatory and speculative and there is 
surprisingly little empirical work on the impact of agencies on the policy process. 
There is also an over-reliance on the use of descriptive and normative models for 
analysis which fail to appreciate the state centric nature of relationships following 
agencification, the disaggregated nature of the impact of the reform and the 
relational nature of power. 
In concluding, this chapter has suggested a multiple case study is required to 
address the empirical questions outlined above and argues for a more theoretically 
driven analysis. The following chapter will examine the chosen theoretical approach 
for this research and how this can be applied to examining the case study questions 
above. 
48 
CHAPTER THREE 
RELATIONSHIPS IN GOVERNMENT AND THE POLICY 
PROCESS 
Introduction 
The last chapter examined changing relationships in government arising from the 
introduction of agencies. The literature on agencies did not present a clear picture 
of the impact of agencies on government and drew attention to two questions which 
were not addressed in the existing literature. Firstly, how is it possible to 
understand department-agency relationships? Secondly why have some of these 
relationships have worked well whilst others have not? It was argued that existing 
approaches to the analysis of agencies were inappropriate in addressing these 
questions. The chapter concluded by suggesting the need to take a more state 
centric analysis, which acknowledges the dis-aggregated nature of the impact of 
agencies and the relational nature of power. 
This chapter will introduce the theoretical ideas and concepts which have informed 
this research and how they may be operationalised to examine the questions 
above. In the first part of the chapter, initially, the idea of power dependency and its 
application in looking at intra-state relationships is set out. Next the associated 
concept of policy networks is presented and the link between networks and 
outcomes explored. This suggests a possible explanation for why some 
relationships have worked well whilst others have been problematic. The third part 
of the chapter discusses the need to link these meso level approaches with the 
macro level of analysis and at the micro level with theories of agency. This section 
suggests that ideas from the historical institutionalist literature are helpful here. The 
last section of the chapter examines criticisms of the policy networks approach and 
outlines the methodological steps taken to address these criticisms. These include 
use of a multiple case study and presentation of empirical findings thematically. 
Finally the chapter concludes by outlining further theoretical questions raised by 
looking at the impact of agencification using the concept of policy networks. 
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Power Dependency and Policy Networks 
Contemporary analytical concepts which have been associated with recent studies 
of the core executive are the idea of power dependency and the concept of policy 
networks (Rhodes, 1988 and 1995; Thain and Wright, 1995; Burch and Holliday, 
1995; Marsh and Smith, 1995; Smith, 1999a). In seeking to examine department- 
agency relationships it is these approaches which will provide the theoretical 
framework for the study. It is argued that by using the framework of power 
dependency it may be possible to account for the variation in current intra-state 
relationships. It should also be possible to examine the extent to which the type of 
relationships or networks identified have impacted on the policy process and policy 
outcomes. (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a). The following section of this chapter will 
look at these approaches and how they can be applied to understanding 
department-agency relationships. 
Power dependency in inter state relationships 
The idea of power dependency suggests that organisations exchange resources to 
achieve goals, creating a power dependency relationship. The relative power 
potential of interacting organisations and relationships between them relate to the 
organisations and the resources they exchange, the rules of the game and the 
processes of exchange between them. 
The idea of power dependency in inter-state relationships was developed by 
Rhodes when looking at relations between central and local government (Rhodes, 
1988). Rhodes criticised the existing literature on central-local relations which 
characterised relationships between central government and local authorities as 
moving from a partnership to an agency relationship (Rhodes, 1981; 33). He 
argued the relationship was based on power dependency, "Discretion and relative 
power of the various tiers of Government is a product of their resources, the rules of 
the game and the values and interests supporting both the rules and the existing 
distribution of resources" (Rhodes 1981,10). He suggested a framework of 
analysis based on five propositions: 
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1 Any organisation is dependent upon other organisations for resources. 
2 In order to achieve their 
, 
qoals, the organisations have to exchange resources. 
3 Although decision making within the organisation is constrained by other 
organisations, the dominant coalition retains some discretion. The 
appreciative s ystem of the dominant coalition influences which relationships 
are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought. 
4 The dominant coalition employs strateq-ies within known rules of the _qame 
to 
regulate the process of exchanqe. 
5 Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and relative 
power potential of interacting organisations. This relative power potential is a 
product of each organisation, of the rules of the game, and of the process of 
exchange between organisations. (Rhodes, 1981: 98). 
Using this model of power dependency, centre-local relations were described as a 
game. Each organisation manoeuvred for advantage using resources (which may 
be political legitimation, authority, finance, organisational or informational) within its 
power to maximise control over policy outcomes and to minimise their dependence 
on other players. In a later analysis Rhodes developed the model and suggested a 
range of relationships between centre and sub-central government. The networks 
varied according to the degree of integration, the type of membership and the 
distribution of resources. Rhodes suggests that understanding the variety of 
relationships in sub-central government "requires an examination of relationships 
within networks, of the process of exchange and the rules and strategies governing 
resource transactions" (Rhodes, 1988,87). 
Whilst the 'Rhodes model' points to the institutional or structural features of 
relationships, it also allows for the importance of informal relationships in 
strengthening institutional links. Thus the success of strategies enacted by actors 
to maximise their relative power potential will depend upon the skills, ability, 
experience and commitment of individuals (Rhodes, 1988,107). More recently 
Rhodes has emphasised the interpersonal features of the model and highlighted 
the importance of 'trust' between network members as being essential to ensure co- 
operative behaviour (Rhodes, 1997). 
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This analysis suggests an approach to the question identified in chapter two of how 
to understand department-agency relationships. Application of the Rhodes model 
to examining department-agency relationships would suggest that the changed 
distribution of resources heralded by the introduction of agency arrangements has 
led to the development of changed power dependent relationships in central 
government. 
Power dependency in department - agency relationships 
A power dependency approach to understanding the relationship between agencies 
and departments would suggest networks develop because the creation of a 
framework document creates the conditions for the exchange of resources. In 
contrast to the hierarchical command structure which existed between levels in the 
bureaucracy previously, agencification introduces a transfer of resources between 
the centre of departments and arm's length units. This will led to power 
dependency. The resulting relationships will vary according to the degree of 
dependence arising from the goals of each organisation, resources exchanged, the 
rules of the game, appreciative systems and the strategies undertaken. Each will 
be briefly considered in relation to department-agency relationships. 
Which resources are exchanged will depend upon the goals of each organisation. 
In the case of agency - department relationships, the goals of the agency are 
formally stated in the framework document based around the policy operational 
split. However, identifying an agency's goals is not always straightforward. Policy 
goals can be subject to rapid alteration because of outside political factors with 
operational consequences or operational goals may become politically salient. 
There is also the potential for operational goals pursued by agencies to be required 
because of bigger policy goals, for example, market testing and other efficiency 
measures. Goals may be changeable and this may led to disagreement between 
department and agency about which goals are primary. The formal goals stated in 
the framework document may not reflect the informal goals each organisation is 
seeking to pursue. In addition, the department and agency share the administrative 
policy goal of implementing the agency concept and ensuring the delivery of 
government goals through this administrative set-up. 
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The type of goals set out for the agency, i. e. the size and type of agency, will 
determine the extent and nature of the exchange of resources. In general, parent 
departments will offer political legitimation, legal authority and very often financial 
support to agencies. However, the extent of their power will vary. Although lacking 
the separate political legitimation of local authorities, agencies sometimes have 
delegated authority if operating under statute. They control (in some cases) 
considerable organisational, informational and administrative resources and 
possess policy expertise. Departments need the organisational and informational 
resources of agencies to deliver government goals and to fulfil departmental needs 
to protect and service ministers (Rose, 1987). Agencies need the political 
legitimacy and constitutional authority of ministers to operate and sometimes direct 
funding or the authority to charge for their outputs. The dependency of departments 
on agencies may be less if they can obtain that service elsewhere (i. e. if the agency 
is not a monopoly). It may be more if the agency is undertaking a politically very 
salient task, for example, one with either high visibility, involving contact with the 
public, or where the agency is carrying out a statutory or quasi-legal duty. 
Agencies' dependence on departments is reduced if they can obtain work from 
outside the department and if they can finance their own operations. 
According to the Rhodes model, actors can maximise their discretion in the 
exchange of resources by using strategies within the rules of the game. In the case 
department-agency relationships, the rules of the game partly depend upon formal 
structures and procedures which developed alongside the agency project. 
Although the agency concept has not, except in the establishment of trading funds, 
been underpinned by legislation, there are codes and instructions issued centrally 
by the Treasury and the Next Steps Team. These relate to how the department and 
agency draw up a framework document and how they go about agreeing, setting 
and reporting on targets. The framework document for each agency sets out the 
role of the agency chief executive (ACE) and the extent to which ACEs are involved 
in policy decisions and policy making. It states the accountability arrangements and 
the extent of the agencies financial, personnel and decision making autonomy. 
These formal procedures, based on the policy/ operational split, are likely to be 
linked to the political salience of the policy area (Massey, 1995b, 80). The 
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frequency of interaction is therefore also likely be related to the type of policy, the 
sensitivity of the policy agenda and the stage of policy implementation. 
These formal procedures will structure the exchange of resources. In addition it is 
likely that informal 'rules of the game' will also govern the processes of exchange 
and influence the appreciative system of the actors involved. These informal rules 
relate to actors' norms, conventions and values. Chapter two outlined the norms of 
the 'Whitehall model' and the Haldane principles, both underpinned by traditional 
notions of the dominance of ministerial authority. The agency concept introduced 
changed expectations of accountibility conventions, a contracting role for civil 
servants and a less anonymous role for chief executives whilst at the same time 
maintaining the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Therefore it is envisaged that 
both traditional notions of the rules of the game and changed expectations arising 
from the concept of agencies will guide perceptions of roles and appropriate 
behaviour. Changing recruitment and personnel policies at all levels of the civil 
service will impact on the extent to which norms are shared. Informal norms and 
values may also relate to departmental practice and history, and one of the specific 
aims of agencification was to encourage the formation of agency cultures. Thus the 
type of informal understandings which influence appreciative systems will depend 
upon both the institutional and interpersonal histories of actors in departments and 
agencies. 
The Rhodes model of power dependency offers a framework to identify the nature 
of intra-state relationships. It suggests a focus on identifying the goals of each 
organisation, the resources held by each agency and how they are exchanged, the 
rules of the game and appreciative systems which govern their interactions, the 
skills and tactics of agents as informed by the rules of the game and their 
appreciative systems. It suggests variations in these features will led to different 
types of networks in central government as has been found in sub-central 
government. In this way the Rhodes model could account for the diversity of 
relationships suggested in the literature. 
The Rhodes model is particularly appropriate for use in exploring department - 
agency relationships. Whilst these relationships are intra-state relationships and 
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agencies lack the separate political legitimacy of local authorities or the 
independent policy platforms of pressure groups, NSAs are relatively autonomous 
organisations controlling considerable organisational and informational resources. 
The evidence in chapter two illustrated the increasing autonomy of agencies and 
the institutional and cultural changes identified may lead some relationships to more 
closely resemble inter-state relationships. Despite controlling considerable 
resources however, agencies ultimately operate under ministerial authority, the 
rules of the game prioritise this authority and agencies in this sense are not 
separate bodies and their autonomy is closely bounded. The model can capture 
these different features and the interplay between them. "With its emphasis on the 
game-like quality of the links - on the resources of participants and the rules of the 
game, strategies and appreciative systems conditioning their exchange - this 
framework is equally applicable to intra- and inter-network relationships" (Rhodes, 
1988,87). 
The Rhodes model provides the explanatory basis for the concept of policy 
networks. Whilst the model of power dependency is seen as an analytical tool to 
investigate and account for the variety of relationships, it is the concept of policy 
networks which would suggest why some networks work better than others. 
The Concept of Policy Networks 
The development of policy network analysis has been subject to considerable 
ambiguity (Marsh and Rhodes 1992 (a), 18; John and Cole 1995,305; Dowding 
1995(b), 140) and is described as becoming the centre of "linguistic controversy" 
(Judge 1993,121). This confusion is partial-ly rectified by Marsh and Rhodes (1992 
(a)) who summarise the development of the concept in the American and UK 
literature, trace the influences on theorists in this field and suggest a common 
usage for key concepts. Their analysis is explored below. 
The concept of policy networks is a way of understanding and categorising the 
relationships between Government and other organisations such as interest groups, 
business or sub-central government. These relationships exist where there is an 
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exchange of resources in order to achieve certain policy outcomes. Policy networks 
are therefore said to be a "cluster or complex of organisations connected to each 
other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes 
by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies" (Benson 1982, cited Marsh 
and Rhodes, 1992 (a) 13). 
Marsh and Rhodes draw on Rhodes' power dependency model to explain and 
account for differences between networks and over time. They suggest that 1policy 
network' is a generic description (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992 (a), 250). The type of 
network will vary depending on the extent of exchange of resources, the 
membership of the network, and the relative power of each participant. Networks 
vary on a continuum of ideal types from 'policy communities'to 'issue networks'. 
The characteristics of a policy community are: a limited and stable number of 
participants, with professional or economic interests; a high degree of interaction, 
shared values and continuity; members who have resources to exchange and 
whose leaders can represent and control members of their organisations; and a 
balance of power giving a positive sum analysis of power. Issue networks have a 
large number of participants with a changing membership with little continuity or 
agreement over policy issues, a consultative relationship with little or no exchange 
of resources leading to an unequal power relationship resembling more closely a 
zero-sum game. The characteristics of these ideal types are presented in a 
typology which "specifies the key characteristics of policy networks, thereby 
providing a set of diagnostic criteria and setting the outer limits of the analysis" 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992 (a), 251). Their typology is reproduced overleaf as 
Figure 1. 
Marsh and Rhodes point to the importance of examining trends over time to identify 
changes in relationships. Network changes may be in response to external factors, 
economic, ideological, informational and institutional, but it is stressed, that change 
is 'mediated' through the network, "policy networks are part of the process of 
change ... Actors 
in the network shape and construct their world, choosing whether 
or not and how to respond" (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992 (a), 259). Policy networks 
exist to "routinise relationships, they promote continuity and stability" (Marsh and 
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Rhodes, 1992(a), 261). Marsh and Smith argue that "Networks are both cause and 
effect. They both cause certain policy outcomes and cause actors to act in certain 
ways which are then reproduced in the network" (1995,18). 
Figure 1 
characteristics of policy communities and issue networks 
Dimension 
Types of Policy Networks: 
Policy Community Issue Network 
Membership 
No of participants Very limited, some groups 
consciously excluded 
Large 
Type of interest Economic Wor professional 
interests dominate 
Encompasses range of affected 
interests 
Integration 
Frequency of 
interaction 
Frequent high quality, 
interaction of all groups on all 
matters related to policy issue 
Contacts fluctuate in frequency 
and intensity 
Continuity 
Consensus All participants share basic 
values and accept the 
legitimacy of the outcome 
Membership, values and 
outcomes persistent overtime 
Access fluctuates significantly 
A measure of agreement exists 
but conflict is ever present 
Resources 
Distribution of 
resources (within network) 
All participants have resources; 
basic relationship is an 
exchange relationship 
Some participants may have 
resources, but they are limited, 
and basic relationship is 
consultative 
Distribution of 
resources within participating 
organisations 
Power 
Hierarchical, leaders can deliver 
members 
There is a balance of power 
among members. Although one 
group may dominate, it must be 
a positive-sum game if 
community is to persist 
Varied and variable distribution 
and capacity to regulate 
members 
Unequal powers, reflecting 
unequal resources and unequal 
access. It is a zero-sum game. 
Reproduced from: Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R. A. W. 1992 (a). Policy Networks in 
British Government. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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Policy networks and policy outcomes 
Networks are said to impact on the policy process in various ways. In policy 
communities where there is resource dependency and positive sum power 
exchanges, the network is said to develop shared ideology and to form standard 
operating procedures (Smith 1993,226). The shared ideology and institutional 
practices influence which policy options are seen as valid. Networks shape 
attitudes and behaviour and they simplify the policy process by "limiting actions, 
problems and solutions" (Marsh and Smith 1998,12). A policy community 
therefore "constrains the policy agenda and shapes the policy process" (Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992 (a), 262). Thus agricultural policy making between 1945 and the 
early 1980's is described by Smith as taking place in a policy community that had a 
limited and stable membership comprising the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF) and the National Farmers Union (NFU). These participants shared a 
common set of beliefs that were supported by institutional arrangements which 
reinforced the stable and closed nature of the relationship and the resulting policy 
agenda (Smith 1993,132). Conversely, the US agricultural community in the 1980's 
moved from a stable policy community to resemble more closely the features of an 
issue network, with a large number of actors and a more open network (Smith 
1993,134). 
The propensity for there to be stability in relationships between Government and 
interest groups is however emphasised because power is seen as a positive sum 
(Smith 1993,64). If a shared agenda can be pursued in a closed policy community 
then all organisations, parties and actors involved can benefit. This shared agenda 
may not develop if the policy area concerned is controversial or if there is a 
particular ideological commitment to a course of action and one party is prepared to 
bear the costs of implementation (Smith 1993,66-69). 
The concept of policy networks, based around the idea of power dependency, has 
been most usually applied to the study of government interest group relationships, 
or inter governmental relationships. However, as indicated above, the model is 
capable of adaptation to intra-state relationships (Marsh and Smith, 1995). The 
importance of informal networks in smoothing the policy process is said to be one of 
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the features of the traditional civil service culture, "Communication, consultation, 
joint problem solving and conflict resolution between departments have been one of 
the strengths of the civil service" (Metcalfe 1993,363). This is most famously 
described by Heclo and Wildavsky's study of decision making in the Treasury and 
the'Whitehall village community' 
"Community refers to the personal relationships between the major political 
and administrative actors - sometimes in conflict, often in agreement but 
always in touch and operating within a shared framework. Community is the 
cohesive and orienting bond underlying any particular issue. Policy is 
governmental action directed toward and affecting some end outside itself. 
There is no escaping the tension between policy and community, between 
adapting actions and maintaining relationships, between decision and 
cohesion, between governing now and preserving the possibility of governing 
later. To cope with the world outside without destroying the understandings 
their common life requires - this is the underlying dilemma facing the 
community of political administrators" (Heclo and Wildavsky 1981: 1xv). 
The continuing existence of informal networks in the public expenditure policy 
community is found more recently by Thain and Wright, although they stress the 
importance of the institutional setting for such relationships suggesting "To 
understand the participation of individuals and of groups of individuals in the policy 
process, it is necessary to appreciate their institutional origins, loyalties and 
motivations", (Thain and Wright 1995,7). The influence of the Rhodes' model of 
power dependency is implicitly acknowledged in Thain and Wright's analysis of 
relationships between the central and spending departments public expenditure 
policy network (Thain and Wright 1995,170). They find 
"the outcome of any particular policy, issue or problem depends on the 
management of relationships with other organisations in the policy process as 
policy makers seek to exploit the potential for the exercise of power which 
they and their organisation possess by virtue of resources of authority, 
finance, information , expertise and organisation. 
The amount and the mix of 
these resources vary among organisations and with the particularity of the 
policy issue or problem. The management of those relationships is the policy 
makers function, partly balancing and partly optimising .... The priority accorded to balancing and optimising, as resources are exchanged in the particular 
circumstances of an issue or problem, will vary with the policy makers 
judgements or reality and value - his appreciative system", (1995,170). 
59 
Like Heclo and Wildavsky, they find that informal relations act to exclude higher - 
i. e. ministerial involvement. (Thain and Wright 1995,189). They suggest the key to 
relationships between the central and spending departments is the Treasury's need 
for information and the departments' need for authority (Thain and Wright 1995, 
200). Given this exchange of resources, they also stress the importance of good 
informal relations determined by personal qualities and behaviour, "helping each 
other to manage the business is a benefit... A finance division can help an 
expenditure division manage its business if relations are good, or make it more 
difficult if they are bad... informal communications can help establish what is urgent 
and important", (Thain and Wright 1995 206). 
Building a hypothesis 
These accounts, of what in Marsh and Rhodes' terms would be described as close 
policy communities, suggest that the policy process works smoothly where there is 
good interaction, shared values and agreement about policy goals. In contrast, the 
Thatcher Governments were said to have faced implementation problems because 
there was poor interaction, no shared values and little agreement about the aims of 
policies in the intergovernmental and interest group networks in key policy areas 
(Marsh and Rhodes, 1992(b)). 
Chapter two set out one explanation for problematic implementation through the 
agency concept as being linked to the salience of a policy area. This explanation 
was criticised as it could not explain how some politically salient agencies had not 
experienced the sort of problems seen in the CSA and Prison Service. An 
alternative explanation is suggested by the concept of policy networks. Empirical 
work on policy networks suggests that it is features of the network, or the way in 
which the dependency relationships within the network are managed, which is 
linked with problematic implementation. It suggests that the policy process will work 
best where department and agency are aware of their dependency and have a 
shared view of the policy problems they face, how to interact and how 
responsibilities are divided. So for example relationships may be most difficult 
where the agency is new, like the Child Support Agency, because there are no 
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established links, or where the agency is headed by an outsider who is not aware of 
the rules, value and customs of government. 
It is argued that the concepts of dependency and networks have explanatory power. 
They suggest a hypothesis which addresses the question of why some 
departmental agency relationships appear to have worked better than others. This 
hypothesis is that where closed policy communities based on shared values, goals 
and institutional support exist between departments and agencies, agencies will be 
successful in implementing government goals. 
There are however some difficulties in relating the policy networks concept, which 
was developed to analyse inter state and interest group relationships with 
government, to the study of intra state relationships. Marsh and Rhodes suggest a 
range of 'ideal type' characteristics to assist in diagnosing the type of network 
arising from dependency (Marsh and Rhodes 1992 (a), 251). These encompass 
the membership of the group, the degree of integration and the resources held. 
In department-agency relationships the exchange of resources is not voluntary. 
Through the quasi-contracting arrangement, and backed by the authority of 
ministers and accountability to Parliament, agencies and departments must 
exchange resources. The participants and type of interest is defined in the 
framework document. To this extent, relationships resembling issue networks 
would not be expected to be found in department-agency relationships. Rather, 
variations in the type of policy community are envisaged. These networks are likely 
to vary according to the type of resources held as this will lead to differing 
dependencies. 
However, difference in the degree of integration of the network is expected. This 
will be the determinant of how close the network relationship is and therefore will 
impact on policy outcomes. The level of consensus and continuity within the 
network will depend upon the extent to which cultures is shared. Networks are 
frameworks of relationships based on dependencies and structured by the rules of 
the game. As with the expenditure communities found by Heclo and Wildavsky and 
Thain and Wright, it is where there are shared appreciative systems, of the policy 
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goals and policy problems, of their roles and of the rules of the game that 
department-agency relationships are expected to be close. 
Close policy networks, like policy communities, are said to influence policy 
outcomes, by shaping the policy agenda and constraining policy change. Again 
there are problems in applying this to department-agency relationships. Marsh and 
Rhodes accept most empirical work to date examines "heroic, or political, policy 
areas, with only the sea defences case study being 'humdrum' or technical" (Marsh 
and Rhodes 1992 (a), 252). One raison d6tre for the establishment of agencies 
was that they provided routine policies often at some distance from ministers. It is 
unlikely, therefore, to expect to see department-agency networks acting in the same 
way as larger sectoral policy networks, influencing and shaping 'heroic' policy areas 
(although this must remain an empirical question). After all, agencies were 
introduced to effect a policy operations split and an organisational break between 
policy making and management. It is not envisaged they will lobby or assume 
ideological policy positions and seek to shift government goals to better match 
those beliefs. It is envisaged that the existing policy networks which surround a 
policy area between government and interest groups will still exist and operate 
independently of 'bureaucratic' department-agency networks. 
The role of agencies in policy making was designed to highlight the operational 
implications of policy decisions and it may be that by emphasising operational 
parameters, a bureaucratic network will effectively 'steer the policy agenda. It is far 
more likely that department-agency networks will influence and shape 
implementation policies. Although as the literature search in the last chapter made 
clear, implementation difficulties can quickly become major political problems in 
areas of political saliency. 
How bureaucratic networks might act to constrain the policy agenda, or how they 
might interact with existing policy networks in the area are empirical questions in 
their own right and are not addressed directly in this research. Here the aim is to 
take the initial step of applying the concept to agencification to see if department- 
agency relationships can be described as networks. The assertion here is that the 
policy' question that bureaucratic networks are primarily concerned with, is the 
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administrative policy of operating through agency status. It is argued that features 
of the network will impact on implementation of the agency concept and thereby on 
the delivery of the already agreed government goals in that policy area. 
Policy Networks - A'Meso-level' Analysis 
The concept of policy networks is described as a 'meso- level' concept. It is said to 
provide a link between "the micro level of analysis, which deals with the role of 
interests and government in relations to particular policy decisions, and the macro 
level of analysis, which is concerned with the broader questions concerning the 
distribution of power within contemporary society"(Marsh and Rhodes 1992 (a), 1). 
One problem in using a meso level concept is how to relate it to the macro and 
micro level of analysis. What structural features constrain the agents operating in 
these meso level networks? It is important to link the micro, meso and macro levels 
of analysis and take account of the historical, cultural and ideological context. 
Firstly because of the 'dialectical' nature of the way in which 'actors' respond to, 
operate in, and thereby shape, their network. Thus, Schein describes 
organisational culture as 
"a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a 
given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and 
internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, 
therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think 
and feel in relation to those problems" (Schein, 1985 9). 
Further, Lukes suggests power cannot be observed from examining decision 
making or even non-decision making (Lukes 1974). Smith argues in order to 
determine why some interests dominate, it is necessary to link the analysis to 
theories about the distribution of power (Smith 1993,233). Here it is suggested the 
idea of historical institutionalism is helpful in providing a macro level approach to 
power and to the operation of structural features on networks and actors within 
networks. 
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New institutionalism, historical institutionalism and political analysis 
Historical institutionalism is said to be one variant of several 'new institutional' 
approaches to theorising the importance of institutions on political phenomenon. 
The new institutionalist literature is both flourishing and contradictory. New 
institutionalist analyses are found across the disciplines, in politics, sociology 
(including organisational theory) and economics. Broadly speaking new 
institutionalist approaches in politics have focused on the impact of institutional 
arrangements on state development and governance structures. Economic 
approaches have looked at the impact of institutional arrangements on the 
aggregated decision making of individual agents, whilst sociological approaches 
have emphasised the existence of informal and cultural norms and their 
institutionalisation in society generally. Across these broad disciplinary paradigms 
there has been significant and productive cross fertilisation (Gamble 1995; Hall and 
Taylor 1996; Lowndes 1996; Peters 1999). 
March and Olsen, in first articulating the need for new institutionalist analyses in 
political theory, sought to draw attention to a more state centric understanding and 
awareness that "the organisation of political life makes a difference" (March and 
Olsen 1984; Peters 1999). A concern with the operation of institutions has been a 
traditional and long standing concern of political literature, and public administration 
in particular (Rhodes 1995; Lowndes 1996). However 'new institutionalist' 
approaches are said to be differentiated from older variants by being less 
descriptive, having a concern to theorise and by looking beyond the formal, legal 
and constitutional rules to an acceptance of the importance of informal 
arrangements (March and Olsen 1984; Lowndes 1996; Peters 1999). 
Within political science, discernable variants of 'new institutionalism' are identifiable. 
Hall and Taylor identify three approaches, 'rational choice institutionalism' 
stemming from economic approaches to understanding the decision making of 
rational actors in political institutions, 'sociological institutionalism' stemming from 
an acknowledgment of non formal cultural practices in understanding institutions 
and 'historical institutionalism j. The latter emphasises power relations in 
institutions, the historical context and path dependency of social causation, and the 
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possibility for institutions to change in response to exogenous and endogenous 
pressures. The authors see historical institutionalism as having both rational choice 
(or calculus) and sociological (or cultural) variants to the understanding of the 
actions of agents (Hall and Taylor, 1996,937 - 942). 
Peters identifies seven variants and separates a 'normative institutionalism' which 
focuses on informal features - norms, values and cultural expectations - from 
'historical institutionalism' emphasising historical context and path dependency in 
understanding contemporary structures. Peters also links Marsh and Rhodes'work 
on policy networks with a 'societal institutionalism', highlighting the genesis of 
policy networks approaches in an understanding of state - interest group relations 
although accepting insights can be applied to relationships within government 
(Peters 1999,20). 
Peters distinctions are helpful analytically in de-coding the burgeoning new 
institutionalist literature and highlighting the need for empirical clarity in research 
design. However, Peters definition of historical institutionalism is not used here as it 
separates out the historical, normative and power relations aspects of an 
appreciation of the impact of institutional arrangements. There is considerable 
debate about the meaning and epistemology of historical institutionalism in the 
literature. Pierson suggests "historical institutionalism is a loose term covering a 
range of scholarship that has tried to combine social science concerns and methods 
with a recognition that social processes must be understood as historical 
phenomena" (Pierson 1996,131). Indeed Peters concludes his interrogation of the 
literature by seeking to identify where commonality may be found and sees an 
alignment between the normative and historical institutionalist approaches (Peters 
1999,145). This returns to Hall and Taylors broader definition of a historical 
institutionalist approach and it is their review of the literature which guides the 
analysis here. 
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Historical institutionalism, dependency and networks 
Historical institutionalists, emphasise the institutional influences on political and 
policy phenomena and the importance of 'organisational factors in public life' (Hall 
and Taylor 1996; Evans, Ruescherneyer and Skocpol 1985; March and Olsen 
1984). They argue the existing formal and informal institutional arrangements 
provide opportunities to facilitate change, and form constraints on change, in 
response to exogenous and endogenous factors. The 'path dependency' of 
historical events is suggested as existing institutional arrangements both create 
opportunities for and constrain future change through existing state capacity and 
policy legacies, or the operation of policy paradigms, within which policy makers 
operate (Weir and Skocpol 1985; Hall 1993). Previously theorists have stressed 
continuity in institutions with change occurring only at critical junctures where the 
existing institutional arrangements are discredited and new paradigms emerge (Hall 
1993,942). More recently however, work has focused on the nature of incremental 
change (Cortell and Peterson, 1999). Research work examining changes in central 
government have drawn on this body of work to look, at policy making in 
departments (Richards and Smith 1997), at how Whitehall adapted to participation 
in the European Union (Bulmer and Burch 1998) and at the introduction of market 
testing to central government (Newman, Richards and Smith 1998). 
Institutional arrangements arise both from the formal organisational and 
constitutional set-up, which determines roles, rules and the allocation of institutional 
resources, and from informal understandings that structure, influence and guide 
behaviour and policy outcomes. Within these institutional arrangements, applying 
across Whitehall and the British central state, it is suggested here that networks 
based on resource exchange are created. - These networks in turn further act to 
facilitate or constrain change acting as 'institutions' within institutions. 
Taking the ideas of historical institutionalism, dependency and networks together 
provides the following interpretation of the impact of agencies on government. The 
institutional arrangements pre-agency, described as 'management by command', 
led to close informal networks such as identified by Heclo and Wildavsky's famous 
study of the Whitehall Village (Heclo and Wildavsky 1981). The community of 
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political administrators which Heclo and Wildavsky researched operated under the 
'Whitehall model' with the attendant formal and informal rules and beliefs which 
structured their actions and decisions. As described in the previous chapter these 
include the acknowledgement of parliamentary sovereignty most particularly 
exercised through the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, an organisational culture 
based around the Haldane principles and uniformity across the service, and (in 
some cases) an organisational structure based around hierarchical, pyramidal 
departments. The roles of politicians and administrators, the institutional rules and 
appropriate behaviour was understood and shared by all parties. 
Change to these institutional arrangements came in response to both exogenous 
and endogenous factors. Exogenous factors included the economic and ideological 
pressure for change stemming from new right thinking. Endogenous change 
pressures came from the political and managerial critiques of the 'Whitehall model'. 
The introduction of 'management by contract' through the agency concept has 
altered the organisational structures and cultures of central government. It is 
suggested here the introduction of a policy operational split, formalised 
organisationally and supported by changed accountability, financial and personal 
arrangements, has led to a change in the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements and that those arrangements reflect path dependency in their 
development. 
Firstly it is suggested that there will be path dependency in the reallocation of 
resources, i. e. the decision making around the establishment of agencies within 
departments. Which agencies are established and when, is likely to reflect the pre- 
history of those functions or existing 'state capacity' in these areas. As identified in 
chapter two (see page 24) considerable variation in the organisation of departments 
existed and is expected to influence structural changes arising from agencification. 
These structural changes are also likely to be influenced by the existing policy 
preferences of policy makers, civil servants and politicians in each policy area 
influencing the decision making about what is appropriate and possible to move to 
agency status. 
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Secondly drawing on the experience of the nationalised industries highlighted in 
chapter two (see page 33), it is envisaged there will be path dependency in the 
changes in the rules of the game and role expectation heralded by agencification. 
The introduction of the agency concept introduces new rules and norms of 
behaviour but it is expected that existing, informal rules and norms will also be 
maintained. 
The changed institutional arrangements have led to a more explicit exchange of 
resources between ministers, supported by their departments, and agencies. The 
different basis for the exchange of resources has led to the development of power 
dependency relationships between agencies and departments and the creation of 
different networks. 
Agents and networks 
As well as seeking to link the establishment and operation of networks within a 
broader structural context, in a similar vein it is also necessary to link theories of 
agency to the concepts of policy networks and historical institutionalism. Hall and 
Taylor suggest there are two possible approaches within the tradition of historical 
institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). The first is to take a calculus approach and 
draw on theories of agency associated with rational choice. Here the roles and 
rules would come from the institutional arrangements and decisions would be driven 
by rationality and self-maximising behaviour. This type of linkage is advocated by 
Dowding (1995(b)) and James (1994) and there have been attempts to link 
institutional rational choice with network analysis. Blom-Hansen attempts to 
determine the 'behavioural logic' of actors operating in a bargaining game in 
networks (1997). Hindmoor suggests that networks act to reduce transaction costs 
(1998). 
There are similar difficulties with this type of approach to those outlined in respect of 
bureau shaping. The first difficulty is that causal models can frequently be 
inaccurate when tested in new situations (Green and Shapiro, 1996). For example, 
Hindmoor argues that seeing networks as ways of reducing the transaction costs of 
co-operation games permits a causal ranking of the dimensions of Marsh and 
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Rhodes' typology of networks. He argues 
, 
that outcomes will be pareto superior 
where there is trust and that this develops primarily where the number of 
participants is small. Therefore the number of participants is the key indicator Of 
pareto optimum outcomes. Whilst the idea that trust in networks is crucial is also 
highlighted here, this explanation is flawed because of the insistence of seeking a 
causal ordered relationship between the variables. For example, the network 
surrounding the Prison Service Agency primarily consisted of the Home Secretary 
and the ACE. There was no role for the department. Yet despite this network being 
far smaller than others there was a patent lack of trust and deeply problematic 
outcomes. To understand this requires a less deterministic and more reflexive 
interpretation of agency. 
The alternative is to take a 'cultural' approach to understanding the role of agents 
suggesting "choice of a course of action depends on the interpretation of a situation 
rather than on purely instrumental calculation" (Hall and Taylor, 1996,939). This 
takes a fundamentally different ontological approach to the understanding of human 
behaviour, seeing individuals as socialised into roles responding to the 'logic of 
appropriateness' of the institutional circumstances in which they operate. 
"Institutions constitute and legitimise political actors and provide them with 
consistent behavioural rules, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, 
affective ties and endowments and thereby with a capacity for purposeful actions 
(March and Olsen 1996). Actors are driven by and determine moral codes and the 
logic of appropriate behaviour as well as also being rational and sometimes self 
maximising. They are also reflexive both responding to and shaping their 
environments. Simple causal models cannot capture the dialectical and iterative 
relationship between the strategic actions of agents and the structured context in 
which they operate (Hay and Winncott 1998; Marsh and Smith 1998). 
Implicitly this Chapter has already assumed a cultural approach to an 
understanding of agency reflecting the personal philosophical preference of the 
author. It is argued that policy agents operate in a path dependent structured 
environment which sets the rules of the game and allocates roles and resources. In 
particular, the introduction of agencies introduced principal - agent roles alongside 
existing traditional bureaucratic roles. The development of power dependent 
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networks based on resource exchange create the circumstances for actors to 
develop - or not develop - shared perceptions of policy questions and solutions and 
to constrain or facilitate change in that policy environment. The analysis seeks to 
provide a "decentred study of an institution [which] explores the way it is created, 
sustained or modified through the ideas and actions of individuals" (Bevir and 
Rhodes, 1999). Although the linkages between the micro analysis and the macro 
context may be difficult to identify, the advantage of the policy networks approach is 
that it provides the framework for identifying the historical, ideological, institutional 
and interpersonal features of the policy process and most crucially the dynamic 
between these factors. 
The concept of policy networks has been subject to considerable criticism and 
debate. The following section of this chapter will set out these critiques and look at 
methodological steps taken in this thesis to address them. 
Criticisms of the Concept of Policy Networks 
Dowding argues that the concept of policy networks is primarily descriptive not 
explanatory. "The driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not 
network characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within the 
networks " (1995 (b), 137). He claims that the explanatory work is primarily found 
when looking at the 'properties of actors and not in terms of the properties of the 
network" (1995 (b), 141). Further, neither the Rhodes model of power dependence 
or the typology of networks offered by Marsh and Rhodes separates independent 
and dependent variables (Dowding 1995(b)). Dowding's preference, influencing 
the work of Blom-Hansen and Hindmoor mentioned earlier, would be to seek to 
"construct a proper model which causally relates the characteristics to each other 
and to the different types of policy outcome" (1995,141). 
The difficulties in seeking to identify causal relationships or explanations which 
focus on the actions of rational individuals have been discussed earlier. In part the 
choice of whether to seek such scientific explanations depends upon an ontological 
and epistemological stance. Dowding's stance is not shared here. As John and 
70 
Cole point out "it is rarely the case that research into decision making processes 
can separate dependent and independent variables" (1995,306). Proponents of 
policy network analysis do not describe it as a predictive theory. Rather it is 
suggested as a 'concept' that is useful, in explaining relationships, the policy 
process, policy change and therefore the effect on, not determination of, policy 
outcomes (Rhodes 1988; Marsh and Rhodes 1992 (a); Smith 1993; Marsh and 
Smith, 1995). The idea of dependency and networks suggests the range of 
variables which influence the power dependency relationships and how that impacts 
on the policy process. It permits a contextual and dynamic analysis offering a 
framework for linking the institutional and interpersonal. 
Nevertheless, Dowding's criticisms raise important questions. There are questions 
about which part of the network concept drives the explanation. Do networks have 
an institutional basis arising from resource exchange captured by the Rhodes 
model, or are they interpersonal, stemming from the shared informal culture 
indicated in Heclo and Wildavsky's Whitehall village (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992 (a) 
261; Marsh and Smith 1995; Bevir and Rhodes 1999)? 
Marsh and Smith suggest that a 'dialectic' approach is required to integrate the 
influence of interpersonal and institutional factors in examining Whitehall networks 
(Marsh and Smith 1995). They agree that networks are based on resource 
dependencies, thus stressing the importance of organisational relationships. 
"These relationships are structural because they: define the roles that actors within 
networks play; prescribe the issues that are discussed and how they are dealt with; 
they have distinct sets of rules; and contain organisational imperatives - at the very 
least maintaining the network" (Marsh and Smith, 1995,16). Yet, many networks 
will be informal and may depend upon personal contacts. Therefore "within 
networks there is a shared world view; a common culture" (Marsh and Smith 1995, 
17). The question of whether bureaucratic networks identified between 
departments and agencies have an institutional or an interpersonal basis and how 
they operate remains an empirical question. 
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Methodological issues 
In order to address Dowding's (1995(b)) two main critiques (policy network analysis 
is descriptive and not explanatory and that the model fails to establish dependent 
and independent variables) and to seek to explore the related question above of the 
institutional or interpersonal basis of networks, two methodological approaches 
were taken. 
The research design of a multiple case study 
The first is to use a multiple case study to examine the questions set out in chapter 
two. Yin (1994) argues a case study approach is suggested when the investigator 
has little control over events and when the focus is on contemporary phenomena 
within some real life context (Yin 1994,13). He argues that the validity of this 
methodology is improved by the use of theory in establishing the case study design, 
and in using a multiple case study to test for analytical generalisations arising from 
the case study questions. Where it may not be possible to isolate one variable and 
test it as in scientific experiment, Yin suggests it is possible to seek to apply the 
logic of experimental design by using a multiple case study approach. 
Here analytical generalisation is sought using the logic of replication. Thus, using a 
theoretical framework should indicate the conditions under which a particular 
phenomenon would be likely to be found - and when it would not be found. As 
noted earlier, the concept of policy networks suggested an analytical explanation 
for why some department-agency relationships had not worked as well as others 
with consequent difficulties in their operations. Smooth implementation was 
expected to be found where close policy communities based on shared values, 
goals and institutional support exist between departments and agencies. Cases 
can be selected which are expected to support the hypothesis, (literal replication) 
and cases should be picked which are expected to disprove the hypothesis but for 
predictable reasons, (theoretical replication). "If all the cases turn out as predicted, 
these [six to ten] cases in the aggregate would have provided compelling support 
for the initial set of propositions" (Yin 1994,46). 
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A multiple case study of seven agencies' relationships with their parent department 
has formed the basis of this thesis. The agencies were chosen from three 
departments, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Social 
Security (DSS) and the Home Office. This research benefited from association 
with a larger project which focused on these departments examining Central 
Government Departments and the Policy Process (ESRC Whitehall Programme 
L124251023). 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is one of the biggest departments in 
Whitehall with over 10,000 staff of whom approximately one third worked in 
agencies (Daily Telegraph, 16/11/95). It established agencies very early and by 
1994 it had ten agencies although in the last four years some of its agencies have 
been privatised. The Department of Social Security (DSS), like the DTI js was 
reported to have been initially in favour of an agency approach and has the greatest 
delegation to agency status with over 98% of its staff based in agencies, as well as 
responsibility for the biggest agency. At the same time, it is often described as 
seeking to develop a strong departmental approach to agency status. (Greer 1994). 
The Home Office is said to be one of the great Departments of State, having a 
'liberal culture' "generated by decades of research findings from Home Office 
officials and from funded external research " (Dowding 1995(b), 115). It only has 
four agencies, the Passport Office, the Forensic Science Service (FSS), the Fire 
Service College and the Prison Service Agency. These departments therefore 
provide a variety of approaches to agencies and have agencies representing a 
range of organisational histories, funding, size and type. The departments, and 
how they responded to the agency concept, will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
Using the power dependency framework to analyse relationship between 
departments and agencies suggests the following are key variables. Size, larger 
agencies are expected to be of greater importance to ministers and departments 
because of the organisational and administrative resources they hold. Likewise 
type, statutory or monopoly or service agencies are likely to be of greater 
importance if they enforce the law, deal with the public and/or operate in politically 
salient areas. Source of finance , 
how the agency is financed is likely to affect the 
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relationship, as the ability to raise funds may reduce agencies' dependence on 
ministers and departments. The history of the establishment and of the main actors 
involved may influence the kind of informal links, shared appreciative systems and 
store of information held. 
In selecting agencies within these departments, the agencies chosen cover a wide 
variety of sizes, type, funding regimes and organisational histories. Thus, 
according to the Rhodes Framework, these agencies should reveal a variety of 
dependency relationships. Four were chosen to predict literal replication for the 
hypothesis above: Companies House, the Laboratory of the Government Chemist 
(LGC), the Insolvency Service and the FSS. The CSA and the Prison Service 
Agency were chosen to predict theoretical replication, i. e. that where there was not 
shared values goals and institutional support, implementation will be problematic. 
Yin suggests that, if it is uncertain whether external conditions will produce different 
results, then these relevant conditions may be articulated explicitly at the outset and 
a larger number of cases included. The alternative explanation for problematic 
implementation suggested by the literature search was the political salience of the 
policy area. The determinants for political salience were discussed earlier and are 
also related primarily to size and function. The Benefits Agency has been included 
in the case study to represent a very large agency working in a sensitive policy area 
which was said to have a high degree of political saliency. It too was headed by an 
Chief Executive from outside the civil service initially. However he had a local 
government background which suggests a, familiarity with operating in a political 
environment and, coupled with the institutional links the Benefits Agency had with 
the Department of Social Security, this case is expected to show literal replication 
with the hypothesis. 
Details of the agencies, their establishment and operating goals are provided in 
Chapter Five. Overall, the agencies chosen represent a variety of sizes, types, 
financing arrangements, parent departments and potential for political saliency. If 
fieldwork confirms the expectations of the multiple case study then this provides 
strong support for the analysis used to address the case study questions. However 
it is difficult to isolate all the independent variables to provide matching cases as 
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Yin recommends because of the uniqueness of each NSA and the finite number of 
candidates for examination. 
This highlights a problem presented by the comparative or multiple case study 
methodology. As Mackie and Marsh point out selecting the number of cases to 
compare involves a trade off between "d 
, 
etail and general isabi lity" (Mackie and 
Marsh, 1995,180). Where this tradeoff is made may depend on the unit of 
analysis, the traditions of the discipline or the personal preference of the 
researcher. Ultimately the comparative case study method cannot provide a 
substitute for a laboratory and "the trick is to acknowledge and cope with as many 
problems as possible" (Mackie and Marsh, 1994,180). Indeed this methodology is 
not used here in order to ape positivistic experimentation of the sort used in the 
natural sciences. It is used to seek to provide openness in the analysis, and to 
attempt to criticise and compare "rival webs of interpretation about agreed facts 
using rules of intellectual honesty" (Bevir and Rhodes 1999). The application of 
Yin's suggestions for research design and case study tactics to improve the tests of 
validity and reliability provides a helpful framework for addressing the problems of 
case study methodology whilst utilising its suitability for capturing the 
interconnectivity and complexity of real-life situations. 
Details of fieldwork 
In order to explore the validity of the analytical approach chosen to address the 
case study questions, information was gathered from primary and secondary 
sources and through interviews. The vast amount of documentation produced by 
agencies provided a fruitful source of information. This included original and 
revised framework documents, annual reports, strategic and annual business plans 
and evaluation reports. Material was also available through reports on agencies by 
consultants as part of the prior options process and from the annual departmental 
reports and Next Steps Review. Secondary sources included newspaper and 
television reports including documentaries on the IDSS and the role of the Home 
Secretary. Also helpful were quarterly Price Waterhouse publications which 
contained survey information. Particularly valuable were the many Select 
Committee sessions at which department and agency officials gave evidence. 
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Minutes of evidence from the three departmental select committees, the TCSC 
(latterly Public Service Committee), the Public Accounts Committee, the Committee 
of the Parliamentary Ombudsman and the House of Lords Committee on Public 
Service as well as Hansard were consulted. This was particularly useful in 
obtaining relevant material from three former ACEs who it had not been possible to 
contact. 
Interviews were conducted on a (pre-dominantly) non-attributable basis with thirty 
senior off icials, politicians and observers. Pooled questions with the ESRC 
research team permitted interview material to be gathered from a further five 
officials and some junior staff. Interviews were held with a member of the Ibbs 
Team and members and former members of the Next Steps Team. Senior officials 
responsible for the introduction of agencies in each of the departments and those 
with current responsibilities were interviewed, as well as Permanent Secretaries 
from all three departments. Ten of a possible fourteen ACEs in post since the 
launch of each agency were interviewed including all current ACEs'. Finally 
ministers from each department and three academic observers were seen. Most 
interviews took the form of a semi-structured interview with core questions asked of 
each respondent. However it was felt important to create the opportunity for 
interviewees to provide their perceptions of the questions the research sought to 
address and towards the end of the interview open questions permitted more 
discursive and reflexive responses. 
Presentation of findings 
The second methodological step taken to address the criticisms discussed earlier is 
to present the findings thematically and not on a case by case basis assessing each 
network separately. The advantages of presenting findings thematically are 
threefold. Firstly it allows observation of which part of the explanation is driving the 
analysis. Disaggregating information on the exchange of resources, the structural 
and cultural components of how relationships were conducted assists in assessing 
the question of whether an independent variable can be identified as Dowding 
1 The new Director General of the Prison Service was appointed during the final preparation 
of this document and has not been interviewed. 
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argued (1 995(b)). It enables some assessment to be made of the question of 
whether networks are institutionally or interpersonally based (Marsh and Rhodes 
1992). Secondly, it permits some general analysis of the impact of agencies across 
government. Whilst accepting the disaggregated nature of change, it offers the 
chance to see if there are broader themes of how agency arrangements have 
affected the policy process more generally. For example, the degree of autonomy 
agencies exercise and the accountability they provide. Finally, and more 
practically, reporting thematically makes it easier to use the rich data and insightful 
comments gathered through interview material whilst ensuring the non 
attributability of their source. 
Thus drawing on the Rhodes framework, chapter five will look at the goals of the 
case study agencies. Chapter six will examine the change in the distribution of 
resources caused by agencification and how this has altered dependency 
relationships between departments and agencies. Chapter seven will examine the 
processes of exchange used to manage the dependency relationships. Using 
findings from earlier chapters and relating them to the Marsh and Rhodes network 
typology, chapter eight will then look at the networks which have been identified. It 
will address whether features of the network impacted on implementation and 
delivery of government goals. It will seek to assess how closely the fieldwork 
findings support the expectations of the multiple case study. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined analytical approaches which could be applied to 
understanding department-agency relationships. The chosen theoretical approach 
for this thesis uses the idea of power dependency and the concept of policy 
networks as its analytical anchor within an overall framework of historical 
dependency. The introduction of agencies changed the institutional arrangements 
in government and led to new rules of the game, changed role expectations and a 
changed distribution of resources. The exchange of resources between 
departments (and their ministers) and agencies in central government has led to the 
creation of changed power dependency networks. These networks are likely to 
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resemble policy communities given that the exchange of resources is fundamental 
to the framework within which each department and agency operates. However, it 
is argued that features of the network might be linked to the explanation of why 
some relationships have worked well and some have not, with consequent 
problems. It is argued that only where there are shared values, goals and 
institutional support will the network make a smooth transition to operating through 
the agency concept and manage the tensions created by the new arrangements. 
Where this does not occur problems are anticipated. 
Drawing on these analytical concepts raised additional theory-driven questions in 
addition to the normative and empirical ones outlined in chapter two. For example, 
how much do department-agency relationships have an institutional basis in 
resource exchange or are networks still the traditional informal networks of the type 
identified by Heclo and Wildavsky in the 'Whitehall village'? How do networks affect 
policy implementation and influence the policy process and what is the role of 
networks in policy shaping as well as in implementation? Whilst not forming the 
primary focus of this research it is hoped that the process of assembling data to 
address the case study questions will permit some reflection on these theoretical 
questions as part of the concluding comments of the thesis 
Criticisms of the policy networks approach include suggestions that it is descriptive 
and fails to separate dependent and independent variables. Whilst expressing 
doubt about the possibility of finding a single causal and testable explanation for the 
questions above, these criticisms draw attention to the need to introduce some 
comparability of findings and provide clarity about how the explanation is operating. 
This chapter concluded by setting out the design of a multiple case study and how 
findings will be presented. The next chapter begins the process of presenting 
findings. It examines path dependency and resource dependency in the 
introduction of agencies both in departments at the centre, and in centre of the 
three departments examined. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TAKING FORWARD NEXT STEPS 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to set out contextual information about the development of 
agencies both across government and in the specific departments in this research. 
As the 'historical institutionalism' literature (discussed in chapter three) sets out, 
exploring these institutional contexts is helpful as they inform the formal and 
informal rules of the game within which department-agency relationships are 
perceived and conducted. The institutional arrangements supporting agencification 
also determine the distribution of resources between departments and agencies 
and suggest the roles. actors expected and were expecting to play. 
The chapter draws on two analytical themes outlined in chapter three. The first is 
that of 'resource dependency' operating in the core executive, between 
departments at the centre and the centre of departments. It is argued this 
dependency led to compromise and negotiation in the implementation of the 
agency concept in departments. The second is of 'path dependency' in the 
development of institutional arrangements both across government and within 
departments. 
Initially the chapter will briefly review information presented in chapter two. It will 
look at how the Next Steps policy was developed and how the key features of the 
policy reflected the existing institutional contexts and the process of getting Next 
Steps on the agenda. The second section of the chapter looks at the work of the 
Next Steps Team and the Treasury and how these departments at the centre 
interacted with departments to take forward 'Next Steps'. Finally departmental 
responses are discussed, especially the three departments chosen, the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department of Social Security (DSS) and the Home 
Office. This illustrates how the context of each department differed and resulted in 
adaptations to the 'Next Steps' model. 
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In conclusion, it will be argued firstly that the interdependency between parts of 
government caused compromises in the implementation of the agency concept. 
Secondly, that path dependency in existing arrangements across government and 
within departments led to further compromises and departmental adaptations. 
Actors' understandings of what'Next Steps' meant, of the rules of the game, of the 
roles they should play, was not uniform across government. Understandings of 
some of the formal and informal rules were dynamic and often quite departmentally- 
specif ic. 
Getting Next Steps on the Agenda 
The debates and battles in Whitehall as the 'Next Steps' policy was formulated and 
introduced were outlined in chapter two. It was suggested that the original report 
was more radical than the published version and that the changes reflected the 
interests and concerns of both ministers and officials. These assertions are 
discussed further here. 
During 1987 and 1988 the Efficiency Unit and subsequently the Next Steps Team 
held a far more devolutionary approach towards the establishment of agencies than 
either the Treasury or most departments. They were concerned with wrenching 
control over routine management tasks, like pay and personnel, away from the 
centre and passing it to operational units, "[t]o some extent, with the people who 
were keen to become agencies, we were sort of like liberators" (member of the 
Next Steps 'ream). Those at the centre, in the Treasury did not want to lose control 
over spending initially (Chapman, 1997), although they could see the link with the 
potential for privatisation (Lawson, 1993). Equally, ministers and those at the 
centre of departments did not want to lose control over those resources and 
departments especially feared the threat of privatisation (Zifcak, 1994). Finally the 
Prime Minister, and other politicians were said to be unhappy with the radical 
changes to parliamentary accountability being suggested (Hennessy, 1989). 
The collection of ideas that came to be presented as the 'Next Steps' concept in the 
lbbs Report can be seen to reflect the debates and compromises during this 
80 
gestation period. These ideas were sometimes contradictory. They included the 
appointment of a Chief Executive figurehead having clear oversight over an area of 
work, but with limited financial delegation, the proposal that departments were to 
maintain their role in advising ministers yet were to develop new roles in managing 
operations at arm's length and also the combination of a policy operations split and 
yet the continuation of ministerial responsibility. 
The ambiguity surrounding the Next Steps message can be seen to be essential as 
it allowed each institutional actor to seek to fulfil their own wishes through its 
framework. To some extent this ambiguity was deliberate. One official involved with 
negotiations at the start suggested, "[e]ither agencies could have been simply 
within the public sector, doing it better, which is what we said with one side of our 
mouth you might say, the other side of the mouth said 'there it is packaging it for 
privatisation'" (interview with former member of the Next Steps Team). 
The Next Steps concept was not enshrined in legislation or placed on any statutory 
footing. One official involved in the early days reflected, "[o]ne of the great things 
going for Next Steps was there wasn't much written down about it. There was just 
the original report and the PM's statement ... thank goodness we didn't have to do 
any legal stuff really because we'd never have made it" (interview with former Next 
Steps Team official). , 
The only primary legislation which applied to the agency concept was the 
Government Trading Act 1990 permitting the establishment of agencies as trading 
funds and the appointment of ACEs as accounting officers. Over time some of the 
administrative procedures began to be formalised in response to demands from the 
TCSC, for example the publication of framework documents (TCSC, HC 494,1988, 
8), procedures for the appointment of ACEs (TCSC, HC 348,1989,8), and 
publication of ACE replies to parliamentary questions in Hansard (TCSC, HC 390, 
1992,207), leading to the development of codes and conventions informing the 
formal rules of the game. The original lbbs recommendations were supplemented 
by further recommendations from the centre of government stemming from the 
Fraser and Trosa reports (Efficiency Unit, 1991; Trosa, 1994). These formal rules 
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of the game were summarised in chapter two'. However at core, the 'Next Steps' 
orthodoxy was, and still is, a dynamic concept, reflexive and responsive to external 
events, institutional learning and political imperatives. Or as one former member of 
the Next Steps Team pointed out I think it's whatever people can make work' 
Accounting for ambiguity 
Two ideas from chapter three assist in explaining how the Next Steps concept came 
to have ambiguous and sometimes contradictory meaning. The first is the idea of 
resource dependency within the core executive. The Efficiency Unit needed the 
backing of the Prime Minister. Having the Prime Minister's endorsement gave the 
policy a strong platform across government. Nevertheless the co-operation of the 
Treasury in particular and of departmental officials and departmental ministers was 
essential to put the policy through the machinery of government. The approval and 
authority of the Treasury was needed because of the potential impact on its role of 
ensuring public probity. The centre also needed the organisational and 
informational resources of departments and the authority of departmental ministers 
to take the policy forward. For example, in the period before the launch of the 
report, the centre needed to find potential agency candidates in departments for the 
announcement to Parliament. 
The importance of the commitment of the Prime Minister and Head of the Civil 
Service to Next Steps provided strong incentives for co-operation. For some, it was 
perceived that their Minister would be keen to progress the project. One deputy 
secretary with responsibility for drawing up nominations before the February 1988 
announcement said "we just assumed our Minister would want to be in the van". 
(interview with senior official) The dependency between various part of government 
led to compromise over key parts of the new arrangements and a degree of 
ambiguity in their interpretation. 
The Next Steps concept also illustrates the idea of 'path dependency' in the way 
that existing institutional arrangements act to constrain change and determine the 
1A single comprehensive guide to the various sources of guidance is 'The Chief Executive's 
Handbook' which combines agency specific references with more general civil service 
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extent of change in institutions. This can be particularly seen in relation to the 
accountability arrangements which were introduced. The changes to accountability 
arrangements were set out in Annex A of the lbbs Report (Efficiency Unit 1988,17). 
This suggested (where agencies remained part of departments) the establishment 
of a 'convention' understood by ministers and officials, about how to act in order to 
ensure the autonomy of agency chief executives in operational matters at the same 
time as preserving the overall doctrine of ministerial responsibility. 
This Annex was drafted by Sir Kenneth Stowe and can be seen to relate to his 
background in the DHSS (interview with former official). The DHSS, which has 
always had the biggest post bag of the Whitehall Departments, (Norton, 1988) had 
had to develop this kind of system in order to operate, given the volume of 
correspondence. Members of Parliament frequently contacted the local DSS office 
in the first instance and wrote to ministers where problems could not be resolved at 
local level (Gains, 1990). One official from the DHSS, involved at the start of the 
project, commented "[t]here's a very direct causal link between what we were doing 
in the DHSS and the content of the Next Steps report". Another official from the 
Next Steps Team drew attention to how ministers in the DSS and Employment 
Department had responded to the changed accountability arrangements, I think 
that Employment and the Department of Social Security have been very good... the 
best, maybe it's the nature of the functions, maybe it's because those departments 
deal with the public more" (interview with Next Steps Team Official). This 
institutional history was not shared across government. The messages in the lbbs 
Report were ambiguous and permitted vastly different interpretations of the extent 
of managerial freedom and the meaning of accountability to flourish. 
The 'idea' of Next Steps was not entirely a shared vocabulary or creed. The 
government's Next Steps policy represented a compromise which 'papered over 
substantially different approaches in the 'mind set' of actors in different structural 
positions. This ambiguity, dynamism and compromise continued as agencies were 
established in government. The following section of the chapter looks at how 
departments at the centre, particularly the Next Steps Team, operated to take 
forward Next Steps policy and to develop agencies in government. Later 
references (Next Steps Team, 1997). 
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departmental responses are explored. 
path dependency are seen here also. 
The Role of the Next Steps Team 
The themes of resource dependency and 
The appointment of a Project Manager to oversee the project and drive it forward 
under the authority of the Prime Minister and the Head of the Civil Service was a 
deliberate attempt to provide the project with coherence as well as momentum. The 
announcement in Parliament stated that Peter Kemp was appointed to this role as 
second permanent secretary in the Office of the Minister for the Public Service. 
Kemp headed a small Next Steps team. 
During the Autumn of 1987, the Management and Personnel Office had sought 
candidates for Next Steps status and 12 likely functions had been identified before 
the launch of the project (Goldsworthy 1991,10). Kemp's job in the immediate 
aftermath of the launch was to see these candidates through to agency status, and 
badger departments to comply with the project by identifying more candidates. Part 
of the role of the Team and especially Kemp as its head was to 'sell' the reform to 
the civil service (Gray and Jenkins, 1991/2,45). This was done in both public and 
private arenas, through the media and the hearings of the Treasury and Civil 
Service Committee and in meetings behind the scenes across Whitehall. This was a 
the first time this type of approach had been taken (Goldsworthy, 1991). Kemp set 
about giving a coherence to the Next Steps 'story' and engaging the various 
institutional actors in its implementation. 
Kemp had been at the Treasury and his appointment was helpful in smoothing over 
Treasury concerns. His appointment was also judicious as he had previously 
worked on the Whitely Council pay negotiations and was known and trusted by the 
civil service unions "at the expense of a vast amount of trouble and talking I'd built 
up a certain amount of trust and could pull them along" (Interview with Kemp, 1997). 
Kemp's hardest battles were with those departments and ministers who were 
reluctant to engage with the idea of Next Steps. 
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The role of the project manager and the Treasury and the arrangements for co- 
ordination were described in a submission to the National Audit Office and 
subsequently to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee (NAO, 1989, pp 18 - 21; 
HC 481,1990). Kemp's role included: li 
, 
aison with departments to ensure they 
were informed about the Next Steps proposals and knew what was expected of 
them i. e. the development of a programme to set up agencies; to help departments 
set up agencies through the sharing of experience and providing a liaison role 
between departments and their agencies; to "identify and tackle" issues which 
arose; to make sure training was offered and provided and to report to the Prime 
Minister. 
Kemp was assisted by a small Next Steps unit of (initially) three members. It is 
evident that the team felt a crusading spirit 
"we were a close knit community -I mean I don't think we should get starry- 
eyed or dewy-eyed but there were people who had a real interest and felt 
themselves to be part of a change which was worthwhile making, there was a 
bit of a crusade about it with some people", (official in early Next Steps during 
early phase of implementation). 
The three desk officers each worked closely with a group of departments. The aim 
was to build up close relationships with those departments and to identify potential 
agencies and process these through to achieving agency status. Kemp explained 
"you had to identify friends... you identified friends, people on your side and 
you spent an awful lot of time going to meetings with permanent secretaries 
and things like that to push it along, trying to cash in on the strength which 
was at the back of you all which was Mrs Thatcher' (Interview with Kemp 
1997). 
The team was a vehicle to ensure the transmission of the Prime Ministers authority 
throughout Whitehall and, as Flynn points out, was seen to have positional 
authority stemming from the backing given to the project by the Prime Minister 
(Flynn 1990 165). 
To help with the implementation process several project groups were established. 
A Project Executive made up of representatives from the OMCS, the Next Steps 
Team, the Treasury and the Efficiency Unit met to examine issues which cut across 
government and to look at key strategic issues, such as the changes to the Trading 
85 
Fund legislation. In addition to the Project' Executive, two Project Liaison groups 
made up of departmental representatives, usually the principal finance officersy met, 
one for the large departments and one for smaller ones. These groups looked at 
any issues raised by the Project Executive and shared experiences. In the official 
history of 'Next Steps', Goldsworthy explains "The aim was to foster support for and 
a sense of purpose about Next Steps at senior level", (Goldsworthy, 1991,22). 
This recollection is not universally shared. One Deputy Secretary who attended the 
meetings described them as 
"[d]readful, absolutely unspeakable, nightmarish-to some extent we swapped 
ideas on where we were at but each agency at that stage was pretty much sui 
generis and there was a limit for which exchanged information was useful, 
they were totally formless and they really added no value at all)). 
This really reflects the great antipathy towards the agency concept held by 
departments. An official in the Next Steps team involved in the early days said 
"departments were fairly hostile to the whole concept, a lot of them thought 'this'll go 
away' ". 
It is clear that the key imperative was momentum and this lent an urgency to 
negotiations. "The opposition we had from permanent secretaries, from some 
ministers, from people down in the machine was fantastic and the only way to do it 
was to crash at it very very hard" (interview with Kemp, 1997). Another Next Steps 
Team member explained "it wasn't a project for faint hearts ... there weren't many 
prisoners taken in a sort of Whitehall way in the early meetings - trying to persuade 
people to do things". 
One official on the receiving end of a Next Steps team visit explained " they were 
pretty forceful people coming in and they had different styles, hectoring people or 
badgering people and this terrible speed at which they did things and then, two 
hours later, you'd get a letter! " (Interview with departmental official). An official in 
the DHSS remembered the pressure was "To get it manageable and working to an 
incredibly short deadline. Again there was this sense of being driven by the centre, 
of Peter with Margaret Thatcher's force behind him". 
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This pressure for results led to considerable flexibility in the arrangements - or 
'rules of the game' - made for different agencies depending on how far the team 
and the desk officer in charge was able to resist departmental adaptation (interview 
with former Next Steps team official). Departments had to be seen to go along with 
a policy that carried the Prime Ministers authority, however the Team depended 
upon departments to implement. The power dependency this created permitted 
compromise. The introduction of the agency concept into departments was path 
dependent upon the existing institutional arrangements - the existing departmental 
structure of decision making, as well as the existing rules of the game which 
departments were reluctant to alter. 
The role of the Treasury 
The Treasury was important in the continuing development of Next Steps policies or 
'rules of the game'. As indicated above, prior to the launch of the initiative the 
Treasury had negotiated a considerable role in the process of setting up agencies 
(Henessey, 1988; Chapman, 1997). Although the Treasury were not keen initially 
with the delegation proposed by Next Steps, once reassured about the controls they 
could exert they took the initiative (Thain and Wright, 1995,81). As Kemp 
explained to the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, the process of creating an 
agency allowed "the Treasury to be more relaxed" (TSCS, HC 481,1990, p481). 
This process involved the Treasury at all stages (TCSC, HC 348,1989). 
Once departments identified a function which could be considered for agency status 
they approached the Treasury as well as OMCS to review the 'prior options'. If 
agency status was agreed as the right proposal the Treasury were involved with the 
department, OMCS and any relevant future agency staff in drawing up the 
framework documene. The Treasury advised and authorised the degree to which 
financial and personnel control could be delegated (Greer, 1994; Chapman, 1997). 
They ensured that putative agencies had adequate financial and reporting systems 
and became involved in the process of setting targets. Chapman describes their 
role as having two purposes, a critical purpose in order to check for flaws and a 
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constructive purpose to assist in the process of delegating responsibilities 
(Chapman, 1995,121). The extent of Treasury involvement has relaxed more 
recently as delegation to departments and agencies has become more widespread 
(interview with official in Next Steps team). 
The Treasury were responsible for publishing guidance on the financing and 
accountability of agencies (Cm 914,198-9); on setting targets and measuring 
performance (HM Treasury, 1992) and on other memoranda on the content of 
annual reports. In this way, they were important in establishing the formalising of 
administrative expectations or rules which surround the project over time. 
Departmental Responses 
It is clear there were enormous differences in the way departments responded, with 
some eager to move in the direction of developing agencies and others very 
resistant to the idea. This again highlights path dependency in the Next Steps 
implementation trajectory. There were several problems for departments in 
adopting a Next Steps approach. The first involved the fundamental change of role 
expected at the centre of departments (Zifcak, 1995,84). The implications of the 
Ibbs Report were that the centre of departments would have to change from being 
the apex of a hierarchy which delivered government functions to adopting a 
purchaser role, setting the framework within which the agency works, and advising 
Ministers on evaluating performance in a hands off fashion. Although stressing that 
political sensitivities had to be handled well, departments would have to 'stand back' 
from the operational details and leave 'managers free to manage' (Ibbs Report, 
1988,11). This was problematic for civil servants who were used to smoothing 
policy problems and who would have to continue to operate under the system of 
ministerial responsibility. One deputy secretary explained 
"[d]epartments can never resist meddling, partly because Ministers can't keep 
their hands out of it when things go pear-shaped politically and partly because 
2 The involvement of putative ACEs in developing the agency proposals depended upon 
whether they were an internal candidate, or if externally appointed at what stage their 
appointment was made. 
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it does represent the detraction from the power of the central department and 
nobody likes losing power". 
This hints at a less constitutional ly-based 'departmental concern about agencies. 
For departments, the delegation involved in establishing agencies was very 
threatening in terms of the control they exerted over resources "it took a certain 
amount of power away from the central departments which they didn't welcome 
because a large part of their budgets were no longer under their control" (interview 
with agency chief executive). The greatest resistance to Next Steps was located 
within the finance and resources directorates of departments (Greer, 1994; 
interview with former Next Steps team official). 
The focus on management skills was also threatening to the civil servants who had 
assumed 'the golden route to the top was through policy advice'. There was an 
expectation that high fliers would have to do a spell in agencies and this had 
implications for their career development "they didn't want it to be part of their 
career progression" (interview with official). 
Overall, departments. were said to be deeply resistant. There were, however, 
equally strong motivations for co-operating with the project. Flynn et al suggest that 
some departments, for example DSS and Transport, were already attracted to the 
federal model (1990,166). Others departments, as mentioned earlier, felt they had 
to respond to a policy which had the Prime Minister's backing. A department's 
perceived readiness to respond was key, "it was then very important for 
departments to be seen as virtuous" (Former Deputy Secretary, Finance and 
Resources). 
Being seen to respond, however, did not mean jumping in with both feet. Most of 
the early agency candidates were not key to their departments. One official 
indicated that some functions were offered up as 'sacrificial lambs' to keep the heat 
off other parts of their work (interview with senior official). Overcoming this 
resistance was the key to the first stage of the Next Steps project. 
All the three departments studied for this research put forward a candidate for the 
list of twelve potential agencies announced on the day the lbbs Report was 
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presented to Parliament. These were Companies House in the DTI, the 
Resettlement Unit in the DSS and the Passport Office in the Home Office. 
(Goldsworthy, 1991). These responses from the three departments encompassed 
a range of different decision making processes, institutional and individual 
responses. The next part of this chapter will look at each department in turn to set 
out historical and contextual features which are relevant to the establishment of 
agencies in the department and their different and distinct relationships with their 
agencies. 
Department of Trade and Industry 
The TCSC took evidence from departments about their plans to implement Next 
Steps in their first two inquiries in April 1988 and again in July 1989. The response 
from the DTI gave details about the Comp anies Registration Office as an agency 
candidate. It went on to state that the Next Steps recommendations would be 
examined in relation to service delivery functions which comprised over half the 
Department. Something of the ambivalence the Department felt towards Next 
Steps is indicated in their response "The DTI is concerned to improve the quality of 
services it provides and the value for money that it offers to the taxpayer. Creation 
of executive agencies can provide a means of achieving both these objectives. " 
(TSCS, HC 494, Unpublished memorandum, 1988). 
Peter Gregson the Permanent Secretary at the DTI at the time of the 
announcement in February 1988 was said to be unsure about the idea of agencies 
"his initial feeling was he wasn't in favour of it ... the 
Government having made the 
decision they were going ahead, his job was to make sure it worked ... he was very 
supportive" (former DTI Agency Chief Executive). The DTI's response to the 
announcement was co-ordinated through the Departments Finance and Personnel 
Section in February 1988. One official involved in preparing for the response 
explained, 
I hadn't particularly heard of this until suddenly, I think in February it 
became obvious that Government, driven from No 10, were going to activate 
it. So we very rapidly got to work on it. But we decided really as officials, 
that our Ministers would want to be 'in the van'... and we went through the 
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DTI functional directory and said that's a potential agency, that isn't, one 
afternoon, wrote them out on the back of the envelope if you like. And we 
presented the list to Ministers within a day or so and they said 'Yes we're happy to go along with that' and I believe that every single one of those, 
either became an agency or was something similar'. (Senior official in DTI 
at time of lbbs Report). 
Companies House (Company Information Office as was), was top of the DTI's list. 
It had clear executive responsibilities and a geographical base outside London 
making it very suitable for agency status. The other activities identified were also 
those with "a low policy content", with the exception of the Patent Office (but the 
Department split patent policy from the Patent Office before it was created as an 
agency) (interview with senior official in 1988). The department felt it was able to 
move quite quickly both with the establishment of Companies House and more 
generally in the development of agencies because it could' benefit from previous 
hard work on the financial management initiative and had "the systems in place and 
had got clearly and quite well defined objectives for most of the operations, and 
targets, and so it wasn't a huge step, it was literally a Next Steps to turn them into 
agencies and give them more executive responsibility and public targets and the 
like" (senior official in DTI 1988). 
Lord Young, who was Secretary of State at the time was broadly supportive and 
keen for a speedy launch of Companies House as an agency. It was in fact the 
second agency to be launched just weeks after DVLC. Nicholas Ridley, who took 
over in the summer of 1989 was also enthusiastic and even professed ownership of 
the Next Steps idea (interview with agency chief executive). By 1991/92 the DTI 
had ten agencies with over 50% of the Department's staff working in agencies. 
These included laboratories, regulatory agencies and one providing internal 
services. In 1995 three of the Department's agencies were privatised and the 
percentage of departmental staff working in agencies fell to approximately 25% 
(Next Steps Annual Report 1995; interview with Next Steps team official). 
Despite this apparently early readiness to move down the Next Steps path, there 
were differences of approach between the DTI and the Next Steps Unit reflecting 
the ambivalence outlined earlier. The DTI wanted more control over its agencies 
than the Next Steps Unit thought appropriate. 
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In particular, the DTI had a house style for the governance arrangements of its 
agencies, each of which had a steering board. The Steering Board was chaired by 
the line manager in the department, usually the Deputy Secretary of the appropriate 
Division. This role was later described as the ministers representative following 
publication of the Fraser Report. The Steering Boards also had one or two 
representatives of the finance division and one or two people with a policy interest 
in the relevant operational area from the DTI and one or two outsiders. The 
purpose of these steering boards was to advise the Minister on setting targets, the 
annual business and corporate plans and on the agencies activities. This 
arrangement permitted a degree of close control and supervision. One official 
explained, 
"We felt-that we had to have control, we had to decide what targets to set 
and we had to know enough about it et cetera and-although we could have 
an arm's length relationship, it was not - we weren't going to put a blind 
screen down between us and it. And I don't think that any private sector 
company will do the same with a subsidiary, I mean we were following a 
model of parent company subsidiary although I don't think we ever expressed 
it in those terms but I think that was what we've set up" (senior official in DTI 
1988). 
This very direct and controlling role for the department led a former official in the 
Next Steps team to express the feeling that "some of us here never found the DTI to 
be a particularly Next Steps friendly department. Its always been a very centralist 
department... I think the Chief Executives, although they would tell you otherwise, 
have always had less latitude to do what they want than they might have had in 
some other departments". 
The DTI is perceived as being the department closest to the business world. When 
established, from the historically distinct cultures of the former separate Trade and 
Industry Departments, it was said to have combined both a strong free trade and 
an interventionist ethos respectively (Richards and Smith 1997,8; interviews with 
officials). Both of these aspects are apparent in its agency dealings and give the 
DTI's relationships with its agencies a distinct set of formal and informal rules. Its 
interventionist ethos led it to have a centralising tendency towards its agencies. At 
the same time its close contact with the private sector meant the DTI was more 
familiar with private sector management models than most other departments. The 
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holding company model (which was later recommended for adoption by 
departments and agencies in the Fraser Report (Efficiency Unit, 1991), was 
adopted early and consistently in all the DTI agencies. All its agencies were chosen 
because they did not involve strong policy content 
These historical and contextual features influenced and shaped the framework 
within which the DTI responded to Next Steps and built its relationships with the 
agencies within the department. The decision making structures and process were 
guided not only by the overall Next Steps arrangements but by these departmental 
'rules' and understandings. These were quite different in the two other departments 
studied. 
Department of Social Security 
The DSS is one of the largest departments in Whitehall in terms of budget or share 
of government spending and sheer size of operation with its national network of 
local offices (Henessey, 1989). Unlike most other Whitehall departments it delivers 
its own 'product': there are no other non statutory providerS3 or professional 
intermediaries such as in housing, education or health. As a department, it has 
always had a reputation for producing home grown talent (Interviews with officials, 
Greer 1994,43) with many policy officials beginning their career in the local offices 
delivering benefits and interviewing the public. There has always been a close 
relationship between policy and operations in the Department of Social Security and 
an awareness of the complexity and huge responsibility of delivering social security 
policies. It is argued that the size, interdependence of policy and operations, and 
relatively contained staff culture of the DSS all contributed to the particular way in 
which the DSS responded to the Next Steps concept. 
The Department's response was guided by a series of reports as the introduction of 
the agency concept coincided with a review, in the Department about the delivery of 
social security. The Next Steps idea became linked with debates in the department 
about how social security operations should be conducted (Flynn, Gray and 
3 Housing Benefit is delivered through local authodties and Job Seekers Allowance is run in 
conjunction with the Employment Agency. 
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Jenkins, 1990; Greer, 1995). Karen Caines, one of the members of the Ibbs Team 
which drew up the report came from the Department of Social Security and it is 
clear there was a degree of cross fertilization of ideas. Just after the Ibbs team 
completed their scrutiny in March 1987, Margaret Moodie prepared an internal 
DHSS study into the operation of the regions, which was completed just before 
Christmas 1987 and published shortly after the Ibbs Report in May 1988 (DSS, 
1988). This report was charged with examining the delivery of social security 
through the regions. It drew on similar contemporary management concepts which 
highlighted the need for staff to 'own' their work and for the organisation to get close 
to the consumer and see their'business as service' (DSS, 1988). 
During the period before the publication of the lbbs and Moodie Reports, the 
Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) was still one department. The 
DHSS, like the DTI, quickly offered up a candidate in response to the call for 
candidates before the launch of 'Next Steps' in Parliament. As one official involved 
in the response explained "there was the usual Whitehall question of do you want 
to respond in token fashion to get the centre off your back or with something very 
big" (senior official in DHSS, 1987). The possibility of a developing a 'Collections 
Agency' gathering together functions from the Department of Social Security, Inland 
Revenue and Customs and Excise was considered but not pursued (interview with 
senior official). The Medicines Controls Directorate from the Health side was 
considered. The Resettlement Unit was finally put forward (Unpublished 
memorandum to TCSC, 1988). This provided the possibility for a controlled 
response whilst the Department contemplated the far bigger change suggested by 
the Moodie Report (Unpublished memorandum to TCSC, 1988). 
The Moodie Report 
The Moodie Report' examined the operation of the regional social security 
organisation - the delivery arm of the social security side of the department. Its 
findings were that service levels were highly variable, there was a difficulty in 
retaining staff especially in London and a lack of mission and measurable targets. In 
a striking resemblance to the findings of the Ibbs Report it stated "[t]he urgent tends 
to crowd out the important, the short term necessities obscure the long term 
objectives". (DSS 1988,22). These problems could be addressed by the adoption 
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of strategic oversight by senior management coupled with devolved responsibilities 
for local managers and a clearer sense of good service. It made several 
recommendations, one of which - the relocation of work outside London -received 
the most public and parliamentary attention. Crucially, however, it also suggested 
that the regional organisation was an obvious candidate for agency status. The 
report suggested that, though derived independently, the agency solution suggests 
the same changes. Moving towards the development of an agency would not only 
be valuable as an objective in itself, but the process of creating an agency would 
"concentrate everybody's mind wonderfully" (DSS 1988,23). 
This analysis was not uncontested within the department. Michael Partridge, (who 
took over as Permanent Secretary of the social security side of the DHSS when the 
department split in July 1988) was keen on the idea of agencies (interviews with 
officials). The idea of a policy operational split reflected his experiences in the 
Home Office and the health side of the DHSS where several service delivery 
functions were provided at arm's length (for example, policing, fire, probation and 
social services). It also offered the opportunity to cut out a regional tier of 
management. Partridge was concerned that splitting up the newly created 
department up might cause fragmentation (interviews with senior officials from 
Department of Social Security). There was also resistance to the idea which largely 
stemmed from the finance and personnel division whose chief concern was with the 
loss of control and power that the centre could exert over finance, pay and 
personnel policies (Greer 1994,51; interviews with senior Department of Social 
Security official). Strong corporate policies were developed to address these 
concerns. 
The Hickey Report 
A further study (Hickey Report) was commissioned in July 1988, shortly after the 
Ibbs and Moodie Reports were published, to examine whether social security 
operations could be run as a Next Steps agency or agencies (DSS 1989). This type 
of consideration was essential because of the size and complexity of social security 
operations. A parallel study looked specifically at the viability of the Department's 
IT operations running as an agency (Greer, 1994). The Hickey Report (completed 
at the end of 1988) concluded that agency status would be beneficial. It would 
95. 
introduce managerialism to the operation and would help to focus Ministers' minds 
on the need for service delivery improvements. Privatisation, contractorisation, 
regionalisation and separate smaller agencies covering specific client groups or 
benefits were considered but not thought to 
, 
be appropriate because of the politically 
sensitive and unified nature of social security. 
Like the Moodie Report, the Hickey Report emphasised how the process of moving 
towards agency status would be a vehicle for much needed changes, 
"[a]gency status could reinforce and boost the process of change (even where 
in theory it might not be an essential pre-requisite), by signalling a 
commitment to improvement from the top, by imposing new disciplines, by 
focusing vigorous management attention on the issues, and ultimately by 
providing a catalyst and a focus for change. The importance of these 
psychological factors in driving through improved performance should not be 
under-esti mated" (Hickey, 1988,26). 
The report suggested an early appointment of the chief executive and the 
development of a shadow agency structure prior to launch. It outlined a need for 
staff mobility across agencies and close working relationships between the policy 
and operational arms. A number of formal mechanisms for supporting informal 
close working were suggested. These could be established through policy branches 
having clearly defined opposite numbers in the agency, and 'benefit boards' could 
be set up to provide forums for debate about policy areas. The establishment of a 
departmental management board was suggested to assist the permanent secretary 
in advising the minister. The key debate was whether the contributions unit should 
operate as a separate agency - which it subsequently did. These considerations of 
how close working relationships could be sustained again reflected the complexity 
of social security and that many staff had experience of working in both policy ad 
operations. 
Although the permanent secretary wanted to move to a more federal style 
department, Ministers were less keen to relinquish control. One official described 
the response of Ministers to the proposals, 
"Ministers were always twitchy and it remains the difficulty to this day that 
executive agencies is about handing over to somebody who's more at arm's 
length than a policy official or an official'under their direct control .... 
decisions 
and actions which would be of extreme sensitivity and interest to members of 
Parliament. So Ministers didn't awfully like it" . 
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The risks of moving to agency status however were less than that of displeasing the 
Prime Minister (interview with officials). So in the spring of 1989 the Secretary of 
State announced the Department of Social Security would have, in addition to a 
Resettlement Agency (due to launch the following week), an IT agency from April 
1990, a Benefits Agency representing the whole of the department's former 
operations arm from 1991 and possibility of the development of a Contributions 
Agency. This would place the vast majority, approximately 98% of the department 
into agencies leaving a small policy orientated HQ. These four were subsequently 
joined by two other agencies, the CSA set up to administer new child support 
arrangements in 1993 and the War Pensions Agency in 1994 4. 
Review of DSS HQ 
Uniquely across Whitehall, the Department of Social Security produced a 'Review of 
Department of Social Security HQ, Role, Qrganisation and Functions' to examine 
the work of the Department in the light of agencification. It suggested the move to 
agencies would create an organisation "more akin to a federal or holding company 
structure", (DSS, 1991,1). This report also stressed mechanisms for cross- 
collaboration, communication and co-ordination. It recommended a departmental 
management board - although chief executives of the agencies were not expected 
to be members at this point. 
The department took a very corporate approach to considering the question of 
agencies, including whether to have them, how to divide them and how they would 
work with the remaining HQ policy arm. Their response was far more holistic and 
considered, reflecting the size of the proposed changes, the nature and complexity 
of the work and the relatively self-contained culture of the Department. In many 
ways the split replicated existing organisational structures in the sense that the 
operational arm of the department, the regional organisation, always had a separate 
management and reporting structure. The predisposition towards agencies was as 
a solution to existing departmentally identified issues. The Department of Social 
Security plans were however the most dramatic apparent shift to a new federal way 
of organising. 
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The corporate nature of this approach disguised some major and fundamental 
disagreements between parts of the Department of Social Security, the Next Steps 
team and the emerging agencies. This aspect will be examined in greater detail in 
the next chapter. The Next Steps team felt that the department had taken a too 
cautious approach and stifled the degree of delegation which was desirable 
(interview with officials at centre). Nevertheless the DSS's approach was markedly 
different to other departments not only in the scale of the shift to agencies but in the 
way in which relationships with the agencies were organised. 
This partly reflected the unified nature of the social security operations. Because of 
the technical nature of social security it would be impossible to plan to change a 
social security policy without considering how this could be administered. It also 
reflected the size of the operational or service delivery arm of the department. It 
had the largest executive operation and therefore, logically, the largest percentage 
of work potentially suitable for agencies. The coherence and continuity of 
departmental control was maintained, not through individual steering boards but 
through active staff mobility, historic links and departmental governance through a 
management board. The Department established structures like the management 
board, the policy liaison contacts and staff mobility policies, in addition to the Next 
Steps arrangements which provided formal and informal rules governing the 
relationship between the Department and its agencies. 
Home Office 
The Home Off ice is traditionally described as 'conservative' in constitutional 
orientation whilst liberal in policy outlook (Dowding 1995a; Hennessey 1989; Lewis, 
1997,25; interviews with officials). Two features are relevant to contextualising the 
institutional motivations, beliefs and actions of Home Office civil servants in their 
responses to the agency agenda. Until the Senior Management Review, the 
Department was organised into separate divisions which operated autonomously. 
Decision making was vertically segmented officials in the Home Office often stated 
4 Since 1996 the Resettlement Agency wound up its operations and the Contributions 
Agency has moved to the Inland Revenue. 
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that the divisions 'consume their own smoke' (interviews). Secondly, the subject 
matter of the Home Office is often concerned with questions of the competing 
values of authoritarianism and libertarianism leading to cerebral and cautious 
weighing up of philosophical positions in policy areas which do not involve technical 
clarity to provide definitive answers (Richards and Smith 1997,14). These factors 
led to a cautious and individualised approach being taken to the question of 
agencies in the Home Office with no overal] co-ordination As one official put it, "it 
was a slow, thorough, p recedent-d riven culture, just about as antipathetic to the sort 
of new management as you could find in any government department" (interview 
with former senior home office official). These features again are relevant when 
considering the way in which the Home Office adapted and implemented the 
agency concept. 
The Passport Office was put forward as one of the first twelve candidates 
announced on the publication of the Ibbs Report. The Home Office report to the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee indicates their cautious approach to further 
agencification. It said the Home Office was 
"planning a progressive extension of agencies by reviewing other executive 
functions .... No areas of activity are ruled out, though the process will naturally be concentrating principally upon discrete administrative units which are 
wholly concerned with the delivery of services to the public or to government, 
which are of sufficient size to justify major structural change, and which could 
be made independently accountable within their parent departments" (TCSC, 
HC494 Unpublished memorandum, 1988). 
The Passport Office was joined as an agency candidate by the Forensic Science 
Service in 1990 (Cm 699, May 1989). The recommendation for agency status here 
came after a consultant's report, a recommendation from the Home Affairs Select 
Committee and with the keen support of the Chief Executive (HC 26,1989; 
interviews with officials). Neither was launched as an agency until April 1991 over 
three years after the publication of the lbbs Report (Cm 1509,1991,5). 
At the Treasury and Civil Service Committee's 1989 investigation into 
Developments in the Next Steps Programme, the Home Office was criticised for 
being slow to respond. The Home Office confirmed that discussions were taking 
place within the Home Office about the possibility of the prison service taking 
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agency status (HC348,1989). Kemp was questioned about their response again in 
the TCSC 1990 report to which he responded "we keep after them" (TCSC HC 481, 
july 1990). In a Home Affairs Committee investigation into Next Steps Agencies 
the following year, the Committee took evidence from the official in the Home Office 
with responsibility for co-ordinating the Department's response to the Next Steps 
initiative. This was a grade five official who headed a small unit (Home Affairs 
Select Committee, HC 177,1991). This unit was felt to be extremely supportive by 
staff in the agencies (interviews with agency staff) At this stage the Home Office 
still only had two agencies. The Fire Service College began operations in 1992. 
However the main pressure from the centre of government was on the Home Office 
to consider agency status for the prison service (interviews with officials). 
Debates about the Prison Service and agency status 
The prison service had been a separate department until 1962 when it moved into 
the Home Office, becoming its biggest division. It was headed by a Director 
General, the equivalent of a Deputy Permanent Secretary or grade two. It 
represented three quarters of central government expenditure by the Home Office 
and therefore presented, like the Benefits Agency in the DSS, a potentially huge 
transfer. (Cm 611,1989). The Service had implemented extensive changes in 
working practices in 1987, called 'Fresh Start' to deal with appalling industrial 
relations and perceived inefficiencies (King and McDermott 1995; see HC 57,1997 
for background). 
The possibility of the prison service becoming an agency was addressed by several 
reports in the period from the launch of the Next Steps initiative to the decision to 
set up the agency. The first by PA Consulting in 1989 (commissioned to examine 
the organisation and location of the Prison Service HQ) was cautious about how the 
agency idea could be adapted to the prison service. It identified a gulf between the 
policy instructions, issued at head office to protect ministers from attack, and 
operational activity in prisons. It identified a need for policy development and 
operational delivery to work more closely together. The key question the report 
identified was how much the Home Secretary would be able to stand back from 
operational matters given the level of public and parliamentary interest, (PA 
Consulting, 1989). This view in the Home Office, at the time when Ibbs, was 
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published, led the then Director General of the Prison Service and senior Home 
Office officials to be 'nervous' about separating policy and operations. They felt it 
was not appropriate for an agency (interviews with senior Home Office Officials). 
The Home Secretary at the time, Douglas Hurd, was also not keen (interviews). 
Strangeways Riot and the Wooff Report 
The years from 1987 to 1992 represented a period of rapid change for the Prison 
Service. Following the introduction of Fresh Start, fundamental changes to 
sentencing policy were planned and introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1991. In 
the middle of this period the Prison Service suffered a very damaging riot at 
Strangeways Jail. At the time of the riot, David Waddington had been appointed 
Home Secretary. The subsequent enquiry into the riot, the Woolf Report, provided 
the opportunity for a comprehensive review of the problems of the Prison Service 
and penal policy (Cm 1456 1991). This report achieved a consensus and its 
recommendations were largely represented in a subsequent White Paper, Custody, 
Care and Justice, (King and McDermott 1994,41). The report was very critical of 
the management of the Service and the neglect of these issues by successive 
ministers. Amongst many issues concerned with prisoner care and control, it called 
for more visible leadership of the Service by the Director General and greater 
responsibility to be delegated to Governors. It also recommended the separation of 
policy and operations, thus creating a resonance with the Next Steps concept (Cm 
1456 1991: Cm 1647 1991). The riot damaged Waddington's career and he was 
shortly replaced by Kenneth Baker. 
The effect of the Strangeways Riot was two-fold. It persuaded the new Home 
Secretary that he would be better protected from political damage through agency 
status (interviews with officials). It also provided a very graphic illustration of the 
management problems facing the Service (Lewis, 1997). Almost immediately after 
the publication of the Woolf Report a policy of contracting out the running of new 
and existing prisons was activated and a second report was commissioned 
specifically to look at the question of moving the Prison Service to agency status 
(King and McDermott 1995,47). 
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The Lygo Report 
This report by Admiral Lygo in 1991 was more positive. It pointed to the same need 
for better management and leadership as the earlier reports, but suggested this 
could be achieved through agency status. It did argue, however, that agency status 
needed to be adapted to fit the needs of the Prison Service. He suggested the 
creation of a supervisory board to permit the Home Secretary to have sufficient 
confidence in the management of the service to stand back, and a management 
board to assist the Director General. The report published at the end of 1991 
recommended preparations for a move to agency status straight away with "a firm 
hand on the tiller" (Lygo 1991, letter placed with report). The recommendation was 
accepted in March 1992 ( (King and McDermott 1995,47). In April of that year the 
Fire Service College also became an agency. 
Another change of Home Secretary after the general election in April 1992 led to 
Kenneth Clarke taking forward agencification of the prison service. He held a far 
more bullish attitude towards both agency status and privatisation and contracting 
out initiatives (Lewis 1997,5). He took an active part in the appointment of the new 
Director General rejecting the existing civil servant in the role, Joe Pilling and 
appointing Derek Lewis a former television executive (Lewis 1997,11). Two critical 
organisational decisions were taken during this period in the run-up to the launch of 
the agency. The first was that policy should stay with operations and become part 
of the new agency. This reflected the Home Office's historical concern that, without 
close ties, policy decisions were made that were un-implementable. Clive 
Whitemore, the Permanent Secretary at the time, explained the reasoning, 
"I insisted that the Chief Executive of the Agency should be responsible not 
only for the operation of the Service but also for prisons policy. I was quite 
clear, and I still am, that if I had set up a unit of bright young civil servants at 
the centre of the Home Office and outside the Prison Service and made them 
responsible for the development of prisons policy and confined the prison 
service to the operation of the prison system, we would have seen policy 
gradually becoming more unrealistic and less soundly based as it ceased to 
be informed by the hard facts of operational experience"(Whitemore, 1994,10 
- 11). 
Whitemore chaired the work of the party which prepared the framework document 
(interview with senior Home Office official). The agency Framework Document, 
describes the role of the Chief Executive, still called a Director General - as being 
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"the Home Secretary's principal policy adviser), (unlike the Benefits Agency which 
described the chief executive's role as being the Ministers principal adviser on 
operational functions). Although the permanent secretary, according to the Next 
Steps principles retained his overall role as the Ministers principal adviser, this was 
not supported by any policy capacity in the department. 
The second key decision was Clarke's absolute refusal to establish a Ministerial 
Advisory Board as advised in the Lygo Report "Ken Clarke was the sort of person 
who said 'well I don't care what the norm is - is it going to be useful and in this case, 
if not then I'm not going to have it' " (interview with former Prison Service official). 
The Next Steps team wanted an advisory board in this case but they were unable to 
force the issue (Kemp and Next Steps team official). 
After the Prison Service became an agency in April 1993, the Home Office 'caught 
up' with other departments, with over 78% of its civil servants working in agencies 
(Cm 2508,1994). Several factors had led to this change of direction. The new 
Director General, Joe Pilling, who had been appointed as Lygo was concluding his 
report was more supportive to the idea of agencies and held the view that any 
change was better than no change for the prison service which was badly in need of 
improved management (Interview with senior official, Prison Service). At the same 
time, Baker, the new Home Secretary was more persuaded and so the Permanent 
Secretary changed his position (interview with senior official in the Home Office). 
But both Ministers and civil servants in the Home Office were cautious about 
making the Prison Service into an agency and were far less enamoured by agency 
status than either of the other two departments studied. Their caution was centred 
around the practicality of being able to separate prisons policy from operational 
policy - as the agency concept demanded - when recent experience argued for the 
need to become more cohesive. This was coupled with a perceived difficulty for 
Home Secretaries in standing back from the detail of operational matters. The 
arrangements surrounding the establishment of the Prison Service as an agency 
illustrate the operation of power dependency in the core executive. Under some 
pressure from the NS team and the Prime Minister to increase its adaptation of the 
idea, the largest area of executive work available was the prison service (interview 
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with former ACE in the Home Office). The Next Steps team was unable to exert 
pressure for the establishment of an advisory board against Clarke's wishes and 
risk jeopardising the move to agency status, 
"it would have damaged the credibility of Next Steps ... it would be seen as the prison service rejects Next Steps or the Home Office rejects the Next Steps 
approach. And so, the reality of the negotiation, is there is a balance, there 
are other issues which come into play" (interview with former Next Steps 
team officials). 
Overall the Home Office was a late and reluctant convert to agencification. The 
development of agencies in the Home Office reflect its compartmentalised structure 
at the time and the cautiousness of decision making associated with the Home 
Office. By 1993, the Home Office had four agencies, but there was no overall 
corporate approach to standardise how the Department related to its agencies as in 
the other Departments. In the case of the Prison Service in particular, the 
institutional arrangements set up to support the agency arrangement were uniquely 
related to the context of its establishment, both the history of the prison service and 
the decision making of key actors at the time. The set-up flouted the 
recommendations of several reports and the wishes of the Next Steps Team but 
they needed the Agency to go ahead and they had no authority to overrule. 
Departmental contexts 
The third section of this chapter has examined departmental responses to the Next 
Steps agenda in three departments. It has shown the different motivations and 
perceptions held by actors holding different structural positions - ministers, 
permanent secretaries and other senior civil servants. It has also drawn attention to 
the different departmental structures, histories and 'taken for granted' assumptions 
about the way each department operated which also had a crucial effect on how 
they responded. In this way the implementation of agencies in these departments 
was path dependent upon the existing institutional arrangements. 
The DTI responded early and quickly. DTI, Ministers were keen. Both officials and 
ministers were more comfortable with the management ideas behind the Next Steps 
approach. It identified executive work and separated any attached policy functions. 
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It developed a strong centralised pattern to its relationships with each agency using 
a'steering board' model, with several IDTI civil servants as members. 
The Department of Social Security also responded quickly but with more caution as 
it examined the potential for placing the vast majority of the department into agency 
status. The agency model was adapted to suit existing administrative and 
management proposals for change. Close attention was given to maintaining the 
unity of the department given the 'holistic' nature of its work. There were tensions 
within the department and Ministers were not instinctively in favour but overall the 
Department of Social Security took a very corporate approach to the establishment 
of agencies and paid a great deal of attention to additional formal and informal 
mechanisms for strengthening the link between policy and operations. 
The Home Office was very cautious about the agency concept. It was deeply 
reluctant to apply an agency approach to its biggest block of executive work in the 
Prison Service. Ministers were also ambivalent initially. There was no clear 
departmental view of the roles those in agencies and the centre of the department 
should play. The agency concept was not dealt with at senior level and the 
department took a compartmental ised approach in line with its vertically segregated 
structure of the time. 
The agency concept demanded an individualised application and stressed that the 
precise arrangements would vary according to the function and wishes of the 
Minister. Yet it can be seen, in the three departments examined above, that 
departments customised and adapted the already ambiguous Next Steps concept. 
This departmental interpretation is important to identify as it helped to determine 
which agencies were established (and therefore what resources were exchanged), 
the perception of the rules of the game and the roles which should be adopted. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that the Next Steps concept and the institutional rules 
surrounding the concept, were the product of compromise and accommodation to 
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satisfy different actors across Whitehall. This process occurred both in the 
development of the government's agency policy and subsequently in its 
implementation by departments. This compromise arose because of the 
interdependence of actors within the core executive. 
Ministers were dependent upon the Prime Ministers approval and, de facto, the 
approval of the Next Steps team. The Prime Minister and hence the Next Steps 
team carried authority which both ministers and departments could not ignore. 
Equally, ministers were reliant upon their own departmental civil servants. 
Departments were used to acting to protect their ministers and also controlling 
financial and personnel resources. The agency concept threatened both these 
roles. Where departmental advice conflicted with the push towards agencies there 
was clearly delay and caution. The centre was, in turn, dependent upon 
departments to activate the policy. This dependence led to compromises, firstly in 
the development of the policy and then in its adoption and implementation. As one 
former Next Steps Team member explained "depending upon the personalities in 
the Next Steps team and the desk officer in charge, some of this would have been 
resisted more fiercely... and its probably true to say there wasn't a unified 
approach". 
The institutional rules of the game which applied following these compromises 
illustrate the path dependency of policy change. Both the agency concept, and how 
this concept was adopted in departments, depended upon the existing formal and 
informal institutional arrangements. The agency policy carried a mix of old and new 
'rules of the game', the introduction of arm's length control alongside a maintenance 
of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. These ambiguous rules of the game 
became more customised when agencies were established in departments. 
Departmental contexts - existing structures of decision making, organisational 
histories, attitudes and beliefs about the policy area and roles led to differential 
formal and informal 'rules of the game'. Here again new formal and informal rules 
and roles developed and co-existed alongside the maintenance of existing cultures 
and beliefs. 
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This chapter has provided information about the three departments examined by 
the thesis. It has explored the context of the introduction of agencies into each 
department. It illuminates the appreciative system of those in departments, their 
understanding of their role and their attitude towards agencies. It has provided 
more detail on the rules of the game as they applied in each departmental context. 
This highlights the ambiguous, dynamic and often departmentally specific 
appreciation of the rules of the game and roles adopted. The following chapter will 
introduce the seven case study agencies from these departments. It will look at 
their background, key features and their goals before moving on to look at the 
resource exchange between each department and agency in chapter six. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CASE STUDY AGENCIES AND THEIR GOALS 
Introduction 
This chapter will introduce the case study agencies and their goals. These 
agencies represent a range of agency size, type, funding regime and organisational 
history. They have been chosen to test for either literal or theoretical replication for 
the hypothesis developed in chapter three. This suggested that, where close policy 
communities with shared values, goals and institutional support exist between 
departments and agencies, agencies will be successful in implementing 
government goals. This chapter will highlight details which are key to subsequent 
analysis in particular about the history of each agency and of the nature of their 
goals. 
A focus on understanding each agency's goals here is important for three reasons. 
Firstly on a practical level, the agreed operational goals of an agency provide the 
reason for the development of the relationship between department and agency and 
the basis for the exchange of resources. The agency's goals are the policy half of 
the policy and resources framework. Exploration of these goals is a necessary pre- 
cursor before going on to explore the resulting exchange of resources in the next 
chapter and how the department and agency manage the processes of exchange in 
chapter seven. Secondly, the chosen theoretical approach of the thesis places the 
idea of a sharing of goals - or goal agreement - between network actors as central 
to ensuring unproblematic implementation. This chapter aims to contribute to an 
assessment of how far goal agreement can be identified. Finally, an alternative 
explanation for problematic implementation set out in chapter two sees this as 
being related to the saliency of policy goals. This chapter intends to look in more 
detail at the salience of the agencies' goals to address this argument. 
Initially the chapter will begin by discussing the difficulty of identifying organisational 
goals. It is suggested that goals are multiple, hierarchical, and often conflicting. 
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Guiding criteria for assessing the saliency of policy goals are suggested. Next, 
each agency will be briefly examined paying particular attention to: their aims and 
objectives, or the goals they have agreed with their parent department; any key 
characteristics, and give a brief history of their establishment and development up 
to the current time, highlighting important features relating to the case study 
hypothesis . The third part of the chapter will look at the saliency of the policy goals 
and the extent of goal agreement in the agencies. It concludes by suggesting that, 
for three of the agencies, goal agreement was difficult and saliency high. 
Identifying Organisational Goals and Saliency 
Before going on to look at each of the case study agencies and their goals, the first 
section of the chapter examines the question of how to identify an organisation's 
goals. There are a number of problems in examining the policy goals associated 
with an agency's sphere of operations. The type and source of policy goals 
affecting agencies are described below, illustrating that their goals are multiple, 
hierarchical, sometimes competing, changeable, difficult to identify and often covert 
as well as overt. 
Service or output policies 
The formal goals of the case study agencies are expressed in the Framework 
Document. 
. 
Massey describes these as service or output policies which specify 
the needs to be met and the methods used to meet them (1995,82-3). They may 
be described as aims and objectives (in the DSS agencies and Companies House) 
or role and tasks (as in the Prison Service), purpose and aims (in the FSS) or role 
aims and objectives (the LGC and Insolvency Service). There is no consistency of 
language across government or indeed in organisations generally. They express 
what the agency does, and in some cases the client group and method. These 
general aims and objectives are supported by specific targets annually in the 
agency's business plan. Depending upon the type of agency, some of these goals 
stem from statute and earlier legislation (for example those of the Benefits Agency 
and Child Support Agency), some from non statutory policy purposes (for example 
the Wilton Park Conference Centre or the Social Security IT Agency). The 
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policy/operational split was intended to, allow ministers to concentrate on 
establishing the 'what' and 'who' policy framework and free ministers from 
concerning themselves in detail with the 'how to do it' decisions, although as 
discussed in chapter two, there are difficulties in sustaining this separation. 
The service or output policies which cover an agency's responsibilities can alter, 
with a change in the legislative framework or, for example, after a change in 
government. This may be reflected in the annual business plan with an alteration of 
aims and objectives, or it may not be reflected in these statements but by a different 
emphasis in the targets set. For example, taking the Benefit Agency's vision 
statement of 'paying the right benefit to the right person at the right time; every time' 
(Benefits Agency Annual Report, HC 489,1996), although (as yet) formally 
unchanged, has been interpreted quite differently by the new Labour 
administration. The emphasis used to be on paying benefits quickly 'at the right 
time', with targets based around speed. Now the emphasis is on accuracy, 'the 
right person' and targets for speed have been replaced with targets for accuracy. 
Resource or fiscal policies 
Secondly, how an agency is able to deliver its service or output policies is also in 
part dependent upon economic policy making, and wider resource and fiscal 
policies (Massey, 1995,82 - 83). For example the DSS agencies' running costs 
were put under pressure by efficiency targets demanded from the Fundamental 
Expenditure Review in the Department (Cm 3213 1996). Of course, the annual 
business planning and target setting process between departments and agencies is 
concerned to update the financial and resource framework within which the agency 
operates, so that each year there is a specific agreement about what can be 
achieved within that business plan and what the focus should be. What this means, 
however, is that when looking at the goals in the Framework Document, sometimes 
these represent goals agreed at a specific period in time and their achievability, or 
relative priority, is subject to subsequent alteration. 
Governance or administrative policies 
Finally, each agency's goals are also influenced by wider govemance or 
administrative policies (Massey, 1995, pp 82 - 83) The introduction of agencies 
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into government is an example of a governance policy itself, for example. More 
recently, the market testing initiative was a governance policy which cut across the 
operational responsibilities of agencies and required amendment to their aims, 
objectives and targets (Price Waterhouse, 1994) 
goals can be competing and contradictory. 
Informal or Unwritten Goals 
This, too, illustrates how policy 
Each of the above type of goal (or policy) - service or output, resource, fiscal and 
governance - even where changeable, competing and hierarchical finds formal 
written or overt expression through policy announcements such as agency 
framework documents and business plans,, the Chancellor's budget statement and 
Command Papers such as the lbbs Report and the annual Next Steps Review. 
There may, however, be other policy goals associated with an agency's operations 
which are covert, unwritten, personal or informal. 
It was suggested earlier (chapters two and four) that ministers and departments 
have policy goals associated with the avoidance of embarrassment and or 
parliamentary concern (Next Steps Team 1995,10). They may have policy goals 
which relate to the preparation for future policy change. A concern with the 
presentation of policy in relation to the primary policy goals themselves has been a 
criticism made of the New Labour administration (Public Administration Committee, 
1998, HC 770). They may have political goals or ideological goals (Smith 1993, 
50). These personal policy goals may be related, or tangential, to the formal goals 
expressed for the agency. For example, Harriet Harman, when Secretary of State 
for Social Security, also held the brief as Minister for Women. Her policy brief and 
well known personal commitment to women's policies was influential in averting the 
closure of a cr6che for Benefits Agency staff (interview with senior DSS official). In 
a similar vein, agency chief executives and senior agency staff may have their own 
goals concerned with commitment to a particular policy direction or to do with other 
personal ambitions, promotion, transfer or retirement. For example, the 
maintenance of a London base for the FSS was important to key agency staff 
although never formally expressed in the Agency's annual business plan (interviews 
with Agency and Department officials). 
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These difficulties mean it is not as easy to identify agencies' informal goals as those 
expressed formally in the framework documents. What this section shows is that, 
when looking at the how agencies deliver government goals, their aims and 
objectives are hierarchical, multiple, changeable, in some cases contradictory, and 
are influenced not only by the specific policy area which the agency operates in but 
by wider economic and administrative aims of government and the personal, private 
and political goals of actors within the relationship (network). When seeking to 
identify an agency's goals and the extent, of goal agreement within an agency's 
sphere of operations, it is this messy complex of goals which needs to be 
examined beyond the formal framework document. This chapter will identify for 
each agency their aims and objectives (from the framework document). It will 
summarise their goals more generally by looking at the impact of wider economic 
and administrative aims of government, and the personal and political goals of 
actors on their operations and it will seek to make a judgement about the extent of 
goal agreement and the relative saliency of the policy area. The identification of 
saliency is discussed next. 
Determining politica sa iency 
There have been several attempts to measure the saliency of policy goals (Hood 
and Dunsire, 1981; Dudley, 1994; Next Steps Team, 1995). Dudley is the author 
who most directly states that agencies which have a high potential for political 
salience are unsuitable for operating at arm's length and should be under direct 
ministerial control (Dudley 1994). He attempts to identify the Next Steps agencies 
which have a high potential for political saliency by building on earlier work by Hood 
and Dunsire (1981). Dudley suggests a range of features which indicate the 
potential for high political salience of a policy area. Some of these features are 
related to the primary policy goals of the agency and some are related to wider 
government goals and ministerial priorities (Dudley 1994,33-37). 
He suggests that high potential political saliency of a policy area is related to the 
size of an agency's budget or operations, the extent to which it has face to face 
contact with the public, and the extent of parliamentary or press interest. Agencies 
which are smaller, have a face to face relationship with a more restricted customer 
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group or work for government itself are expected to have less potential for political 
saliency although controversial or sensitive issues may increase their saliency 
potential. A similar exercise was undertaken by the Strategic Management of 
Agencies Consortium Project which set out criteria which indicate the political profile 
of agencies (Next Steps Team, 1995,10 - 11). Drawing on the work of Dudley 
and the Agencies Consortium Team puts forward the following indicators of high 
saliency: size, serving the public directly; sensitive or controversial policy area; high 
degree of parliamentary interest. The saliency of a policy area and the extent to 
which there is goal agreement are in an iterative relationship with each other. The 
saliency of a policy area can make it more difficult to agree on policy goals. 
Equally, disagreement in a policy area can lead to the increased saliency of the 
goals pursued by the agency. 
The Case Study Agencies and their Key Characteristics 
The following section of the chapter will introduce the case study agencies and their 
goals. It will identify their aims and objectives as set out in framework documents 
and business plans and key features such as their size, the level of expertise of 
their staff group, their funding regime and income and expenditure. It will then look 
at the history of the agency, drawing attention to features suggesting integration 
and to any notable issues affecting the wider goals of the agency and particularly 
relating to the extent of goal agreement and saliency. The information on IDSS 
agencies and the Prison Service is lengthier than the IDTI agencies and the FSS 
because of the complexity of their spheres of operations. 
Companies House 
Aims and objectives and key characteristics 
Companies House has two key objectives, to keep a record of company information 
and to ensure that record is made available to the public (Companies House 
Framework Document, 1988). It is a regulatory agency operating under statute. 
Companies House became a trading fund in 1991 although the Agency does not 
have fully devolved pay and employment conditions as yet. It charges fees, set by 
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statute, for its company registration activities which provide approximately two thirds 
of its income. The remaining one third comes from the charges it levies, set by 
ministers, for the provision of information to a variety of users, large and small, 
commercial, academic and research organisations. In the year 1997 - 98, 
Companies House had an income of E34.9 million and expenditure of E34.5 million 
(HC 824,1998,32). 
The agency operates through a network of search rooms throughout the Country 
but its head office is in Cardiff where the majority of its 839 staff are based. As a 
'business', Companies House is operating in a rapidly changing technological 
environment which has enormous implications for the way it collects, processes and 
provides the information it is charged with holding. Companies House has a 
monopoly of its company registration activities but is in the unusual position of 
having customers who are also competitors for its information provision (Mellon, 
1993). 
History and development 
Companies House was established in the last century representing one of the first 
ways in which Government acted to ensure the probity and integrity of the private 
sector. Companies House was the second agency to be established under the 
'Next Steps' programme in April 1988. Its first ACE was an internal appointment, 
subsequently two outside appointments were made. It is cited as one of the best 
examples of how agency status can improve the executive functions of Government 
(Mellon, TCSC, 1993). The agency's prior options process began in October 1992 
and the agency went through an extensive period of review following the process, 
with consideration given to privatisation and contracting out. Finally in February 
1996, the review was completed with only two parts of the agency contracted out. 
Revision of the Framework Document was delayed by the General Election and the 
loss of prospective legislation since the new Labour administration came to power 
has scaled down some of the planned developments in the move to electronic 
incorporation of records (HC 824,1998). 
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Laboratory of the Government Chemist 
Aims and objectives and key charactefistics 
The LGC provides a range of chemical analyses in support of government 
legislation. The Government Chemist was the arbiter of last resort in disputed 
cases of chemical analysis. When it was established as an agency its primary 
objectives were to maintain its reputation for independence and authority and to 
cover its costs (LGC Policy and Resources Framework, 1989). 
As an agency, LGC was a self funding, non-monopoly research establishment. 
Under the Rothschild principle (which states that Government research labs should 
only do work which customers are prepared to pay for, (Cm 2250,1993)) and in the 
more business-conscious environment of the DTI, the LGC had long operated a 
system of direct charging, although this was routed through the vote system. Well 
before the LGC became an agency it had clearly identified customers and charges. 
It moved to net costs running control in April 1990 (LGC Framework Document). 
The majority of its staff are scientists (there were 273 staff on the point of 
privatisation) and the Laboratory operated from one purpose built site in 
Teddington. 
History and development 
The LGC was established in the last century to ensure the non-adulteration of 
tobacco as customs and excise duties were introduced. It gradually increased its 
range of analytical chemistry analysis on behalf of government and in support of 
legislation in over 23 different Acts. The role of the Government Chemist - who was 
also the Chief Executive of the LGC - was to act as an independent and impartial 
arbiter of last resort in the case of disputes over chemical analysis in the courts. It 
did not directly support Government but was seen as supporting the aims of 
Government expressed through a myriad of different acts protecting business, 
consumer and Government interests. The LGC started life under the jurisdiction of 
Customs and Excise, and had transferred to the Treasury before finally moving to 
the DTI (Hammond and Egan, 1991). 
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At the time of agencification, the LGC did almost no work in support of DTI 
legislation but the majority of its work came from other departments, predominantly 
Agriculture, Customs and Excise and the Ministry of Defence. The LGC became an 
agency in 1989 with the keen support of the Chief Executive and the line manager 
in the Department (the Chief Engineer and Scientist) who had previously been the 
Government Chemist. In May 1993, after Michael Heseltine's appointment as 
president of the Board of Trade he ordered a review of all the laboratories in the 
DTI, which preceded. a multi-departmental review across Government (Cm 2991, 
1995). This formed the basis of the LGC's prior options process (LGC Annual 
Report, HC 809,1993). 
By this time, some three or four years after the LGC was established, the efficiency 
agenda had forced a change in the LGC's customer base as departments 
increasingly altered traditional links and sought to tender for analysis in support of 
their work. At this time however - during the period of the review the DTI became a 
customer of the LGC in support of its National Measuring System initiative (LGC 
Annual Report, HC 809,1993). The review was informed by a consultant's report 
into the possibilities for privatisation or contracting out. The report, published in 
March 1994 suggested various options were possible, ranging from sale to a third 
party or to a management buy-out, the creation of a Company limited by Guarantee 
or a move to a Non Profit Making Distributing Company (NPDC) (KPMG Corporate 
Finance, 1994). In April 1994, Michael Heseltine announced that LGC would be 
transformed into a NPDC by April 1996, although the possibility of a trade sale was 
still a possibility if a buyer could demonstrate "the required independence" (Press 
Notice, DTI 1994). 
The future of the LGC remained unclear during the following year and was "the 
subject of extensive discussions within the DTI" (LGC Annual Report, 1995). 
Finally, following Michael Heseltine's move to the office of Deputy Prime Minister, in 
September 1995, the Government Chemist submitted a consortium business plan 
which was accepted later that year. In April 1996 the LGC was privatised and sold 
to a consortium bidder, and is now a Limited Company as a subsidiary of LGC 
Holdings Ltd which is jointly owned by the staff, the Royal Society Of Chemistry and 
N Group pIc. The Chief Executive retains his Government Chemist role under a 
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purchaser - provider contract with the DTI. The final annual report states the LGC 
has been transferred into the private sector in such as way that "we will be able to 
build on and strengthen our reputation as'a national centre for analytical science 
with a hallmark of independence, impartiality and integrity", (LGC Annual Report, 
1996). Nevertheless, there was concern expressed about how this independence 
or the role of the Government Chemist could be maintained, given its increasingly 
commercial role (Independent, 14 April, 1994). 
Insolvency Service 
Aims and objectives and key charactedstics 
The Insolvency Service is a regulatory agency with considerable devolved statutory 
duties. It is charged with overseeing personal bankruptcies and company 
liquidations (Insolvency Service Framework Document 1990). These investigations 
can lead on to prosecution and the disqualification of former company directors 
from future trading. It also advises ministers on insolvency policy issues. 
The Insolvency Service has 1,345 staff who operate from offices throughout the 
Country (HC 828,1988). The work is very complex, the service has a strong 
professional culture and ethic, and Insolvency Service staff, the 'official receivers), 
are officers of the Court. There are other insolvency practitioners who undertake 
some insolvency duties and the Service authorises and regulates these private 
sector practitioners. However, contested and disputed cases and those requiring 
further investigation or prosecution are only done by civil servants acting on behalf 
of the Minister. Although the Insolvency Service charges fees for its work, the very 
nature of its business means that, as well as being demand led, it cannot guarantee 
to find income from bankrupts and company failures and there is, therefore, no 
correlation between its input and output. It is felt improper to fund the service from 
the proceeds of insolvency and so is vote funded. It is, and is likely to remain, a 
gross running costs agency (interviews with senior agency officials). In 1997 - 98 
its income was E37.4 million and its expenditure was E78 million (insolvency 
Service Annual Report, HC 828,1998,44). 
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History and development 
Like Companies House, the Insolvency Service was established in the last century 
as part of the state's involvement in overseeing the operation of markets. It became 
an agency in 1990 with the existing Head appointed as ACE - The agency was a 
somewhat reluctant recruit to the agency concept and had a very difficult first three 
years during which time the level of resources it was allocated did not rise while 
company bankruptcies doubled. This period ended with a very critical NAO report 
on the lack of company disqualification work undertaken by the Insolvency Service 
under pressure of work (National Audit Office, HC 907,1993). 
During the Service's prior options process, the then President of the Board of 
Trade, Michael Heseltine, was keen to consider the possibility of privatisation 
(interview) and consultants were brought in, to consider whether certain parts of the 
process could be contracted out as a way of coping with fluctuating levels of 
demand. (Stoy Hayward Consulting, 1994). 
The detailed nature of the task meant the consultants needed to work closely with 
the Insolvency Service in drawing up the specification to meet the high standards of 
probity expected. Media reporting, although inaccurate in both substance and 
detail, highlighted parliamentary concerns about some of the bidders for the work 
(Guardian, 27 February, 1996). It is not clear how much this raised concerns with 
ministers, who would still remain answerable for the actions of private sector actors. 
However, the results of the contracting out exercise were that the six bidders were 
considered by the steering board who made recommendations to Ministers that the 
work should remain in house and this was the recommendation accepted - again by 
Michael Heseltine's replacement, Ian Lang, the new President of the Board of 
Trade. 
Benefits Agency 
Aims and objectives and key characteristics 
The role of the Benefits Agency is to administer social security law and pay out 
benefits to eligible claimants. The Agency sought to improve its previous levels of 
service and provide a 'customer orientated service' and information to the public 
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"So that they are informed about their entitlements" (Benefits Agency Framework 
Document, 1991,4). 
In 1991 the Agency disbursed E52 billion to 20 million claimants. The Benefits 
Agency is the largest government agency, the net cost of its operations was 2.5 
billion in 1997 - 98 and it employs over 66,000 staff who provide a national service 
from a network of local offices. The Agency has its headquarters in Leeds (HC, 
901,1998). The Agency operates under gross running costs control; running costs 
are financed by the Treasury with funding for benefit payments stemming from the 
National Insurance Fund and general taxation. From the start it had quite extensive 
delegations, for authorisation of capital projects, to create posts up to grade six, and 
recruitment below grade seven. 
History and development 
The Benefits Agency was established in 1991. The Agency was based on the 
former operational arm of the Department of Social Security following three major 
investigations into how the Department as a whole would benefit from agency 
status (see chapter four). Shortly after moving to agency status the Agency had to 
implement the introduction of the two new benefits, the Disability Living Allowance 
and the Disability Working Allowance. This caused enormous operational problems 
with long delays suffered by disabled applicants for the new benefit (Social Security 
Committee, HC 284,1992/93; DSS Annual Report, Cm 2213,1993). This 
culminated in considerable parliamentary concern and a highly critical report by the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman (Parliamentary' Commissioner for the Administration, 
HC 652,1992/93). 
The Agency is also responsible for administering the Social Fund. This fund 
provides grants or loans to claimants on Income Support for essential household 
items. The fund was cash limited in each office and decision making was 
discretionary (within guidance provided by the Secretary of State). The money was 
mostly provided in loan form and claimants had to pay back the loan from their 
weekly benefit reducing income levels below the minimum. This scheme was 
highly contentious and closely monitored through Parliament. 
119 
The Agency also faced problems when its self-professed customer orientation was 
threatened by cuts to its running costs to meet the efficiency targets of the 
Fundamental Expenditure Review (Social Security Committee, HC 382,1994/95, 
xx; Cm 3213,1996). This resulted in the closure of the Agency's Treeline Service' 
which provided advice on claiming, a simplification of the appeal and review system 
and a focus on anti-fraud activities. Even 'the Secretary of State Peter Lilley was 
cited as saying the scale of the cuts "fills me with despair" (Independent 9 Feburary 
1996). Nevertheless, throughout Lilley's period as Secretary of State he sought to 
capture headlines to demonstrate a tough approach to bolster his political 
ambitions, raising the profile of spending on single parents, asylum seekers and 
highlighting fraud in the system (Lilley, speech to Conservative Party Conference, 
October 1993; interview with academic observer). 
The Agency went through an evaluation and prior options review in 1994 (BA 
Annual Report, HC621,1994/95) which considered splitting the Agency into 
regional units. The outcome was to retain a single unified organisation. The 
Framework Document was re-written and reflected contemporary objectives such 
as the Citizens Charter and a commitment to combat fraud (Benefit Agency 
Framework Document, 1995/2000). Its most recent Annual Report shows another 
revised statement of purpose which reflects the new Government agenda, stating 
the BA will "help to create and deliver an active modern social security service 
which encourages and enables independence" (HC 901 1998,4). Throughout 
these changes in aims, the BA has retained its vision statement which is to pay "the 
right money to the right person at the right time; every time" (Benefits Agency 
Annual Report, HC 489,1996) although as outlined above, the focus has shifted 
since the Labour Government took office to a focus on accuracy and away from 
speed. 
The change of government has led to the Agency being involved in planning 
changes to almost every part of the benefits system as well as continuing and 
developing initiatives like the 'one stop shop' which aim to improve service levels 
(interview with senior official; Cm 4214,1999). One of these changes involves 
reviews to the operation of DLA which has continued to cause problems. The 
Social Security Select Committee described DLA as an "unstable benefit" which 
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was ill-defined, complex and unworkable (Social Security Committee, HC 641, 
1997/98) and the official 'Disability Living'Allowance Advisory Board', in its first 
report, described the. administration of the benefit as 'seriously flawed' (Guardian, 
14 March, 1998). Discussions over the future of disability benefits are currently still 
taking place. 
Child Support Agency 
Aims and objectives and key characteristics 
The CSA seeks to ensure that parents who do not live with their children contribute 
to their maintenance. It aims to "deliver a consistent, accurate, timely and cost 
effective service in the assessment, collection and payment of maintenance 
ensuring that children receive the financial support to which they are entitled" (HC 
864,1998,2). 
The CSA operates from six child support centres and out of the Benefits Agency's 
local offices. It currently employs 7,909 staff, having grown from 5,000 as 
envisaged in the Framework Document, (Child Support Agency Framework 
Document, 1993). Like the Insolvency Service, although the CSA collects money, 
this does not finance the Agency. It is financed through taxation and operates 
under gross running costs control. The net cost of its operations in 1997 - 98 was 
E225 million, (CSA Annual Report, HC 864,1998) It had, and sought, far fewer 
delegations than the Benefits Agency (Greer, 1994,63). 
History and Development 
The Child Support Agency formally began operations as an agency in April 1993. It 
was created to effect the 1991 Child Support Act. The CSA was therefore a new 
organisation, operating under new legislation and moving the state into an entirely 
new area of involvement with private citizens. Its first Chief Executive was an 
outside appointee who previously worked for a national mental health charity. 
Changes to the system for collecting child maintenance arose from a changing 
ideological agenda and fiscal pressures compounded by problems in the 
administration of existing policies affecting child maintenance. A strong ministerial 
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agenda problematised the growing numbers of lone parents on benefit and sought 
to reduce welfare dependence and social security spending, enforce parental duties 
and avoid the state undertaking responsibilities which were seen as belonging to 
the family (interviews). This stemmed from new right ideological beliefs about the 
role of the state and the role of the family as well as fiscal prudence in the face of 
rising spending on lone parents claiming benefits. There was a growing recognition 
of the effects that benefit structures had on behaviour and incentives. Thus John 
Moore (Secretary of State at the time) announced at the 1988 Conservative party 
conference, 
"[w]e have to continue to work on the connection between benefits and 
behaviour ..... 
Of course we will continue to help poor families. But as we do it 
we have to ask some hard questions, is the hope of a council flat and a 
guaranteed income a factor in unmarried teenage pregnancy? Is the 
knowledge that the state will provide a factor in fathers deserting their 
families? What is Ao be done about the nearly half a million fathers who pay 
nothing at all toward the support of their wives and children? " (Moore, 
12/10/88). 
The desire for reform of the maintenance arrangements was shared by the Labour 
Party (Consultation Document, Michael Meacher's Office, February 1990; Field, 
Guardian, 24/6/90). The Labour Party agenda saw increasing fathers' contributions 
towards maintenance payments as part of its anti poverty and economic equality 
strategies. The ideological underpinnings here were linked to a feminist agenda 
which linked male fecklessness to family poverty. 
Thus although stemming from opposite ideological agendas, the Government and 
opposition agreed on the need for the agency. Statistical and research evidence 
could be used to support both the new right and feminist interpretations. The 
number of lone parents receiving income related benefits almost doubled from 1979 
to 1988 whilst at the same time, the proportion of lone parent families receiving 
income support who also received maintenance from an absent parent had fallen 
from 50% in 1981 to only 23% in 1988 (Public Accounts Committee HC 429,1990). 
The same research also provided the evidence for a different interpretation showing 
the importance of maintenance (along with access to employment and child care) 
as the key route out of poverty for lone parents (Millar, 1989; Brown, 1989; 
Bradshaw and Millar, 1991) 
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At this time (prior to 1993) maintenance was assessed and enforced by the Courts. 
The Court system was fragmented and led to widely varying payments and 
ineffective enforcement (Cm 1264,1990). The Department of Social Security, 
through its 'liable relative' sections, became involved if the caring parent was on 
benefit. In these circumstances the Department of Social Security could pay the 
appropriate social security benefit level to the caring parent and take responsibility 
for collecting (and recouping) maintenance from the absent parent. The work was 
not high priority for the Department of Socia 
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Security and enforcement of the liable 
relative provisions was piecemeal depending upon other workload pressures (NAO, 
HC 328,1990). Policy changes introduced to simplify the system following the 
Fowler Review and subsequent 1988 Social Security Act had the effect of reducing 
incentives for parents with care to work by removing the cost of child care from 
exempt income (HC 429, PAC, 1990). In part therefore, the 'problem' of collecting 
child maintenance stemmed from the administration of previous policies. 
In the face of a highly critical NAO investigation and PAC report (Public Accounts 
Committee, HC 429,1989/90) the Department of Social Security announced 
strengthened procedures for recovering maintenance through its liable relative 
sections work and a survey of the maintenance system. A more radical 
improvement was sought and the experience of other countries was examined, 
especially schemes introduced in Australia, and Wisconsin USA (Shephard, 
Hansard, 8/1/90, c692w; Shephard, Hansard, 29/1/90, c137w). Officials visited 
Australia and a ministerial team visited Wisconsin to examine their newly introduced 
system (Guardian, 8/2/90; interviews with senior Department of Social Security 
officials). 
The idea of an agency which would enforce parental responsibilities, provide a 
more comprehensive and equitable maintenance arrangement and collection 
function and which would save the Treasury money was attractive to Ministers. As 
one senior official explained "the attraction of the Child Support Agency was here 
was something which hoiked it out from the Benefits Agency and gave it 
tremendous prominence and gave substance to the Thatcherite rhetoric! ' (Interview 
senior official in Department of Social Security). The intention to set up a Child 
Support Agency to trace absent parents and to move to a system whereby 
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maintenance was assessed through a formula was announced by Mrs Thatcher in 
July 1990 (Thatcher, 18 July 1990, Pankhurst Lecture). 
The Government's policy agenda for child maintenance was set out in a White 
Paper 'Children Come First' which stressed that maintenance was a parental and 
not a taxpayer's responsibility (Cm 1264,1990). The White Paper announced that 
a new agency should be responsible for assessing, collecting and enforcing 
maintenance payments. The amount of maintenance due would be based on a 
national formula which took into account income and the existence of second 
families. Caring parents claiming income support would be required to make a 
claim for maintenance unless there was good cause and refusal would result in a 
deduction from benefit. Where the absent parent was also claiming benefits there 
would be either a very low nominal transfer or no transfer from their benefit. Where 
however the absent parent was employed, the effect of the new arrangements 
would be to provide income which would reduce the caring parent's need for means 
tested support in part or all together. In this way the benefits bill for lone parents 
would reduce and responsibility for supporting children would transfer back from the 
state to parents, in particular absent fathers. 
The decision to set up this new function as an agency rather than beef up liable 
relative work within the existing Court system seemed appropriate given the 
growing agencification across government and especially in the Department of 
Social Security (interviews with senior officials). The legislation seemed to offer a 
clear cut line between child support policy and the Agency's responsibilities in 
administering that policy and thus fitted the agency concept. There was debate 
about where to locate the Agency and whether it belonged in the Inland Revenue as 
a tax gathering instrument of public policy, or whether it should be part of the 
Department of Social Security as it was an instrument of social policy. Treasury 
ministers did not want the Agency and it ended up being located in the Department 
of Social Security (interviews). 
The Bill to establish the legislation to which the Agency worked passed through 
Parliament with cross-party agreement. The plans united both the new right and 
feminist agendas of the parties. The main points of disagreement arose over how 
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far caring parents should be forced to co-operate with the Agency given the 
potential for some absent parents to be violent, and the sanctions imposed on those 
parents who did not want to co-operate (Social Security Advisory Committee, 1991; 
Hansard, 8 January, 1990). 
There was considerable pressure from the centre to recruit an outsider as Chief 
Executive (interviews) and Ros Hepplewhite was appointed in 1992. The putative 
agency had one year within which to establish itself before becoming active. Staff 
were recruited to work in the six new claims processing centres. Existing 
Department of Social Security liable relative staff from local offices also transferred 
to the new agency, but overall approximately 70% of the agency's staff were new 
(Hansard, 20 June 1997). 
The agency had a potentially huge 'customer base' and an early decision was to 
stagger its statutory involvement with different types of cases over a number of 
years. Unlike schemes running in Australia and New Zealand, which began with 
new cases, it was decided that the Agency would take on cases where there was 
no maintenance being paid and where the caring parent was dependent upon 
income support. During this period new cases would continue to go to Court to 
arrange maintenance. Then cases where there was an existing court order would 
be added to the Agency's caseload and finally all new cases would go through the 
Agency. It was anticipated that this process would take three years. 
The Agency was launched in April 1993 with tough targets responding to Treasury 
pressure (Garnham and Knights 1991). In particular it was expected to make 
annual benefit savings of E121 million. Within a few months, MPs' post bags began 
to swell with CSA cases and as early as December of 1993 the Social Security 
Select Committee was suggesting changes, which were introduced in February of 
1994 (Social Security Committee, HC 69,1993). Amid a media barrage of criticism 
and the growth of increasingly vocal protest groups, the Labour Party called an 
Opposition Day debate in July of that year and the Select Committee held a second 
enquiry in the Autumn (Hansard 4 July 1994; Social Security Committee, HC 470, 
1994). Signs of difficulties between ACE and minister were apparent at the 
hearings, Ros Hepplewhite defended the system as it existed whilst Peter Lilley 
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took a more cautious approach, acknowledging problems with the agency's 
performance and stating a DSS insider had been brought in as Head of Operations 
to improve matters (Social Security Committee, HC 470ý 1994). 
Before the Social Security Committee report was published, the first Chief 
Executive resigned, just eighteen months after the agency began operations 
(Guardian, 3 September 1994). Ros Hepplewhite was replaced by a career civil 
servant, Ann Chant, who came from being Chief Executive of the Contributions 
Agency. Non-cooperation in returning forms and paying the newly assessed 
maintenance, coupled with the change of rules meant the agency failed to achieve 
its targets for arranging maintenance or sa vings on benefit in its first year despite 
the Agency taking on -extra staff and receiving extra funds. 
The criticism of the agency has subsequently been relentless. Over the next four 
years, every scrutiny of the Agency by either the National Audit Office (NAO) and 
Public Accounts Committee, the Social Security Select Committee, the Chief Child 
Support Officer (overseeing standards of adjudication), the CSA National Client 
Survey and the Parliamentary Ombudsman and Select Committee for the 
Administration has been critical of the Agency's standards of assessment, speed, 
accuracy and relationships with its customers. The timetable for phasing in the 
work of the agency was delayed, its accounts have been queried and its targets 
have frequently not been met, or have not been set to demand improvement. The 
Ombudsman in his first report, noting the similarity of the problems the Benefits 
Agency had with the introduction of DLA and the introduction of child support was 
especially critical of the Department for not learning the lessons of the earlier 
difficulties (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Administration, HC 135,1994/95). 
The Agency has faced several major changes to the policy framework it operates 
within, through amending legislation. A second White Paper responded to the 
detailed suggestions made by the Social Security Select Committee and suggested 
the formula needed to become more sensitive to individual cases and a system of 
departures from the formula was piloted and subsequently introduced (Cm 2745 
Improving Child Support, 1995). This had the effect of creating an even more 
complicated system which permitted greater delays in maintenance being agreed 
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and paid. Following these amendments and up until the 1997 election, the agency 
went through a period where ministers were keen to acknowledge the difficult job 
the Agency performed and to provide support for its aims and the administration of 
Government policy by the Agency (Social Security Select Committee, HC 282, 
1997; Hansard, 20 March 1997). 
Following the election of the Labour Government in 1997 the problems the CSA 
faced were more explicitly aired. Parliamentary and press information emphasised 
the rate of non-compliance by both fathers and mothers, the difficulty the Agency 
had in working with the complicated formula, the backlog of unprocessed cases and 
the amounts of uncollected maintenance (Observer, 15 June 1997; Hansard, 20, 
June. 1990; Social Security Committee HC 1013,1998; Guardian, 21 April 1998; 
interview with minister). The Agency's prior options review became wrapped up 
with a fundamental review by the incoming Government of the agency. There were 
strong lobbies within the Parliamentary Labour party and in the Liberal Democrats 
for a return to the Court System. There was also discussion about whether the 
agency should transfer to the Inland Revenue, as had been announced for the 
Contributions Agency (Guardian, 25 April 1997; Sunday Times, 25 January 1998; 
interview with senior Agency official). 
A Green Paper published in March 1998 proposed to keep the Agency as a Next 
Steps agency but to make two fundamental changes to the legislation it operated 
under. The first was to radically simplify the formula to a straight percentage of 
income, rising according to the number of children. This broad brush approach is 
likely to be simpler to administer and led to less scope for delay and obfuscation 
although providing 'rough justice' in some cases. Secondly a maintenance 
disregard will be introduced allowing the caring parent to keep up to E10 of 
maintenance before it is deducted from benefit entitlement. This is anticipated to 
encourage compliance of the caring partner and create better incentives for 
returning to work. In the last year preceding the introduction of the Green Paper, 
politicians of all parties acknowledged the very difficult job the Agency had had to 
do, including the then Minister for Social Security and former Chair of the Social 
Security Select Committee, Frank Field who stated 1, as a politician apologise for 
being a member of this place who put the CSA on the statute book. Responsibility 
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for the CSA rests with this House ... This House established the CSA and the House 
will have to reform it" (Hansard, 23 February 1998). A White Paper confirming the 
introduction of the changes above has just- been published with the new simplified 
system expected to begin in 2001 (Cm 4349 1 July 1999). 
Forensic Science Service 
Aims and objectives and key characteristics 
The FSS exists to serve the administration of justice through the provision of 
assistance at the scenes of crimes, the analysis of evidence and the provision of 
independent expert advice to Courts on behalf of both the prosecution and the 
defence (FSS Framework Document). 
It is not a monopoly as forensic science advice is available in a small private sector 
and from other government laboratories (including the LGC). It is however the main 
provider in the 'market' and provides a national fully integrated service (FSS HC 
129,1997). In Court, forensic scientists do not act on behalf of the Home 
Secretary, in the same way for example as Immigration Officers, but the legal- 
constitutional importance of their role was still very important to the Home Office in 
support of the administration of justice (interviews). Independence and impartiality 
are seen as key (FSS Framework Document, 1991, FSS HC 623,1994). Like the 
LGC, it is a non-monopoly research establishment. 
The agency employs 1,238 mainly specialist scientific staff in six laboratories 
covering every area of England and Wales. Its headquarters are in London on the 
site of the former Metropolitan Police Laboratory, with whom it merged in 1996. It 
charges for its analysis, the majority of its work comes from the police, but it also 
provides analysis for the defence side and is increasingly providing international 
consultancy and casework support. The FSS operates as a net costs agency It is 
financed by earned revenue and is able to fund investment from its operating 
surpluses (FSS, HC 129 1997,14). In 1997 - 98 its income was E59.7 million and 
expenditure was E54.4 million (FSS HC 878,1998) 
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History and development 
The Forensic Science Service became an agency in April 1991. The agency 
developed from six former police labs, which had previously served police forces 
directly, with funding being provided through a vote from the Police Division of the 
Home Office (Home Affairs Select Committee, HC 26,1989). After many inquiries 
and reviews the FSS became an agency in 1991 with the keen support of its 
existing Head and future Chief Executive. There were two important changes from 
its previous organisational features. The first was to increase the amount of work it 
provided for the defence - to enhance its role supporting the administration of 
justice and not simply to serve its main customer, the police. The second was to 
charge for its services and introduce a customer - contractor relationship. 
By the time of its prior options review, which was announced in May 1993 during 
the period of increased privatisation strictures, the FSS had become more of a 
corporate organisation, was covering its costs (after an early drop in demand from 
the police after charging was first introduced) and was reaping the rewards of the 
organisational independence agency status offered. 
It was announced that the Agency would remain an agency in 1994. Ostensibly the 
reason given was that the forensic market was too immature to permit self- 
regulation and the impartiality and independence of the forensic science advice 
were best retained under the jurisdiction and accountability provided by association 
with the Home Off ice (interviews with Agency and Home Office officials). Shortly 
afterwards, in April 1996, the FSS merged with the Metropolitan Police Laboratory. 
This removed forensic work from the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan force, which 
was thought to be more proper and solved a problem for the Home Office. It also 
completed regional coverage for the FSS, Making it a national service and provided 
a London HQ, both of which were important to the FSS. A second prior options 
process in 1998 is likely to result in a move to Trading Fund status for the FSS 
(Press Notice 20 October 1998) although the revised Framework Document is still 
undergoing revision. The FSS looks likely to expand considerably during the next 
three years (Press notice, 29 April 1998). 
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Prison Service Agency 
Aims and objectives and key characteristics 
The Prison Service Agency's key aims, as expressed by its statement of purpose, 
were to keep in custody those committed by the Court and to look after them "with 
humanity and help them lead law abiding and useful lives in custody and after 
release" (HM Prison Service, Framework Document, 1993). This statement of 
purpose, which reflected the findings of the Woolf Report, had not changed with the 
move to agency status. It placed both punishment and rehabilitation at the heart of 
the agency's role. This broad aim is supplemented by more detailed objectives and 
Agency values which were clarified and developed by the incoming Director 
General in the three months after he was appointed, and before the Agency was 
launched (interview). The goals were to: keep prisoners in custody; maintain order, 
control, discipline and a safe environment; provide decent conditions for prisoners 
and meet their needs including health care; provide positive regimes which help 
prisoners address their offending behaviour and allow them as full and responsible 
a life as possible; help prisoners prepare for their return to the community and 
deliver prison services using the resources provided by Parliament with maximum 
efficiency" (HM Prison Service Framework Document 1993) 
The Prison Service became the third biggest agency after the Benefits Agency and 
the Employment Service Agency, with 78% of Home Office Staff and 65% of Home 
Office expenditure (Cm 2208,1992). The Service had over 38,000 staff in post at 
the time of launch and over 42,000 prisoners at over 128 prison establishments, the 
most recent figures s how over 39,363 staff in post and 65,435 prisoners (HC 486, 
1998). Most of these establishments were owned and run by the Prison Service but 
it also was responsible for contracting some capacity from private sector prisons. In 
1997 - 98 the net cost of its operations was E1.9 billion and it operated under gross 
running costs control (HM Prison Service, HC 274 1998). The Prison Service's 
statutory duties derive from the 1952 Prison Act, and rules made under that Act 
(HM Prison Service Framework Document, 1993). The Prison Service Rules, rather 
like the Social Security regulations, do not require parliamentary assent but are 
made available to Parliament for scrutiny (Public Service Committee, HC 313,92). 
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Histofy and development 
The Prison Service had a long history of being a separate organisation outside the 
Home Office. In the last century prisons operated locally. The 1835 Prison Act 
permitted the Home Secretary to appoint Inspectors and in 1878 a Prisons Act 
brought nearly all prisons under the control of a national system run by a Prison 
Commission. The Prison Commission ran prisons until 1963 when it became the 
Prison Department of the Home Office. 
The Agency was established in April 1993 after a long period of procrastination 
within the Home Office (see chapter four). Like the Benefits Agency, the Prison 
Service Agency corresponded to an pre-existing division of the Home Office which 
had been headed by a 'Director General' of grade two level. On moving to agency 
status there was initially little alteration to the organisational structures. The chief 
executive of the Agency continued being called the Director General. The main 
operational difference was in the roles and responsibilities of the Director General 
(which will be addressed in chapter Seven). 
At the time of moving to agency status the incoming Chief Executive found three 
distinct cultures amongst the staff of the Agency. There were the traditional Home 
Office mandarinate, who moved into the Prison Service as part of their career in the 
Home Office and whose skills and interests lay in policy work. There were the 
social-work-trained Prison Governors, who held liberal values and emphasised the 
rehabilitation role of prisons. And there were prison officers with more authoritarian 
values, who ran the prisons and who were tightly organised by their trade union, the 
Prison Officers Association. (Lewis, 1997, p24). There were severe 
communication difficulties between both the POA and the rest of the service. This 
was an issue that was being tackled both through the Fresh Start proposals (see 
chapter four) and through the introduction of private prisons which was aimed at 
breaking the monopoly that the POA had on prison staffing (interviews with officials 
in the Prison Service and Next Steps Team). There was also a history of poor 
communication between the 'policy' people in the Home Office and the rest of the 
Service which resulted in implementation difficulties. As described in chapter four, 
this was the rationale for making the deputy directors have responsibilities for both 
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policy and operations and in making the Director General the Home Secretary's 
principal policy advisor (interviews with officials). 
The new Director General initially focused on the problems identified by the Woolf 
and Lygo Reports which included addressing the issue of prison overcrowding and 
the use of police cells, improving the financial controls within the Service and 
tackling the problematic relations with the Prison Officers Association (POA). 
Within a few months, however, the Prison Service and was faced with two 
significant changes which impacted on its work. The first was a change of Home 
Secretary with Michael Howard being appointed in the summer of 1993. 
Howard used this role to establish his radical credentials and to shore up his 
position as a leadership contender (Guardian 7 March 1997). At his first 
conference speech as Home Secretary at the 1993 Conservative Party Conference, 
Howard launched his 'prison works' campaign which signalled a more punitive 
regime to sentencers, and led to the biggest rise in prison numbers ever seen. In 
1993 the prison establishment was 43,000. This had risen to 65,000 by 1998 
(Home Affairs Select Committee, HC 486 1998). This meant that virtually from the 
start of the agency's life, after a period of consensus and gradually falling prison 
numbers, it faced a rapidly changing policy environment. It also indicated a 
changing ministerial view of the goals of the Service. 
Despite this significant change in the Prison Service's operating environment, the 
agency made progress in meeting its targets. However during 1994/95 two serious 
prison escapes at Whitemoor Prison in September 1994 and Parkhurst In January 
1995, caused considerable press and parliamentary interest and embarrassment for 
the Home Secretary. After the first escape an enquiry headed by Sir John 
Woodcock was established. This reported 
"[t]here exists at all levels within the Service some confusion as to the 
respective roles of ministers, the Agency HQ and individual prison governors. 
In particular the Inquiry has identified the difficulty of determining what is an 
operational matter and what is policy leading to confusion as to where 
responsibility lies" (Woodcock Report, Cm 2741,1994). 
Following the second incident another report headed by Sir John Learmont was 
commissioned, with the brief to look more generally at physical and procedural 
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security in prisons (Cm 3020,1995). His conclusions were that there were serious 
lapses of security at Parkhurst, that the Prison Service had considerable 
rnanagement problems and that the control function of imprisonment was being 
subsumed by the care aspect. Howard used this report as grounds for sacking 
Derek Lewis. He argued that the report had found fault with operational matters 
which were not his responsibility and had not criticised his policy decisions. He 
used the policy operational split inherent in the Next Steps arrangements to argue 
he could not be responsible. The terms of the parliamentary debate on the matter 
were shaped by this assertion, with the Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw 
seeking to prove that not only had the Home Secretary interfered with operational 
matters, thus nullifying the distinction, but had interfered so much that he made the 
Director General's job impossible (Lewis 1997,209 - 210). For many commentators 
this illustrated the 'accountability gap' which the Next Steps arrangements had 
created. 
Richard Tilt, a deputy Director and former Prison Governor took over as acting 
Director General, and after unsuccessful attempts to appoint another private sector 
candidate was appointed as the second Director General. As prison numbers 
continued to rise, Tilt faced grave difficulties in avoiding the use of police cells to 
cope with rising numbers. The election of the Labour Government in May 1997 
again altered the environment within which the prison service operated. The new 
Home Secretary, Jack Straw, immediately announced his intention to resume 
answering parliamentary questions about the Prison Service in a symbolic gesture 
to illustrate his ultimate responsibility for prison service matters (Hansard, 19 May 
1997; interview with minister in the Home Office). 
The new Home Secretary also sought to change the sentencing climate, to signal 
confidence in non-custodial sentences and alter public perceptions of the value of 
prison sentences as a deterrent. A review of community sentences was 
announced, the importance of deterrence and prevention highlighted, the 
presentation of crime statistics taken out of the political arena and a new policy of 
research-led policy making looking at 'what works J, was announced (Home Office 
Press Notice, 6 August 1998; Home Office Annual Report, Cm 3908,1998; Home 
Office Research Study 187,1998). This was consolidated by a decisive report from 
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the Home Affairs Select Committee which expressed grave concern at the growing 
prison population and urged the use of alternatives to custody whereever possible 
(Home Affairs Select Committee, HC 486 1998). 
The new Government also announced the start of the Prison Service's prior options 
process (Press Notice 30 July 1998). Early in 1999 following the retirement of its 
second Director General, a third Director General was appointed. Unlike his 
predecessors, Martin Narey was not appointed through open competition and, 
although he has experience of working in prisons, he is a Home Office policy 
specialist (Guardian, 14 April, 1999) 
Despite this more favorable climate since the election, prison numbers have 
continued to rise. Two new policies have had contradictory effects on the numbers 
of prisoners. A policy of early release, where prison was followed by a period of 
monitoring through tagging was introduced, the first time tagging has been used in 
conjunction with custodial sentences (Guardian, 27 January 1999). This was 
estimated to cut prison numbers by approximately 4,000. However in March 1999, 
legislation from the previous administration, introducing minimum sentences for 
repeat offenders was enacted which is expected to cause an equivalent rise in 
prison numbers (Guardian, 23 June 1999). Nevertheless, a return to a more 
liberal regime is indicated. The emphasis has returned to rehabilitation and away 
from purely punishment. This is signaled by the new Director General who 
describes his priorities for the Service as improving literacy, suicide prevention and 
confronting racism in the Service (Guardian, 14 April, 1999). The expression of 
these more rehabilitative aims would have been unthinkable during Howard's 
'decent but austere' pun ishment-orientated regime. 
Summary of key characteristics and agency history 
This introduction to the case study agencies highlights their key characteristics, 
summarised on Table 1, over. 
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The agencies represent a range of types, sizes, and funding regimes. The impact 
these features have on the type of relationship the agency has with its parent 
department will be explored in the following chapter. This summary sets out the 
different histories of each agency. All except the CSA were established parts of 
their departments, the Prison Service and the Benefits Agency representing very 
large parts of the their parent departments. Several of the agencies were headed 
initially by the existing head of the operation, (Companies House, LGC, Insolvency 
Service and FSS). With the exception of the Insolvency Service these agencies 
were keen converts to agency status. The FSS and the Insolvency Service still 
retain their original ACE. In Companies House and the LGC, subsequent 
appointments were of non civil servants. All three of the remaining agencies, the 
Benefits Agency, CSA and Prison Service Agency, initially appointed outsiders as 
first Chief Executives. Subsequently, all follow-up appointments went to existing 
civil servants (although the Benefit Agency's second chief executive had only joined 
the civil service as head of the War Pensions Agency in the DSS some two years 
before, having previously worked in the private sector) 
This summary has also provided details of the agencies' service policies or goals 
and any significant change or addition to these goals arising from other 
resource/fiscal policies, from other governance/administrative policies or from 
informal goals held by minister, department or agency. The next section of the 
chapter will look at the saliency of agencies' goals and goal agreement in the case 
study agencies. 
The Saliency of Agency Goals 
An alternative explanation for problematic relationships between departments and 
agencies with consequent implementation difficulties, links these with the political 
saliency of a policy area. Political saliency in a policy area focuses parliamentary, 
press and public attention on the policy area. Saliency highlights the interests of 
those involved and therefore exposes and exacerbates tensions or ambiguity in 
policy goals. The argument is that, in highly salient areas, a policy operational split 
is impossible to achieve. Ministers will intervene and this then places a strain on 
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the agency concept. The final section of this chapter will seek to assess the 
saliency of the agencies' policies and address this alternative explanation. 
Using the criteria outlined at the beginning of this chapter, (size, serving the public 
directly, sensitive or controversial policy area and high degree of parliamentary 
interest) there are clear differences in the agencies in the case study between 
those with highly salient policy goals and those with low saliency policy goals. The 
DTI agencies and the FSS in the Home Office are all smaller agencies with low 
budgets and smaller staff groups. The LGC and the FSS do not service the public 
directly. Although the Insolvency Service and Companies House do deal with the 
public, their customers are very few in comparison to the Benefits Agency or the 
Prison Service for example. Work in these agencies has the potential to become 
salient but none of these agencies has a history of operating in a sensitive policy 
area. Similarly, work in these agencies has the capacity to raise parliamentary 
interest. This occurred with the Insolvency Service for example at the time of the 
critical NAO report on the level of company disqualifications. In an investigation into 
agencies and informationary accountability, the fluctuating level of interest in the 
Insolvency Service is thought to be related to the level of insolvencies processed 
and the level of parliamentary interest has declined over time (Judge, Hogwood and 
McVicar, 1997). 
This, however, does riot compare with level of parliamentary interest shown in the 
Benefits Agency, CSA and Prison Service Agency measured in terms of 
parliamentary questions and ministerial/ACE correspondence. The level of 
correspondence from members of Parliament to ministers and ACEs over a two 
year period was recorded by the Public Service Committee in their investigation into 
ministerial responsibility and accountability (Public Service Committee, HC 313, 
1995/96). The figures for the case study agencies are shown below, together with 
the information on the number of parliamentary questions received by each agency 
in 1995, taken from research by Judge, Hogwood and McVicar (1997). This clearly 
indicates the far greater parliamentary interest in these three agencies. The Prison 
Service Agency was the agency with the most parliamentary questions and the 
Benefits Agency and Child Support Agency received the highest number of letters 
from MPs. 
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Table 2: Parliamentary Interest in the Case Study Agencies 
Agency Letters from MPs to Written parliamentary 
ministers and ACEs (1) questions to agencies 
1994 1995 (1995)(2) 
Benefits Agency 21,411 2,689(3) 217 
Child Support Agency 9,092 5,554 231 
Prison Service Agency 1,569 2,564 613 
Forensic Science Service not shown not shown 16 
Companies House 79 44 46 
Insolvency Service 33 29 109 
LGC under 10 under 10 15 
(1)Source Public Service Committee, HC313,1995/96, x1viii 
(2) Source Judge, Hogwood and McVicar, 1997,109 
(3) In addition the Benefits Agency replied to 13,981 letters from MPs sent to district offices 
This high level of parliamentary interest reflects the size of the agencies, their 
coverage, each one serving the public nationwide, and the political sensitivity of the 
policy area. These agencies are concerned with income replacement in times of 
hardship, family and financial responsibilities and the deprivation of liberty 
respectively. Each area is contested and allied with strong ideological stances 
which are often linked to party political positioning. All three agencies are highly 
salient. The saliency of these policy areas, is reflected when looking at the level of 
goal agreement in each agency. 
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Goal Agreement in the Case Study Agencies 
Conflicting goals were apparent in all of the case study agencies. In all the DTI 
agencies the strong commitment to privatisation by Michael Heseltinel when he was 
Secretary of State, was not shared by the agencies who wished to keep their 
agency status. This provides an example of two wider government administrative 
policies being potentially in conflict with one another. Companies House's hopes to 
introduce changes to the electronic collection and dissemination of date were 
affected by the loss of legislation after the election and the lack of priority given to 
this policy by the incoming administration. The Insolvency Service had a serious 
disagreement over the level of resources required to cope with rising bankruptcies. 
Nevertheless, the potential for goal agreement over service policies was far more 
straightforward in the smaller agencies, the DTI agencies and the FSS. As outlined 
earlier, the larger agencies, the Benefits Agency, CSA and Prison Service Agency, 
by virtue of the more complicated operational goals and the saliency of their policy 
area, had multiple goals not straighforwardly represented by the formal service 
policies of the agency. The saliency of the policy area also presented the difficulty 
of separating policy and operational responsibilities, with operational matters quickly 
becoming the subject of political debate. When problems subsequently arose in 
agreeing goals this then increased the saliency of the agencies' activities in an 
iterative relationship. 
The Prison Service Agency had established its goals in a post-Woolf era of 
increasing liberalism in penal policies. Lewis had personally taken charge of 
developing the objectives and targets which flowed from those goals (interview with 
former Prison Service official). Howard's personal political goals led to his espousal 
of a far less liberal agenda, and one which stressed punishment and not 
rehabilitation. The thrust of the Prison Service's formal goals was at variance with 
the more austere regime Howard sought to introduce. The policy and operational 
responsibilities of decision making about the policy of running prisons was hard to 
distinguish. This is illustrated, for example, by disagreements over television in 
cells and the Prison Service code of standards (Lewis, 1997,105 and 117). The 
result of the change in the political messages led to a change in the sentencing 
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climate and resulted in the Service having to respond to a rapid rise in prison 
numbers. This key task was not represented in the formal goals of the agency as 
represented by its objectives and targets. Here also policy decisions impacted on 
operational matters causing confusion in assigning responsibility for policy and 
operational matters. The formal and informal goals of the Agency were conflicting 
and rapidly changing. 
Fundamentally different agendas were also apparent when looking at the formal 
goals of the CSA. Here the ambiguous ideological origins of the policy, 
representing both feminist and right wing perceptions of the family and family 
responsibility, permitted differing intentions to be captured in the new legislation. 
According to Ann Chant, the social policy aims of the Agency were undermined by 
the fiscal aims of the Treasury who set high targets for recouping benefits 
expenditure (Social Security Select Committee, HC 282,1996/97; interview with 
former Next Steps official). The political aims of politicians, seeking to have the 
new agency operational at the optimum period in the political cycle also pressured 
the agency in terms of the time it could devote to staff training and IT preparations 
(interview with senior agency official). Child support policy was new, complicated 
and subject to rapid and frequent revision making operational targets difficult to 
meet. Here, too, policy and operational responsibilities were difficult to distinguish 
and goals were conflicting and rapidly changing. 
The Benefits Agency also had faced difficulties arising from a clash between the 
formal goals or service policies of the agency and wider government economic 
policies, making operational and policy responsibilities difficult to distinguish. The 
Agency built its culture on service to the customer, (Benefits Agency Framework 
Document, 1991) yet this was severely compromised by the efficiency cuts 
following the fundamental expenditure review. Service policies were undermined by 
wider resource policies. As the Social Security Committee noted, there was a 
tension between customer service and value for money in the Benefits Agency 
(Social Security Committee, HC 382,1994/95). Like the CSA, the Benefits Agency 
had introduced a new benefit (DLA) which was complicated and faced immediate 
problems causing political pressure for improvement. Like the Prison Service 
Agency, the Benefit Agency operated in areas where distinguishing between policy 
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and operational decision making was both very difficult and highly contentious, for 
example, in administering the social fund. Government objectives in this area were 
deliberately highly ambiguous and different to the Agency's view of the aims of the 
policy, leaving the Agency vulnerable (interview with former senior agency official). 
It is clear that these three agencies had multiple, conflicting and rapidly changing 
goals which were highly politically salient. Separating policy from operational 
responsibilities was difficult in each case, either because wider government or 
political goals impacted on operational goals, or because operational matters 
became politically sensitive. This made agreement about the service policies of 
the agencies difficult. 
At the Public Service Committee Bichard was asked if the difficulties faced by the 
Benefits Agency were any easier than the Prison Service because the Agency 
largely administers benefits under statutory legislation which could help to clarify the 
policy operational split. Bichard replied "the potential for controversy and 
complexity and political sensitivities in the way in which they are interpreted is still 
quite considerable" (Public Service Committee, HC 313,1995/96,154). Both Sir 
Peter Kemp and Derek Lewis make the same point in their submissions to the 
Committee (Public Service Committee, HC ý13,110 and 95 respectively). 
If it is accepted that all three agencies operated in highly salient arenas, with 
similar policy problems and where separation of policy and operational 
responsibilities are hard to establish, this suggests that saliency cannot be the 
direct cause of the difficulties in implementing through the agency concept. 
Despite its saliency, the Benefits Agency is widely cited as being an Agency which 
has been successful in implementing government policy (Social Security 
Committee, HC 382,1994/95; Kemp, Public Service Committee, HC 313,1995/96, 
110). 
The hypothesis outlined in chapter three suggested that goal agreement was a 
feature of smooth implementation. The analysis of the case study agency goals 
here suggests that this was easier in the smaller agencies which were chosen to 
provide literal replication with the hypothesis Goal agreement was certainly 
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problematic in the two agencies chosen to suggest theoretical replication for the 
hypothesis. Goal agreement was also found to be problematic in the Benefits 
Agency, included to test the saliency argument, and yet it is suggested 
implementation has been perceived as unproblematic. However, this chapter has 
concentrated on examining the 'service or output' policies (or goals) of the 
agencies. It has not explored the extent of goal agreement over the administrative 
or governance policy of operating through the agency concept. This area will be 
covered more extensively in chapter seven which looks at how the departments and 
agencies managed their relationships. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the case study'agencies. It has noted the range of key 
characteristics and histories of the agencies. It has explored the agencies' service 
or output goals. This is crucial as these form the basis for the subsequent 
exchange of resources. The type and size of an agency will determine the extent 
and nature of the exchange of resource required. The Benefits Agency, for 
example, because of its nation-wide coverage, huge client group and statutory 
nature requires a large transfer of resources. The LGC with its specialised role 
requires a far smaller exchange. It has noted that in all the agencies, goals can be 
multiple, hierarchical, conflicting and changeable. They may reflect formal goals 
about the agency's service or outputs, or they may reflect informal goals held by the 
agency, minister or department. Of the seven agencies, there were three agencies 
where goal agreement was problematic, the Benefits Agency, the CSA and the 
Prison Service Agency. This partly reflected the saliency of the policy area and, to 
a certain extent contributed to the saliency of the policy area. 
The chapter has also. offered an assessment of the saliency of the agencies' policy 
goals. It argues that the IDTI agencies and the FSS have low saliency policy goals 
compared to the IDSS agencies and the Prison Service. The latter three all operate 
in an area of high saliency. This undermines the argument that saliency is the 
reason for problematic implementation. The Benefits Agency did not suffer the 
public difficulties in relationships and consequent implementation problems that the 
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CSA and the Prison Service did. The explanation for problematic implementation 
must lie elsewhere. It is argued that the saliency of a policy area cannot be directly 
linked to problematic implementation. 
An alternative explanation is that close policy communities with shared values, 
goals and institutional support will led to smooth implementation. This chapter has 
looked at some aspects of the agencies' histories which indicate whether there is 
institutional support. It has also suggested that, although goal agreement over the 
agencies' service or output goals has been addressed here, it is intended to look 
more closely in chapter seven at the , extent of goal agreement over the 
administrative policy of operating through the agency concept. Before that, chapter 
six will develop the theoretical analysis of department-agency relationships by 
looking at the extent and impact of the exchange of resources which has resulted 
from agencification. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AGENCIFICATION AND THE CHANGING PATTERN OF 
RESOURCE EXCHANGE 
Introduction 
Chapter three argued that the establishment of agencies has led to changing 
dependencies in Government. There has been a large-scale transfer of resources 
from departments to agencies. Departments, acting under the authority of their 
minister, exchange resources with agencies to achieve agreed goals. The creation 
of semi-autonomous agencies holding resources in order to deliver government 
goals has led to power dependency relationships between departments and 
agencies. The extent of power dependency will vary according to the extent and 
type of resources exchanged. Differing dependencies are likely to lead to differing 
types of networks. Chapter four looked at how departments responded to 
agencification and chapter five looked at the goals of the case study agencies. This 
chapter examines the changed distribution of resources following agencification in 
the case study agencies. It looks at who holds what resources, what dependencies 
have developed and the power dependent networks which are created. 
Initially, the chapter will look generally at who holds the resources of legitimacy, 
authority, finance, organisation and information, and at how this has changed 
following agencification. It will outline what dependencies are created arguing that 
new power dependency relationships between ministers, departments and agencies 
have developed. Next the power dependent relationship between each department 
and agency will be analysed and finally the chapter will assess the level of 
dependency in each relationship. In conclusion, it is argued that the transfer of 
resources to agencies has increased their power potential. New power dependent 
relationships between ministers, departments and agencies have been created. 
Power in these relationships is relational although differing levels of dependency 
were discernable. 
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The Changing Distribution of Resources 
According to the Rhodes model of Power dependency organisations exchange 
resources to achieve their goals. Political legitimacy, authority, finance, 
organisational and informational resources are described as the means for 
supplying the needs of public sector organisations (Rhodes 1988). The first part of 
the chapter will look at each of these resources to examine who holds what, 
resources and who needs what, following agencification. It will draw on evidence 
from all the case study agencies, commenting generally in order to preserve the 
confidentiality of interviewees. The latter half of the chapter will look specifically at 
the power dependency relationships between each department and agency. 
Political legitimacy 
The resource of 'political legitimacy' provides the rationale for public interventions 
by the state and underpins the activation of the other resources of authority, 
finances, organisation and information to operationalise policy intentions and 
delivery. Political resources are held by elected representatives and both lead to 
their election and derive from their elected office (for example having or gaining 
party and public support). Political resources grant "access to public decision 
making structures" (Rhodes, 1988), or the electoral process. Thus elected 
representatives using their political resources gain the legitimacy to be able to make 
policy proposals, make legal and statutory provision for these to be carried out and 
issue instructions for their implementation. The constitutional arrangements of 
parliamentary democracy, cabinet government and the convention of ministerial 
responsibility places these resources largely in the hands of government ministers. 
However, political resources are held by elected officials outside government i. e. 
opposition and backbench politicians and in other tiers of government, for example 
by local authority councilors and, since devolution, by the regional parliaments. 
The development of agencies in government has not altered the distribution of 
political-legitimation resources in any way. Agencies operate firmly within the 
realms of ministerial responsibility and remain part of departments. Like 
departments they have no access to electoral structures and unlike local authorities 
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they do not have separate political legitimacy. They cannot act politically in their 
own right. Agencies, like departments are dependent upon ministers holding 
political resources for the legitimacy to operate. 
Authority 
The legitimacy to act is confirmed throu 
, 
gh the resource of authority granting 
"mandatory and discretionary rights to carry out [actions] by statute or constitutional 
convention" (Rhodes, 1988,110). Ministers hold authority deriving from their 
political legitimacy and stemming from constitutional conventions. Framework 
documents are based on the assumption that agencies are established to carry out 
ministers' policies and thus acknowledge the over-riding dominance of ministerial 
authority. All the ACEs interviewed routinely acknowledged their accountability to 
their political masters. One Chief Executive when asked to describe agency 
culture stated "giving priority to the policy of Ministerial objectives" as a unifying 
theme (interview, Chief Executive). 
As Smith points however, out the extent of ministerial authority can vary, for 
example, according to the amount of personal and political support held or their 
degree of success (Smith 1999a, 74). Personal confidence, party loyalty or policy 
achievements can boost the extent to which ministers can exert their authority. This 
was suggested by one senior civil servant from the Home Office who commented 
that Kenneth Clarke had a high level of personal security which "affects his whole 
style in dealing with the media and every other respect" (interview with former 
Home Office Deputy Director). 
The exercise of ministerial authority might also be related to their interest in a 
policy area. This might rise with a personal or manifesto commitment or if the area 
has a high media or parliamentary profile. For example, the priority given by Nigel 
Griffiths, junior Minister at the DTI, to the Insolvency Service was far greater than 
his predecessors (interviews, Insolvency Service Annual Report HC828,1998). 
Equally in the absence of these features, ministers may not take a close interest in 
an agency's business. As one Chief Executive stated of his minister "he wasn't that 
interested in what we did". 
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Conversely, there are factors which reduce the degree of authority a Minister is able 
to exert and can leave a vacuum for depart 
' 
ments to fill. The relatively short period 
of time ministers are in post reduces the degree of influence a minister can have. 
Secondly, the more complicated the policy area the harder it is for ministers to 
grasp. One former chief executive explained how a mixture of short tenure and a 
complex policy area constrained the extent to which ministerial authority could be 
exercised 
"in my time I had 5 junior ministers and three secretaries of state, they had an 
enormous changeover and with each one you had a very different sort of 
industrial policy ... It was a revelation to me about politicians at that level-some were intellectually very strong and others were very weak and of 
course few of them had any knowledge of science" (former Chief Executive). 
These factors equally applied to the exercise of ministerial authority over 
departments before the establishment of agencies. The move to agencies in 
government, operating as it has within the existing constitutional framework, has not 
ultimately altered the overriding dominance of ministerial authority in central 
government decision making (Gains, 1999). Ministerial authority can, however, be 
devolved and delegated through statutory or administrative means to actors 
operating in other tiers of government and there have been changes in the way in 
which ministerial authority is devolved because of the development of agencies. 
It is clear that, in some cases, because of the factors outlined above which may 
constrain a ministers ability to exercise authority, ministerial authority is sometimes 
delegated to departments and that agencies look to departments for the authority to 
act. In some cases this is the norm. All of the DTI agencies studied saw the 
Department as the realistic 'day to day' point of authority as did the Forensic 
Science Service. One chief executive described the grade 2 to whom they were 
responsible as "the ministers representative on earth" . 
Another explained 
"There is this gulf between the constitutional theory and the reality .... 
I mean 
I'm appointed by a minister and I report formally to the minister, I'm 
accountable to the minister .... I see almost nothing of ministers ... 
I mean that's 
the reality, and that's how it should be, I mean you don't keep a dog and bark 
yourself' (chief executive of a IDTI agency). 
The delegation of authority to departments, and specifically to the permanent 
secretary, is given formal expression through the role of Accounting Officer. 
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In some cases the minister delegates authority to appointed individuals or bodies 
who have statutory duties to report or advise on policy and/or standards. For 
example in the DSS, it is the Social Security Advisory Committee and the 
Independent Case Examiner (who replaces the Chief Adjudicator and related roles) 
and in the Home Office, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons and the Prisons 
Ombudsman. These roles are appointed by ministers and the legal framework 
under which they operate is subject to legislative change. Unlike ministers they do 
not have separate political resources. They do, however, carry some public 
legitimacy and delegated authority because of the statutory and public nature of 
their role. 
Authority is also delegated by ministers to agencies. The agency concept involves 
a delegation of operational decisions to the Chief Executive who becomes 
responsible for those aspects covered in the Framework Document. Thus, for 
example, depending upon the financial or personnel flexibilities, ACEs may have 
the authority to recruit staff. One chief executive recruited from the private sector 
was astounded at the degree of authority over financial matters delegated to him 
"The delegations were vast - far bigger than you would give a subsidiary company", 
yet this same chief executive was frustrated by not being able to recruit and appoint 
his own personal secretary. The extent and type of authority over financial, 
organisational and informational resources will be discussed next. However it is 
clear that turf wars between departments and agencies discovered by the Fraser 
and Trosa Reports (Efficiency Unit 1991; Trosa Report 1994) were largely about 
who held the delegated authority for these resources with departments deeply 
reluctant to give up control. 
Ministerial authority is delegated to agencies if the agency and its staff undertake 
statutory duties on behalf of the Secretary of State. Some statutes are detailed and 
changes can only be made by new legislation. Here, operating under statute gives 
an agency a legal and binding authority to operate which can insulate them from 
ministerial authority and provide a separate source of legitimacy for their activity. 
Prisons cannot refuse to take prisoners sent to them by the Courts, the Benefits 
Agency cannot withhold benefit from a person who is legally entitled. Of course 
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ministers can initiate changes to the statutory environment and having a statutory 
function does not protect an agency from the overriding dominance of a ministers 
authority. The LGC was privatised on Michael Heseltine's request, despite working 
to 23 separate pieces of legislation and supporting the statutory role of Government 
Chemist (Gains, 1999). Nevertheless, operating under statute can protect an 
agency from rapid change. Some statutes provide for enabling legislation which 
permits greater ministerial discretion in determining the policy direction, here 
ministerial authority can be more directly and immediately applied. 
The move to agencies has had the effect. of passing the opportunity to exercise 
authority to both departments and agencies. A former senior official in the Home 
Office in the pre-agency period felt the role provided considerable autonomous 
authority to represent the service I felt the agency arrangement made sense of 
that, it legitimised it, it gave the chief executive an obvious locus to sort of speak on 
behalf of the service as a whole and that's what the service had been craving for 
and badly needed because the people who filled the vacuum were trade union 
leaders". A chief executive of a medium sized agency performing statutory 
functions explains what the transfer of authority can mean in practice, providing as it 
does access to ministers, select committees and the NAO I do have a range of 
mechanisms that I can use to actually surface issues". 
This section has tried to show that, although in constitutional theory and in the 
agency arrangements, ministers hold the resource of authority, this did not reflect 
reality pre-agency and that post-agency an, even wider distribution of the resource 
of authority has occurred. Constitutional theory means that ministerial authority is 
dominant in the exchange relationship, however, in reality authority is held in 
varying degrees by ministers, departments and agency chief executives, depending 
upon the minister and on the goals of the agency. The dependency relationship is 
predominantly from agencies to ministers and departments. This may be in a linear 
relationship, i. e. agencies look to ministers through departments for the authority to 
act, or a triangular relationship, where agencies are dependent upon both ministers 
and departments directly. However the agency arrangements create a delegation 
of ministerial authority to agency chief executives and agencies' dependence upon 
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ministerial authority may be lessened where the agency provides a statutory 
service. 
Financial resources 
The creation of agencies led to an unprecedented large scale re-structuring of 
budgetary responsibilities. As outlined in previous chapters, chief executives 
became responsible for their administrative budget (and became agency accounting 
officer) or for the whole of the programme budget (becoming an additional 
accounting officer). Spending decisions on capital, staffing, training and delivery 
are specified in each framework document and, over the years since the start of 
agencification, the trend has been to delegate more and more responsibility 
(interviews with officials in the Next Steps Team). The creation of agencies created 
a massive transfer of financial resources to the control of agencies. The most 
extreme example of this is in the IDSS where 98% of the staff work in agencies. 
The agency concept sees this transfer of resources as from minister to agency. In 
fact, the picture is more complicated with cross-cutting dependencies developing 
between ministers, departments and agencies. 
The proper control over public spending has been the concern of the centre of 
departments since the creation of the role of Accounting Officer for Permanent 
Secretaries (see chapter two). This is the one area where officials have an 
independent source of authority and the ability and responsibility of challenging 
improper decisions by their political masters. Agency arrangements make 
departments dependent on agencies to ensure that the money delegated to 
agencies' control was properly spent. 
The loss of control over budgets was a source of great anxiety for departments. 
Several interviewees reported the effects on the principal finance officer and 
permanent secretary in one department where an agency moved to trading fund 
status and lost a great deal of money. One senior official explained I think it really 
shocked them and it affected their relationships with the other agencies because 
they were no longer to take things on trust or let things go their own way, ... 
it was a 
very frightening experience for them I think, " A chief executive from an agency in 
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the same department explained the effect on his permanent secretary "we were 
joint accounting officers for the agency and 
, 
he gathered in the reins 'OK so it may 
say you report to the Secretary of State but you actually report to me' was much 
more of the line" (interview with former Chief Executive). 
The dependency relationship between ministers, departments and agencies for 
financial resources will increase with the size of the budget. Large agencies 
demand a greater share of departmental budgets and are more visible. Peter Kemp 
explained why Michael Partridge, the Permanent Secretary in the Department of 
Social Security when agencies were developed, kept close control "He took an 
enormous interest and why, aside from his own qualities? Because he knew very 
well that if his agencies went down, the department collapsed. The department was 
the agencies.... and he couldn't afford to let it go" (interview with Sir Peter Kemp). 
This degree of anxiety and loss of control obviously increased with the size of the 
budget. 
The creation of agencies operating under a resource framework transferred an 
enormous degree of power and authority to agency chief executives. One chief 
executive described the move to agency status and net cost control as "heaven 
sent .... we could manage our resources in line with our income .... It was our income, 
it came to us .... well it still had to come via the vote system which was a 
complication, but at least we had more direct control over it ... We knew where all the 
money was coming from and going to" (former chief executive). This is recognised 
by departments, one official explained 
"you know what your money is before the beginning of the financial year, you 
know what your targets are, you can get on and meet those targets within that 
budget and you've got flexibility to do that. If you're bombed out mid-year 
then you may have a problem but you can't be raided by the Department in 
the middle of the year if its going to affect your targets, because Ministers will 
have to go back to Parliament ... that's public, 
its not a fudge within the 
Department and that gives the Agency Chief Executive tremendous strength" 
(former Fraser Figure). 
This is particularly evident where the agency is providing a statutory service, or one 
with high visibility. Another chief executive of a large agency described how the 
agency framework has given authority to chief executives "we have been quite 
successful in the last two years in getting additional money when we desperately 
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neededit... and you know the Chief Executive of the agency is able to use avenues 
that you couldn't use if you were just sort of part of the main civil service structure )). 
However the dependency relationship is not one way. The delivery of public 
policies requires financial resources. The obtaining and securing of financial 
resources illustrates the dependency which develops between ministers and 
officials. Ministers use their political resources to argue for financial resources 
within cabinet and with the Treasury. The electoral process grants legitimacy to tax 
and spending decisions. Departments want ministers who will win resources to 
develop new or support existing programmes to which there is likely to be strong 
departmental commitment and support (Smith, 1999a 125). One senior civil servant 
described what makes a good secretary of state "they have to handle themselves in 
cabinet, they have to handle themselves in the PIES round" (interview with 
departmental official).. 
With the establishment of agencies, departments' dependency upon elected 
ministers to provide legitimacy and authority to spending plans is shared with or 
transferred to agencies. Under the quasi-contractual relationship, departments and 
ministers are 'purchasers' and agencies 'providers'. It is argued this transference is 
not total however. Because Ministers are transient, it is often to departments that 
agencies will look for support for spending plans. One chief executive explained 
how the agency's 'Fraser Figure' had helped with a financial matter 
"we needed a particular outcome on what we call our external funding limit... 
its the extent to which we can draw down our reserves in the Treasury's piggy 
bank, its our money but we have to ask them for it (which is another story), 
and having somebody who knows their way around the central system, who 
can get results in those kind of areas is very beneficial 
Again, it is a triangular or linear dependence which develops, not the bi-lateral one 
depicted in the formal agency arrangements. Between departments and agencies, 
therefore, there is the capacity for either conflict, if the goals or policies are not 
shared, or collusion and shared dependency upon Ministerial approval if there is 
shared commitment to a particular policy. This potential for co-operation, (or 
collusion) was seen in the Department of Social Security where bids for the 
forthcoming PES round were decided at the departmental management board, 
which consisted of the Permanent Secretary and all the Chief Executives of the 
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Department of Social Security agencies before the Permanent Secretary and 
Secretary of State approached the Treasury. Virement was permitted and 
encouraged between the agencies' budgets (interview with former departmental 
official) - 
The potential for conflict was mentioned by several of the agency chief executives 
in the agencies studied, particularly in those cases where access to ministers was 
not frequent and the dependency relationship was through the department. One 
chief executive described the situation on the second day after becoming an agency 
"on the Monday I was called into the department, 'yes there's your budget - 
we can only give you El 1 million', and I said no, now I'm an agency its nothing 
to do with you, its my E12 million - you can get lost .... and I said sort it out, [name of minister] made me an agency on Friday, will you come to his office 
with me now and you tell him he can't give me what he said I can have on 
Friday and of course they gave it to me, but that was the sort of break point 
between myself and the department". 
Another graphically explained the impact of the transfer of operational authority, 
particularly for statutory duties, on agencies and how an agency was able to 
demand more resources in this case. As it so clearly sets out the exercise of power 
potential arising from resource dependency it is quoted in full. 
"What I am clear about and what the department is now clear about is that 
there is an equation between caseload, resources, and outcomes. And if in 
setting the business framework for this year and next year and the year after, 
it will start on the basis that there is in effect, an equation of caseload, 
resources and outputs and if ministers want to set outputs at certain levels 
then if something happens, such as case numbers go up or resources go 
down, them something has to happen to outcomes. And they also know now, 
because its been made very clear... that if somebody wants to attempt to 
gloss over all this there will be a letter from the agency accounting officer - 
myself - pointing out very clearly to Ministers what the consequences of the 
policy will be, added to which of course it's been clarified at least in that event 
... they have to be copied to the 
National Audit Office. So through all this pain 
and anguish there has been a very significant clarification of the relationship 
between [name of agency] with the department and with its ministers ..... That 
sort of sharpened up in a way which I think some civil servants in the centres 
find very difficult to cope with, because I think that the mind set at the centre 
of departments is this - that their job is in some way is to square away and 
square up all the figures which actually don't add up because there's never 
enough money to do the things that need to be done or which ministers think 
they want to be done .... Pre agency of course, this would 
have been all done 
and dusted away and tidied away amongst officials but I think agencies have 
now put chief executives much more in the driving seat' (Former Agency 
Chief Executive) 
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This case illustrates how agencies' dependency on ministers and departments for 
financial resources may be lessened if the agency is operating under a statutory 
framework which confers a right to a service or a legal obligation to provide a 
service. Agencies with these types of goals are less susceptible to frequent 
change or challenges. to their budgets although not immune to efficiency savings or 
long term legislative change to their goals. The demand-led nature of their 
provision leads them to be less vulnerable than agencies with discretionary goals 
which may be curtailed or withdrawn without legislative challenge. 
In a similar vein, agencies which are monopolies are less likely to face change in 
their financial circumstances than agencies where there are competing providers. 
One senior official in the centre of a department reflected on the approach taken to 
a non-monopoly agency "you got the real incentive on the customer to say, how 
good is the value for money I'm getting... and can I get this cheaper elsewhere" 
(senior official). In this case, the quasi-contractual relationship introduced through 
agencification, coupled with a pressing efficiency agenda, provided a powerful 
alternative to move directly to a fully contractual relationship. 
The dependency of agencies on Ministers and departments may be reduced, 
however, if they are able to charge for their services to cover their costs or generate 
their own income. Though still requiring ministerial legitimacy and authority to 
operate, agencies not relying on treasury funding are more self reliant. Indeed, 
these type of agencies report operating under tight Treasury control a constraint 
(Greer 1992; Massey 1995; Price Waterhouse 1994; interviews). One chief 
executive appointed from outside the civil service remarked 
"commercial accounting and company accounting is very different to 
government accounting and the vote limit is essentially a cash limit. And in 
government you have to balance the books to the nearest sort of pound if you 
can at the end of the financial year in cash terms not the commercial, whether 
you recover your full economic costs, is the expression for the commercial 
term. So although I had the objective to recover full economic costs, the day 
after I arrived I was told that I also had an objective to keep to this vote limit. 
Now cash is important but it is a rather artificial - so you suddenly realise that 
although the organisation had been set up to be fairly free standing and well 
run within a government department, there were these additional constraints 
(former chief executive). 
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These constraints are eased for agencies which operate as trading funds and 
therefore able to build reserves and invest within specified limits. As one chief 
executive of a trading fund explained I think it's highly beneficial, it's not quite as 
liberating as people might have you believe, but it does allow us to account in 
sensible ways for our activities and to plan one year on another. So it gives us a 
measure of freedom and our revenues are relatively buoyant so that we are 
relatively able to build for the future". Another chief executive waiting to move to 
trading fund status outlined the need for the move "we need more freedoms, we 
need lots more money to invest). 
The changes to financing in central government as a result of agencification has 
had a major impact on the dependency relationships between ministers, 
departments and agencies. The transfer of financial resources to agencies had 
created a ministerial and departmental dependency. However departments and 
agencies are still dependent on ministers to provide the political support for 
spending decisions, and agencies depend upon departments for access to financial 
resources. The degree of dependency between ministers, departments and 
agencies for the obtaining, stewardship and spending of financial resources will 
vary according to the size and type in agencies. In particular it will vary according 
to the degree of statutory work, the availability of substitutes to the agency and the 
agency's ability to charge for its output and fund itself. The relationship is not a 
straightforward bi-lateral transfer from minister to agency. The implications overall 
are a transfer of power potential from ministers and departments to agencies. 
Organisational and informational resources 
A similar picture of shared dependency varying with the size and type of agency is 
found with the transfer of organisational and informational resources to agencies. 
Ministers and departments need agencies to use those organisational and 
informational resources to deliver the agencies' goals. Organisational resources 
include the physical manifestations of people, buildings and equipment. The 
control and use of these resources additionally transfer tremendous amounts of 
information to agencies. This is not only information held by staff members as 
expertise or professionalism, or in technology, for example through records and 
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data, but also experience and expertise of policy implementation and intelligence 
relevant to that policy area. As with financial resources, departments lost control of 
these resources and either with ministers, or in place Of ministers, became 
dependent upon agencies to achieve the policies set out in the policy and resources 
framework. 
Agency status gave more power to agencies by transferring organisational and 
informational resources. All the chief executives interviewed expressed the feeling 
agencies were better able to input to the policy process and better able to articulate 
their needs than previously. For example, one chief executive said I think one of 
the biggest hidden things was actually increasing the respect and the value which 
was placed on operational matters ... it raised the profile within the department 
mandarin group that operations actually had to be valued - it was no good devising 
the policy without seeing how you actually worked in practice" (Chief Executive). 
The degree of dependency varies again with the size, type and saliency of agency. 
Indeed the size of the agency could increase the likelihood of political problems 
emerging (interview with former Prison Service official). As Peter Kemp explained 
"If Companies House goes down, its not the end of the world, it's a pity and there 
will be trouble but nevertheless its not the end of the world. But in the Department 
of Social Security, if the Benefits Agency went down then you were in trouble, you 
had riots on the streets, you had people not getting their giros and you had real 
dead trouble" (interview with Sir Peter Kemp). 
It is not only the size of the Benefit Agency's command of organisational and 
informational resources which creates a large dependency between the agency and 
the department. It is the type of function, which binds all the IDSS's operational 
agencies and the department together. Social security policy is complicated and 
integrated and requires cohesion between the goals of each agency (interviews with 
former senior official, and Secretary of State). This is different to both the IDTI and 
the Home Office, whose agency functions were unconnected. 
There are other features which increase the power potential of the organisational 
and informational resources held by agencies, for example, staff expertise and 
157 
professionalism. This is particularly the case if the agency is performing a statutory 
responsibility or is the only provider of this specialism. The FSSs development of 
DNA technologies made the agency a world leader and became important to the 
Home Office as a 'flagship policy' (interview with senior Home Office Official). 
The coherence of organisational and informational resources was strengthened if 
the agency maintained its former organisat 
' 
ional structures as was the case in the 
Benefits Agency, Prison Service Agency and the Insolvency Service (interviews 
with Chief Executives and senior agency officials). It was not found in the Child 
Support Agency which recruited new staff, working with new technology to new 
legislation. This weakened its power potential considerably. A senior agency 
official stated 
"[t]he policy was a very new one and there wasn't really a test bed for it all .... a lot of the practical issues just weren't thought through and realised 
sufficiently .... ministers were very keen to get it in by certain dates because of things like general elections and so forth and that was really too quick and so 
for some very basic things like the IT system - there just wasn't time to do 
them properly.... and the staff were insufficiently trained to start with for the 
same reasons. They're now very experienced and very good but they weren't 
when they were taken off the streets.... I don't think it helped that there wasn't 
an agency actually in being at the time when that policy and that law was 
actually being put through. The operation was set up later and sort of 
inherited this and asked to make the best of it" (interview with senior agency 
official). 
To try to retain some control over the amount of information held by agencies, 
ministers and departments sought various ways of obtaining information from 
agencies'. One DSS official remembered "Michael Partridge used to drive Michael 
Bichard absolutely bananas at his quarterly review meetings because he used to 
enquire into areas that Michael Bichard thought were entirely his". For some chief 
executives this duty was irksome but unavoidable "we're providing information for a 
very heavily slated Ministerial agenda and we're not providing information via that 
means which we would regard as giving a true and fair picture of the agency, what 
is important within the agency and what the agency is" (interview with Chief 
Executive). Another former chief executive in the same department felt more able 
to resist 
' The ways in which departments and agencies managed this dependency will be explored 
in the following chapter. 
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"from time to time we'd have little contretemps with HQ who'd want some information which we hadn't got and my line of argument was, if I don't need it to run the organisation why do you need it from outside and if you convince 
me its valuable then I need it for running 
, 
my organisation and I'll provide it and if you can't convince me its valuable - you can whistle for it' (interview with former chief executive). 
A former departmental official suggested why departments depended upon 
agencies for information, explaining that although the Next Steps philosophy 
suggested 
"there should be a degree of monitoring of the lightest sort... departments 
never can resist meddling, partly because Ministers can't keep their hands out 
of it when things go pear-shaped politically and partly because it does 
represent the detraction from the power of the central department and nobody 
likes losing power". 
The dependency on organisational and informational resources does not run only 
from ministers and departments to agencies. Agencies also require the 
organisational and informational resources retained in departments. This may be 
for the policy expertise covering the area of an agency's operational responsibilities, 
for example, Companies House pays a fee. for engaging the advice of DTI lawyers 
or for more general administrative matters such as pay, personnel and training 
resources (interviews with departmental official). Agencies need to use 
departments, particularly the finance and resources sections to access information 
about financial matters or to access resources from the Treasury. This is 
particularly the case for smaller agencies. Bigger agencies such as the Benefits 
Agency and the Prison Service Agency have at certain periods been able to deal 
directly with the Treasury (interviews with agency officials). The dependence 
agencies have on departmental organisational and informational resources is 
sometimes focused through the role played by the agency's Fraser figures or 
structured through other formal processes such as meetings and sometimes 
obtained through informal contacts (These processes of exchange will be 
explored further in chapter seven). 
In summary, as with financial resources, the transfer of organisational and 
informational resources to agencies creates ministerial and departmental 
dependency upon agencies to deliver policies using these resources, increasing the 
power potential of agencies. However, the dependency relationship is not one way. 
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Agencies are also dependent upon departments for the organisational and 
informational resources they hold, particularly, organisational access to Whitehall 
and ministerial decision making and the accompanying policy and policy process 
knowledge. Again, the degree of dependence intensifies where agencies' policies 
are of major importance to the departments or minister, are politically salient or 
highly professional i sed. Dependency may be less if the service can be replicated or 
is more executive-type work. Overall the dependency varies and is not bi-lateral, 
but linear or triangular. 
Resources held and dependency arising from resource exchange 
Agencification has altered traditional patterns of power dependency between 
ministers and departments, creating new and dynamic patterns of resource 
exchange and dependency, particularly between departments and agencies. The 
resources held by each actor are shown on Table 3 (overleaf). Ministers retain 
political resources and authority. Departments hold devolved authority and some 
organisational and informational resources relating to access to policy machinery 
and policy information. Agencies also hold some devolved authority for operational 
matters and sometimes devolved statutory authority. They control financial, 
organisational and informational resources. Where agencies have a monopoly over 
policy implementation their power potential is vastly increased. 
The impact of this transfer of resources has altered dependency between the 
actors, and these dependencies are shown in Table 4 (page 160). Ministers are 
dependent upon their permanent bureaucracies for the resources to translate policy 
desires into action. Departments traditionally controlled organisational and 
informational resources through a unified and uniform civil service. The 
establishment of agencies at arm's length from departments headed by a chief 
executive has caused a visible and tangible transfer of resources from departments, 
thereby extending dependence between ministers and departments to achieve 
shared goals, to a dependency between ministers and agencies. Most crutially it is 
suggested that because of the transient nature of ministerial tenure and the high 
involvement of departments in policy making, a dependency between departments 
and agencies is also created. 
160 
Table 3: Resources held by Ministers, Departments and Agencies 
Actor Resource held 
Ministers Political derived from elected office 
Authority over goals and spending decisions 
Departments Authority (devolved) and for financial probity 
Organisational access to ministers 
control over departmental rules 
access to other parts of Whitehall especially 
Treasury 
Informational policy information 
policy process information 
financial information 
Agencies Authority (devolved) for operational matters 
(devolved) for statutory functions 
(devolved) for financial probity 
Finance control over financial resources 
Organisational 0 buildings, staff and technology 
Informational 0 operational information 
a specialism, professionalism and expertise 
0 
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Table 4: Dependencies Arising from Resource Exchange 
Actor Dependency on Resource 
Ministers Departments organisational resources 
information resources 
policy knowledge 
knowledge of Whitehall 
operational knowledge 
Agencies e financial resources ) to deliver 
9 organisational resources ) policy 
0 informational resources ) area 
Departments Ministers 0 political resources and authority 
0 financial resources (access to) 
Agencies 0 financial resources ) to deliver 
0 organisational resources ) policy 
0 informational resources area 
Agencies Ministers political resources and authority 
obtaining financial resources 
Departments 0 authority for policy area 
0 financial resources (access to) 
organisational and informational resources 
(access to ministers & Whitehall 
machinery) 
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Ministers need their policy intentions translated into practice. Ministers need the 
experience, co-ordinating skills and time which departmental civil servants have to 
make and develop po 
' 
licy (Smith 1999a, 125). Before the development of agencies 
they also required the administrative, organisational and informational capacity of 
extended bureaucracy to deliver policies. These resources are now held by 
agencies. In some cases these resources are extensive - the vast network of local 
offices held by the Benefits Agency, for example. It is not simply the amount of 
organisational and administrative capacity or size of agency which creates the 
dependency. It is the type of function it delivers. The separation between policy 
making and policy implementation can be difficult to discern. Implementation may 
led to the identification of further policy problems or may need to be adjusted to 
achieve policy goals. The experience of operationalising a policy is a key resource 
for future policy making. Where the task is complicated or discretionary, agencies 
will retain the expertise and informational resources which are essential to 
maintaining and reviewing the policy process. 
Agency theory suggests there is a bi-lateral dependency between a minister 
(supported by their department) and agencies. This bi-lateral relationship is 
assumed to arise from the quasi-contractual relationship and replace the bi-lateral 
dependency between minister and civil servant under a command relationship. 
Power is seen as a zero sum game. However it is argued here that the agency 
arrangement represents an idealised relationship and, in practice, power 
dependency relationships exist between ministers, departments and agencies. This 
dependency has always existed between ministers and their departments. Their 
dependence now extends to agencies. For departments, however, the creation of 
agencies structurally removed their access to key resources and their control over 
implementation. Their dependency on agencies is new and has grown since the 
senior management review which has further emphasised their policy making role. 
Power is relational, rather than a zero sum bi-lateral relationship: there is a more 
complicated triangular or linear dependency between ministers, departments and 
agencies. 
Ministerial commitment to a policy area will vary. It may be high, for example, if the 
policy represents a manifesto pledge and less so if the policy is an inherited 
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commitment. Their commitment will also vary according to their abilities and 
interests and, most crucially, the time they spend in post (Gains, 1999). Larger, 
more visible and especially more politically salient agencies will demand greater 
ministerial attention than smaller, more executive-type agencies. Where ministerial 
commitment or interest is high, there will be a three way or triangular dependency 
relationship. Ministers provide legitimacy and authority and possibly financial 
resources, but rely on their departments for policy skills and background knowledge 
of the policy area (enabling them to be an intelligent customer in the 'agency' 
jargon) and on agencies for delivery, implementation and operational policy advice. 
Departments will provide the continuity in policy knowledge and policy skills to 
support ministers. Both will depend upon agencies to deliver policy goals using 
their informational and organisational resources. 
Where ministerial commitment is less, the dependency relationship may be more 
linear. Ministers may delegate responsibility for oversight to their departments and 
rely on departments to ensure the function is delivered. Agencies may look to 
departments and not necessarily to ministers for support for the policy process. In 
this linear situation ministers still provide the legitimacy and authority but do not 
exercise it. In the vacuum, departments use their informational and organisational 
resources to steer the policy process. 
In both circumstances key and new dependency relationships between departments 
and agencies have emerged. Departments have institutional commitments to policy 
areas which have developed over time (Richards and Smith, 1997). They want to 
control the policy process in order to avoid policy problems. Departments require 
agencies to deliver policy goals and avoid actions which would embarrass or draw 
parliamentary attention to the minister. Agencies look to the organisational and 
informational skills of departments to smooth the policy process and maintain 
continuity in policy goals. 
This section has argued that a range of dependency relationships will be found 
following agencification. Differences will relate to the size, type, funding regime and 
saliency of the policy area as well as depending upon the interests and capabilities 
of ministers. 
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Departments and Agencies as Resource Dependent Organisations 
The difficulty of trying to classify agency characteristics into typologies in order to 
relate this to other phenomena, such as their relationship with the parent 
department, was discussed in chapter two. Massey (1995) suggests that a 
continuum is more helpful in categorising agencies, ranging from fully autonomous 
lautarky' agencies to purely executive 'cipher agencies. This research will also 
view agencies and their parent departments as having relationships that vary on a 
continuum from high to low dependency based on the extent and type of resources 
exchanged to meet their agreed goals. The second part of this chapter will re- 
examine the departments and agencies in the study as resource dependent 
organisations in a power dependency relationship with each other. 
Department of Social Security 
In the DSS, ministers, the department and all its agencies are highly dependent 
upon each other. This is partly because of the amount of financial, organisational 
and informational resources held by agencies, particularly the Benefits Agency and 
the control they have over implementation. Partly it is because of the nature of 
social security policy, which is very complicated and technical. It requires a unified 
response from the department as policies affecting one group of claimants will 
impact on the work of several agencies, and the goals of each agency have an 
impact on the operations of the others. Social security policies are also very salient, 
they involve direct contact with large numbers of the public, whose personal 
circumstances are greatly affected by the actions of the agencies. This saliency 
draws in ministerial involvement, whilst the technical nature of the policy area and 
brevity of ministerial tenure (Peter Lilley being an exception) means the Department 
has a high incentive to retain the control over resources it held pre-agencification to 
maintain policy continuity and protect ministers from embarrassment. 
For the Department of Social Security the Benefits Agency represented the greater 
part of the former department dealing with politically sensitive business and, 
therefore, the dependency was very great and the anxiety about loss of control 
huge. In the Department of Social Security this dependence arose partly because 
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of departments' traditional role in protecting ministers from Political problems and 
embarrassment, one official at the centre explained "especially for areas like social 
security, departments don't want to lose control ... because so many things could go 
wrong and ministers could end up with a lot of egg on their face" (interview with 
official in Next Steps Team). 
The dependence also arose because the department had its own needs met by the 
Benefits Agency. Uniquely, because of its organisational history and size, the 
Agency provided payroll, purchasing, personnel and training services to the other 
Department of Social Security agencies and the rest of the department (TCSC HC 
496,1990/91 Session). Both the Benefits Agency and the Prison Service Agency, 
when part of their departments, had provided career appointments for high flying 
administrative trainees (or fast trackers). A former Department of Social Security 
official explained "There was this tremendous distrust and paranoia of the Benefit 
Agency because it was so huge that from the outset it could have been completely 
self-sufficient if it had chosen to" (former senior official in the DSS). This led to 
much concern, initially, to ensure staff mobility and common personnel policies as, 
without it, the Department was concerned it could not offer a comprehensive career 
progression to its high fliers (interviews with several senior departmental staff). 
Tension about how to manage this dependence caused early difficulties in the 
Department of Social Security (interviews with senior officials). One senior official 
candidly acknowledged 
"[the Benefits Agency] were flexing their muscles, they didn't see why they 
had to have these common personnel policies, they'd been set up to be 
independent, they had their own culture and ... when the rhetoric sets such 
store by culture and own management ... you create a Frankenstein's 
monster. Now you need to unpack an awful lot that's hidden in that 
statement, at face value its the stuffy and statesman-like senior bureaucrat 
who's only concerned with the welfare of the department overall. At a level 
rather below that it was [an official] whose power was diminished by this ... there was an awful lot of power playjj (senior official in the Department of 
Social Security). 
Agencification has led to the Benefits Agency holding a huge store and monopoly of 
financial, organisational and informational resources due to its size and function. 
The statutory nature of its role gives it a delegated source of authority. Its previous 
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history as a former division within the bepartment gave a coherence to the 
utilisation of those resources and the agency arrangements, while the stress on 
building up a corporate identity and culture increased this coherence. The Benefits 
Agency is tremendously powerful. A senior official from the Agency confirmed 
"the Benefits Agency became a powerful force within the Department of Social 
Security and had to be listened to ... and we were listened to in a way that an operational arm of the department headed up by a grade three in the 
department who owed his future entirely to the permanent secretary and his 
appraisal reports would have found it very difficult to do" (former senior 
agency official). 
However the Agency depended on ministers for the political authority and 
legitimacy to act and particularly for obtaining resources both for operational 
budgets and programme budgets. It also depended upon the department for 
access to decision making and policy knowledge and for access to the Secretary of 
State. In response to the new administration's extensive policy agenda for social 
security and 'joined-up thinking' initiatives, the Agency's dependency on the 
Department has increased since the election and there is less direct contact with 
the Secretary of State (interview with senior agency official). Nevertheless, the 
Agency's power potential, given its monopoly over implementation resources, is 
very high. 
The Child Support Agency holds far fewer financial, organisational and 
informational resources than the Benefits Agency. It is also far less coherent than 
the Benefits Agency, being newly established. These factor reduce its power 
potential. However, ministers' and departmental dependence on these resources is 
high because the policy area is new (and therefore the department has no residual 
knowledge) and highly salient (and the potential for ministerial embarrassment 
high). It has been very dependent upon both departmental and ministerial support 
for operating budgets and negotiations with the Treasury about financial targets. 
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Home Office 
In contrast to the Department of Social Security, the Home Office is described as a 
, loose federation' (interviews). Ministerial and departmental dependence upon the 
financial, organisational and informational resources held by the Home Office 
agencies is more individualised than in the Department of Social Security. 
Ministers again retain political legitimacy and authority. The complexity and 
legalistic nature of Home Office policies makes ministers dependent upon the policy 
knowledge held by officials, particularly in relation to the highly politically salient 
area of penal policies. This policy knowledge and access to ministerial decision 
making was transferred to the agency in the case of the Prison Service Agency but 
was retained in the Department in the case of the FSS. The Home Office retained 
devolved authority, therefore, for the FSS but not for the Prison Service. Yet, both 
the Department and ministers retain a high dependency upon the agency for the 
smooth operation of penal policies to maintain support for the policy and avoid 
embarrassment for ministers. 
The Prison Service Agency, like the Benefits Agency, represented a huge part of 
the department, and controls very large budgets and organisational resources. 
Ministers and the department are highly dependent upon the Prison Service to 
deliver its goals in order to protect ministers from embarrassment in an area of high 
saliency and sensitivity. It had a very coherent institutional structure based on its 
history as a identifiable organisation. Unlike the Benefits Agency, there was less 
internal fluidity between the operational, managerial and policy roles within the 
organisation, although like the Benefits Agency, the Prison Service had provided a 
stepping-stone in the careers of Home Office high fliers. The agency holds policy 
and operational information. It is dependent upon ministers for political legitimacy 
and authority to act, although operating in a statutory framework under the 
jurisdiction of an Inspectorate and Ombudsman provides an additional and 
alternative source of authority. Its other key dependency is for resources which 
became acute after the rise in prison numbers. This dependency was on ministers 
for their political support and with the Home Office for its organisational and 
informational support. 
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The Forensic Science Service is smaller and less salient. Nevertheless, its 
expertise, legalistic function and near monopoly position mean there is a strong 
dependency relationship between department and agency. Although Forensic 
Scientists are officers of the Court and operate under legal processes, the FSS 
currently relies heavily upon the legitimacy and authority of the Home Secretary 
backed by the Home Office for its credibility. Although there are other providers of 
forensic advice including other Government -laboratories, the FSS is the leader in its 
field and the biggest operator, creating ministerial and Home Office dependency 
on it. Attempts to establish industry bodies and independent oversight are seeking 
to reduce this dependence, however. 
The FSS holds financial, organisational and informational resources. Although able 
to raise its own income through charging, the majority of its funding comes from the 
police and thus there is an indirect dependence between the FSS and the Home 
Office, who indirectly fund it through the police funding mechanism. Until its 
transition to trading fund status it is dependent upon Home Office and ministerial 
approval for its budgeting plans. Since merging with the Metropolitan Police 
Laboratory it has provided national coverage. The specialism of forensic scientist 
knowledge increases dependence upon the Agency which has become more 
pronounced with the development of DNA testing. This 'flagship policy', in which 
the FSS is a world leader, has become very, important for both the Home Office, for 
example its international section, and for politicians who benefit from both the kudos 
of the technology and the increased prosecutions it delivers. The dependency 
relationship between the FSS, ministers and the Home Office has kept the FSS 
within the remit of the department despite its capacity as a non-monopoly, fee- 
charging agency to move from a quasi-contractual to a fully contractual agency 
operating in the private sector. 
Department of Trade and Industry 
Although the DTI moved quickly into establishing agencies and at one time had 
over 50% of its staff working in agencies, these agencies were smaller and did not 
individually represent a large section of the department in the same way that the 
Benefits Agency and the Prison Service Agency did. Trade and Industry policies 
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are also not as coherent and interlinked as social security policies, and unlike both 
social security and penal policies, do not directly affect large numbers of 
constituents to the same extent. This means they are less inherently salient 
although their policies retain the capacity to develop saliency as a political issue 
arises. For example, the Companies House investigation into the former Paymaster 
General Geoffrey Robinson's company registration, became very salient when it 
was discovered that the former Secretary of State with responsibility for sanctioning 
that investigation, Peter Mandelson, had borrowed money from Geoffrey Robinson 
to buy a house, leading to accusations of a conflict of interest and contributing 
ultimately to his loss of authority and resignation. 
Thus, the dependence of Ministers and the Department on its agencies was 
intrinsically less than in the other two departments. Ministers were less likely to be 
faced with political difficulties and each policy area was comparatively more 
straightforward. Nevertheless, the department still sought to retain control over the 
financial, organisational and informational resources transferred to agencies 
through strong governance arrangements (which will be discussed further in 
chapter six). This controlling instinct springs partly from the Department's 
interventionist history (Gains, 1999) and partly from modelling business 
arrangements, with which it had a great deal of contact. Also it arose (as in the 
Department of Social Security), to compensate for the loss of resources to 
agencies. In general, because the policy areas covered by the three agencies 
studied were relatively routine and straightforward, ministerial attention was low and 
authority devolved quite considerably to the department. 
Companies House provides a statutory service and therefore depends upon 
ministerial authority to operate. Some parts of its work (the provision of information 
for other users), could be provided by non-statutory organisations and it is a political 
decision as to where the boundary for the agency's information provision lies. This 
has varied according to ministerial approach. Michael Heseltine sought to 
investigate whether part of its work could be privatised or contracted out, the current 
administration have, by contrast, by not prioritising enabling legislation, curtailed the 
agency's ability to compete with its customers. This illustrates that ministerial 
dependency varies according to ideological and policy beliefs and commitments. 
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The work is very straightforward causing little controversy. The agency charges for 
its services, reducing its dependence for funding and approval for operating 
budgets. However its autonomy is limited as because of its statutory nature, and 
the extent of fees and charges it sets are subject to ministerial (and therefore also 
departmental) approval. Although the Agency is still dependent upon the 
Department for several services (personnel, pensions and Company Law policy 
advice) it holds considerable amounts of organisational and informational 
resources, particularly about the technological advances which will alter the service 
it delivers. This emphasises a ministerial and departmental dependence on the 
agency which is balanced by the authority the agency needs to make the changes. 
The Insolvency Service, is in some ways similar to Companies House. It operates 
throughout the Country and upholds company law, serving to regulate the market. 
There are several key differences, however. Insolvency is a far more sensitive 
subject, especially through the recession of the early 1990s. This leads to a higher 
level of ministerial casework and parliamentary interest and a greater propensity for 
political salience. Like company registration, insolvency work is also demand-led. 
However, the work is more legalistic, with Insolvency Officers acting as officers of 
the Court and overseeing the work of private sector practitioners. It is more 
complicated and profesionalised. Like the Prison Service Agency, the Agency is 
also responsible for providing advice on insolvency policy. The informational and 
organisational resources held by the agency lead to a greater departmental and 
possibly ministerial dependence. Conversely, although the agency accrues income, 
it cannot use this income to fund its activities and is wholly dependent upon 
departmental and ministerial approval for level of financial resources and budgetary 
approval. The statutory nature of its activities, professionalism of its staff and 
control over informational resources provides the potential power to its negotiations 
with the Department and ministers in this respect and protects it from radical 
alteration of its activities such as attempts to contract out parts of its work. 
The Laboratory of the Government Chemist has many similarities with the FSS, as 
it is also a self funding, non-monopoly, specialist provider of scientific information 
working under statute. There are, however, key differences in its customer base, 
the saliency of its policy area and the departmental context in which it operates, 
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which led to a far less dependent relationship between the LGC, ministers and the 
DTI than was indicated with the FSS. 
The LGC was one of the smaller agencies, with staff based all on one site in a 
relatively new and very well equipped laboratory. As well as the organisational 
resource represented by the laboratory, the agency's staff were highly skilled and 
expert, in a similar way to scientists in the FSS. Again like the FSS, although the 
staff of the Agency were extremely professionalised and specialised, this expertise 
was available in the private sector. The role of Government Chemist was a statutory 
role which involved the potential for appearing in Court as an independent and 
impartial arbiter of last resort. This was a rare outcome, with disputes being more 
usually resolved through the authority devolved to the Government Chemist by 
virtue of the office. Therefore, although the LGC in theory could offer a similar legal 
role in Courts as the FSS (and indeed competed for and gained some forensic 
work) this was a far smaller part of the agency operations. The agency therefore 
did not depend as closely upon on DTI ministers or the department for the authority 
to act, this authority came from the legislation it worked to which related to several 
departments. This authority has been maintained in privatisation through a new 
arrangement and the Government Chemist role is retained by the Chief Executive 
of the privatised LGC for a fee of E10. 
Again, like the FSS, the agency, although not a trading fund, had been able to 
charge for its services since its establishment and was able to operate under net 
costs control. It was therefore less dependent upon DTI or ministerial approval for 
funding than for example the Insolvency Service. It was, however, highly 
dependent upon a range of departments for continuation of contracts and, as there 
were competing providers, this made them vulnerable to loss of that work. As the 
DTI did not fund the LGC it did not have the same need to ensure value for money 
as the Home Office did in the case of the FSS. Indeed the DTI and DTI ministers 
did not depend upon the LGC to meet its own goals in the way that the Home Office 
did with the FSS. The analyses it provided, under numerous Acts, were mainly for 
departments other than its parent department although latterly, as the agency was 
being privatised, it was providing a role in supporting the DTI initiative for which it 
retained the contract. 
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The department did not depend upon the outcomes of the agency to meet its goals 
in the same way as the other agencies in this study, as the agency was meeting the 
goals of several departments. Where it was working to satisfy a DTI policy agenda, 
this was not a key or especially salient area of work. The agency did not depend 
upon the department for the devolved authority to act, access to decision making or 
financial support. Its statutory role was insignificant and again dispersed in 
importance across departments according to the legislation the Government 
Chemist was acting to enforce. The dependency relationship between the LGC, its 
ministers and the DTI was low. It is this lack of dependency, coupled with a 
departmental propensity to consider privatisation, given its closeness to business, 
which meant that a strong ideological commitment to privatise DTI agencies by 
Michael Heseltine resulted in the LGC's change in status. The stronger 
dependency between the other two DTI agencies and between the FSS and the 
Home Office reduced the propensity for these agencies to change their status. 
Conclusion - Agency Arrangements and Power Dependency 
This chapter has examined the changed distribution of resources following 
agencification showing that the introduction of agencies has transferred financial, 
organisational and informational resources to agencies and thus a great deal of 
power potential. However, although agencies hold delegated authority over 
operational matters, political resources legitimising the operation and the authority 
to act are still held by ministers. Departments too, sometimes provide the authority 
to act in lieu of ministers and it is to departments that agencies look also for 
authority and financial resources. Departments also crucially retain organisational 
resources - access to ministers, control over rules, access to other parts of 
Whitehall - and they hold informational resources about policy, the policy process 
and financial information. 
New patterns of resource exchange are identified leading to the development of 
new power dependent relationships between departments and agencies. Ministers 
still depend on departments to support them and on agencies to deliver policy 
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goals. Departments also depend on agencies to deliver to protect their ministers, 
they also depend on ministers for the authority and legitimacy to act where that 
authority is exercised. Agencies also depend on ministers ultimately for this 
authority and legitimacy and on both ministers and departments for obtaining 
finance. They need departments for the organisational and informational resources 
still held there. 
The exchange of resources creates dependency relationships between all three 
parties. It does not represent the type of zero sum power relationship envisaged in 
the principal agent model or in constitutional theory. Each actor is dependent upon 
each other, power is relational. Ministers' traditional dependence upon departments 
is now extended to agencies. For departments, however, their dependence upon 
agencies is new and this changed pattern of dependency has increased with 
changes to departments arising from the senior management review. 
Agencification has had the impact of making the dependency relationships in 
Government more explicit. The identification of goals and a financial and resource 
framework has removed some of the indeterminacy and secrecy of executive 
operations. The level of dependency varies. Big or monopoly agencies, salient 
agencies, agencies with complicated and multiple goals create high dependency. 
In less complicated policy areas, the ability of an agency to raise its own finance, or 
being one of a number of providers lessens the degree of dependency. 
The change in the distribution of resources has created new power dependent 
networks and has altered the power potential of participants in those networks. In 
some cases agency arrangements have resulted in an enormous shift of power 
potential to agencies, for example in the Benefits Agency and the Prison Service 
Agency. In some cases, such as the LGC, the arrangements have revealed the 
lack of dependency and the vulnerability of relationships. This examination of the 
exchange of resources and dependency this creates, however, only indicates the 
power potential of agencies in government and in their relationships with 
departments. To look at how this power potential is exercised it is necessary to 
examine the processes of exchange or how these relationships were managed. 
The next chapter will look at these processes of exchange between department- 
agency networks in the case study agencies. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RULES, ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS - THE PROCESSES OFEXCHANGE 
introduction 
The last chapter explored how agencification changed the distribution of resources 
in central government, suggesting that the exchange of resources between 
departments and agencies created new power dependency relationships or 
networks. This chapter will look at how these relationships were conducted - at the 
processes of exchange used to manage department-agency networks. This is 
irnportant in identifying: how department-agency networks operate, how and why 
they vary, and how they develop and change over time. 
The first two parts of this chapter will consider the formal and informal aspects of 
how departments and agencies managed their relationships, looking across all the 
case study agencies. These sections permit a broad discussion of the issues 
affecting all department-agency relationships, for example the relative importance of 
formal and informal arrangements for managing the relationship. As with chapter 
six, looking across all cases allows themes to be explored whilst preserving the 
non-attributable nature of contributions. 
The first section will examine the formal processes involved in establishing and 
maintaining the arm's length relationship (or network). These stem from changes 
in the administrative arrangements associated with the agency project (see chapter 
two) and from departmental arrangements (introduced in chapter four). These 
formal arrangements changed the rules of the game and role expectations. It will 
show that these formal arrangements structured relationships very differently 
between different agencies and departments. Partly this relates to the level of 
dependency between department and agency identified in chapter five and partly to 
the departmental context. In this sense these relationships are institutional. 
Other processes of exchange are informal and underpinned by informal networks, 
by both departmental and wider civil service culture and by individuals' perceptions 
of their roles and the rules of the game. The second section will highlight informal 
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rules and understandings, cultural and contextual factors. It will illustrate how 
department-agency relationships are dynamic and changing. As well as 
developments in the formal arrangements prompting change, it is argued that 
critical events can lead to both organisational learning and to changes in role 
perception which alter the nature of relationships between departments and 
agencies. 
The third part of the chapter will return to looking at each case study agency, 
summarising the way agencies conducted their relationships with their parent 
department underlining salient features and changes over time. In conclusion, the 
chapter will argue that networks between departments and agencies, which have 
developed since agencification, based on power dependency, operate through both 
institutional (i. e. structural) and interpersonal or informal links. An examination of 
the processes of exchange indicates that the way relationships or networks 
operated varied according to the degree of dependency, the departmental context 
and changes in both formal and informal rules and understandings. These 
processes of exchange (and the patterns of dependency discussed in the previous 
chapter) are important to identify before looking at the question of why some 
relationships work better than others, or whether the concept of policy networks 
can provide an explanation, which will be addressed in chapter eight. 
Power Dependency and the New'Rules of the Game'. 
The framework document 
The basis for how the arm's length relationship between minister (and therefore 
department) and agency should operate is formally established in each individual 
framework document. This document is backed by instructions and guidance 
applying across Government. These formal 'rules of the game' were described in 
chapter two. The framework documents do not set out detailed arrangements for 
how the relationship should work. They do, however, provide boundaries for the 
relationship, both through the roles and responsibilities ascribed for the various 
parties, and sometimes in setting out certain governance arrangements. 
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Table 5 (over) shows the roles, responsibilities and governance arrangements set 
out in the framework documents in the case study agencies. This analysis of the 
arrangements for consultation and governance and the roles and responsibilities 
ascribed to each party in the original Framework Documents of the seven agencies 
broadly confirms the pattern of dependency traced in the last chapter. 
Those agencies which have a high dependency relationship with departments and 
ministers because of their size and type, such as the Benefits Agency and the 
Prison Service Agency, have high levels of contact built into the Framework 
Document and a greater involvement with policy development. In these agencies, 
the Secretary of State is expected to have regular and personal contact with the 
Chief Executive. In the Prison Service Framework Document, the Director General 
is directly accountable to the Home Secretary, in the Benefits Agency the Chief 
Executive has personal access to the Secretary of State. In the Prison Service the 
Director General is the Secretary of State's principal policy adviser on matters 
relating to the prison service, in the Benefits Agency the Chief Executive is the 
Secretary of State's principal adviser on operational functions. In both, the 
Permanent Secretary is the Secretary of State's principal adviser on the 
Department as a whole and advises the Secretary of State on the agencies' 
performance. 
Of note is the far greater detail on how the relationship between the Chief Executive 
of the Benefits Agency and the Permanent Secretary of the DSS should work 
together, and the specification that the Chief Executive is expected to participate 
with the Department on policy proposals, and can make operational policy 
proposals. In contrast the Home Office does not have a specific policy role in the 
Prison Service's Framework Document. The Director General is responsible for 
advising the Home Secretary on prison matters generally, including both operational 
and policy matters and the expectation that the Home Secretary would expect to be 
consulted by the Director General on sensitive operational issues is built into the 
framework. In the Prison Service Framework, the relationship between Director 
General and Minister is structured to be far more direct and the role of the 
Department far less. The reasons for this are discussed below. 
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Those agencies with lower dependency, (CO' mpanies House, the LGC and the FSS) 
had the expectation of less close contact with Ministers built into the Framework 
and a more overt role for departmental civil servants. Initially, the Chief Executive 
in Companies House was not expected to report to Ministers routinely, and the 
framework stated reporting would be to the line manager in the Department. These 
framework documents specified reporting to 'Ministers', not the Secretary of State, 
and in each case the main link with the department is the former line manager. The 
line manager in these cases is supported by a Steering Board (DTI) or Advisory 
Board (FSS). This more linear relationship reflects the lower dependency between 
Ministers and Agency, with Departments playing a linking role. 
The remaining two agencies in the case study fall between the two groups above. 
The Insolvency Service shares many characteristics in its governance 
arrangements with the other DTI agencies. The link with the Department is through 
the Deputy Secretary who is supported by a Steering Board. The Agency has 
however a greater involvement in policy development, arising from its specialised 
statutory role and professional ised skills and knowledge. Finally, the Child Support 
Agency shares many of its governance characteristics with the Benefits Agency. 
Like the Chief Executive of that Agency, the Chief Executive is the Secretary of 
State's principal adviser on the Agency's operations. The Chief Executive is 
expected to report to the Secretary of State and Permanent Secretary reflecting the 
statutory and salient nature of the policy area. However, the Framework Document 
suggests a less active role in policy involvement than that proposed in the Benefits 
Agency Framework Document, reflecting the Agency's comparatively small size and 
discrete area of operations. 
Agency contact with ministers and department 
In practice, fieldwork confirmed the trend suggested by looking at the framework 
documents. Agencies with a high dependency relationship with departments and 
ministers have high levels of contact, and at a higher level. This contact is both to 
deal with day-to-day policy matters and to manage administrative processes like 
authorising agency targets, agreeing the annual business plan which support the 
framework documents. As Bichard explained "[w]e are treated now more as a 
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partner. We are all involved in policy development activities and that is written into 
the Framework Document, but, more important than that, it happens" (TCSC, 1994 
242). Agencies where the dependency with department and or minister is less, 
being smaller, less salient, non-monopoly, self-financing etc. have less contact and 
at a lower level. This confirms the findings of other more quantitative studies of this 
aspect of the relationship between agencies and Ministers (Massey, 1995; 
Hogwood, 1997). 
The primary contact for the three IDTI agencies and the FSS was with the line 
manager, currently a grade two in the department. Contact with ministers was 
infrequent and was not usually with the Secretary of State. In the Benefits Agency, 
Child Support Agency and Prison Service Agency contact with ministers was 
regular and frequent. In both the Benefits Agency and the Prison Service, ACEs 
access to the Secretary of State occurred when necessary or desired. 
This preliminary review of the formal arrangements for managing relationships 
indicates a link with the power dependency relationships identified in the last 
chapter. However, whilst dependence appears to be a key determinant of how the 
relationship between departments and agencies are set up in the Framework 
Documents, there are other historical and contextual factors which influenced the 
particular arrangements which came to be in place for each agency which are 
considered next. 
Departmental rules and arrangements 
As chapter four set out, the agency concept was supported by formal administrative 
rules and guidelines, but not by legal or constitutional change (except for the trading 
fund arrangements). These formal 'rules of the game' were developed out of 
conflicting beliefs and tensions over the reallocation of resources involved. The 
concept was understood differently in different parts of Government and, in order to 
achieve implementation, was flexible and retained the capacity to be adapted. In 
looking at the governance arrangements or processes of exchange designed to 
manage the new relationships, the degree of departmental adaptation of the agency 
concept is apparent, arising from existing departmental culture and history. This led 
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to specific departmental understandings of the roles and responsibilities and 
supporting governance arrangements introduced to manage the dependency 
relationship. These departmental adaptations will be examined next. 
DTI Supporting Arrangements 
In all the DTI agencies, the ACEs reported to the relevant line manager, who was 
assisted by a Steering Board. Latterly, this person would be described as 'the 
Minister's representative", but in all cases it was the relevant line manager. The 
'department line' was, maintained through the representatives from the Finance and 
Personal Resources Division (interview with senior DTI official). These 
arrangements were closely linked with a model of corporate governance and 
reflected the DTI's close links with the business community. One former DTI official 
explained 
"we know how business works. It wasn't a theoretical concept for us .... 
it was 
quite clear seeing that sort of operating subsidiary relationship with head 
office, if you like and we were very clear that we needed to identify business 
units and then try and give them scope to operate)) . 
The Boards held similar remits - to oversee the development of corporate and 
business plans and to monitor performance against targets. They followed a similar 
formula for membership and indeed there was quite a lot of duplication of DTI 
membership with key finance and personal staff being members of more than one 
Steering Board, again bringing coherence, of expectations and role clarity to the 
arrangements. Other 
- 
members were non civil servants with an interest or expertise 
in the policy area and, in the case of the LGC, civil servants from its other customer 
departments. The number of DTI representatives on each steering board fell after 
the first few years as confidence in the new arm's length relationships rose and the 
DTI became more relaxed about how to manage agencies (interview with 
departmental and agency officials). 
Several other features of the DTI arrangements encouraged the development of a 
shared understanding of the new arrangements. The Department placed a Grade 5 
Administrative Officer in each Agency to assist in the development of informal links 
with the Department and to provide a bridge between the existing Departmental 
IA change introduced in response to the Fraser Report (see page 182). 
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culture and the developing agency cultures. Initially, all the ACEs in the DTI met 
every three months to look at new initiatives and share experiences. This, again 
contributed to the formation of strong identification of the role of Chief Executive 
and how to operate in the new arrangements. 
DSS Supporting Arrangements 
In the DSS, the arrangements in the Framework Documents for the two agencies 
are very similar and these were backed by a range of other formal and informal 
departmental processes to support department-agency relationships. Because of 
the integrated nature of its work, the DSS had given extensive consideration to how 
it would manage its relationship with its agencies and co-ordinate the work of the 
Department (See chapter four). The Agency Study Report (1988) recommended 
setting up a shadow agency structure and making early appointments to Chief 
Executive posts. The Review of DSS HQ Role and Functions stressed there must 
be "regular formal and informal channels of communication", (DSS 1991 40). A 
steering group met to plan each agency and develop the Framework Document. 
These groups then reported to a 'Permanent Secretary's monthly steering group' 
which included all the existing and shadow Chief Executives and other senior staff 
from the Department. - 
The formal links which the DSS had with its agencies involved liaison roles for staff 
at all levels in the agencies to support the expectations of the Framework 
Document. These arrangements were described in evidence to the TCSC and 
included, 'Benefit Boards', project teams, cross training initiatives and staff 
interchange "to make [the] co-ordination... more effective (TCSC, HC 496,1990 - 
1991,32). These mechanisms to ensure collaboration and communication 
between the centre of the Department and its agencies were built upon a strong 
departmental culture stemming from staff being 'home grown' (Greer, 1995; 
interview with senior officials in DSS). 
The DSS established a Management Board following recommendations in the 
1991 Report. Initially this Board did not include the ACEs who were invited to join 
following an early management away-day and the body became known as the 
'Departmental Board' (interviews with officials). As one participant wryly explained 
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"the agencies were intrinsic to the work of the department - and it was better to 
have them inside the tent anyway - because tensions were already beginning" 
(interview with DSS official). This had an important influence on the roles ACEs 
were expected to play. Board members were expected to take a corporate 
approach, as Michael Partridge, former Permanent Secretary at the DSS explained, 
"the Board runs the department because the chief executives are running large 
parts of it but they must not represent their parts of the department on the Board. 
They are there in a personal capacity as the managers of the Department" (Social 
Security Committee HC 382,1995 143). One DSS Chief Executive explained how 
this corporate approach cut across existing their agency management role "while 
each of us have our own management responsibilities, on the Board there is much 
greater visibility of the overall picture". 
Home Office Supporting Arr-angements 
Apart from continuing to call its ACEs, 'Director General', the Home Office did not 
place a strong departmental imprint upon its relationships with its agencies. This 
reflects its traditionally vertically compartmentalised structure. As one former 
Permanent Secretary explained "the Home Office is a lot of different dip sticks" 
(interview with former Home Office official). It also reflects the very different 
operations which moved to agency status in the Home Office, leading to very 
different power dependencies. The FSS framework suggests a similar arrangement 
to the DTI relationships, with the Chief Executive reporting to the former line 
manager, a Deputy Secretary, who is assisted by an Advisory Board. The Prison 
Service is, in some ways, similar to the Benefits Agency arrangements, with a 
similar role suggested for the Permanent Secretary although without the liaison with 
the Director General that is built into the DSS model. 
There are several historical and contextual reasons why the arrangements for 
managing relationships took the form that they did in the Prison Service (see 
chapter four for background). The dominant view in the Home Office at the time that 
the agency was established was that the separation between policy and operations 
had contributed to the managerial problems which faced the Service. Therefore 
the Director General has a wider policy role being the Home Secretary's 'principal 
adviser on matters relating to the prison service). This in effect meant the policy 
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capacity associated with the Prison Service remained with the agency, unlike the 
DSS where policy stayed within the Department. 
The recommendations of the Lygo Report were not followed. The report argued 
accountability requirements, particularly when incidents occur and Ministers and 
their advisers want to become involved, meant that "rather different arrangements 
are required for its top structure than has been the case for other agencies" (Lygo, 
1991,9). The Report recommended the establishment of an Advisory Board, 
chaired by the Home Secretary to advise on major policy and resource questions. 
Kenneth Clarke, the Home Secretary at the time of Agency Status coming to 
fruition, did not wish to have the additional bureaucracy of an Advisory Board. 
Clarke and Lewis, the newly appointed Director General, both felt comfortable 
dealing directly with each other, modelled on a chairman - chief executive basis. 
Thus there were no additional arrangements structured into the 'rules of the game' 
to support those set out in the Framework Document. The Prison Service Agency 
did not have the same degree of links at all levels between the Agency and 
Department as found in the Benefits Agency. This reflects the history of the way 
the old Prison Department was structured within the Home Office - due to its long 
history of being a separate body (interviews with officials). The arrangements relied 
entirely on personalities (interview with senior official in Home Office). As Lewis 
explains "the current constitutional arrangements are too dependent on the 
personal chemistry between the Home Secretary and the Director General of the 
day" (Lewis, 1997,231-232). This reliance on personality alone left the relationship 
between Agency and Minister very vulnerable, as events were to demonstrate. 
Cross government initiatives: Fraser and Trosa Reports 
As well as the formal arrangements reflecting dependence and contextual 
departmental factors, there is evidence of historical development in 'the rules of the 
game'. Several civil servants involved in drawing up the Framework Documents 
mentioned the degree to which there was 4policy learning' from earlier Framework 
Documents "it was drafted from a model - where else would you start? " (interview 
with agency chief executive). Two examples of this are arrangements adopted 
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following the Fraser and Trosa Reports (Efficiency Unit, 1991; Trosa, 1994). The 
recommendations of both reports post date most of the arrangements made in the 
case study framework documents (with only the CSA and Prison Service Agency 
document being completed after publication of the Fraser Report). The reports did 
affect the way in which roles were described and perceived and the language used 
to label relationships which had already developed between departments and 
agencies and so these developments are reviewed here. 
Fraser figures 
The Fraser Report made recommendations on how to improve relationships 
between departments and agencies including the adoption of a 'single focal point 
of contact between departments and agencies at senior level. This role became 
known as the 'Fraser figure' (Efficiency Unit, 1991). The 'Fraser figure' was to act 
as both as a challenger, supporter and facilitator of the work of the Chief Executive. 
The adoption of what came to be known as a 'Fraser figure' was subject to 
confusion and led to different types of arrangement in different agencies, "so many 
people had different views about what it should be, was he a champion for the 
agency, was he a representative from the department laying down the law, was he 
a mediator' (interviews with Next Steps Team). In some cases the arrangements 
which already existed were adapted or re-named so that the line manager, or 
permanent secretary was described as the Fraser figure. 
The Fraser Report suggested the figure should be the minister's adviser and 
should develop a personal relationship with the Chief Executives, what may be 
described as 'a friend at court' role (Efficiency Unit 1991,7). In different agencies 
these aspects were emphasised differently. As one Chief Executive put it "I think 
people have different views ... and when 
I say people I mean this can be MPs, 
ministers and informed commentators... I don't think by any means its universally 
agreed. So I suppose over time people have reacted to the perception of 
expectations". Although according to the 'agency orthodoxy' the Fraser figure was 
meant to have different role to a 'traditional line manger', in the four cases studied, it 
was the existing line manager who chaired the steering board and was described as 
the 'Fraser figure . 
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There was a good deal of consensus about the value of an identifiable figure 
centring on being a 'friend at court'. One senior agency official said of his Fraser 
figure "he is the line manager and advises the Secretary of State, but a much 
stronger role is actually advising [the ACE] and being sort of friend and counsellor' 
This is especially the case if the ACE is new to the civil service. One described the 
Agency Fraser Figure as "very supportive and patient and [he] explained that you 
couldn't quite do it that sort of way but if I did it a different way that would be 
acceptable" (former ACE). 
In one case all contacts with the Department were routed through the Fraser figure, 
in another only the most sensitive were. In this latter agency most contact with the 
Department was via pre-existing links. In the DSS agencies, Michael Partridge has 
been described as the Fraser figure (interviews with Next Steps team) and 
undertook the dual role of advising Ministers on agencies' performance and 
advising agencies (interviews with agency and Department officials), although, in 
fact, contact occurred at all levels between Department and Agency. According to 
Derek Lewis, the role played by the Permanent Secretary in the Home Office was 
unclear. The Department was too big and complex for the Permanent Secretary to 
act as the Home Secretary's principal adviser, yet there was no opportunity for him 
to act as 'chief executive' as most decisions were made by the Home Secretary 
(Lewis, 1997,34). 
A further report, the Trosa Report (1994), was commissioned to examine 
departments' arrangements for managing agencies in the light of the Fraser 
recommendations. This recommended that Fraser figures should be supported by 
Ministerial Advisory Boards which included outside experts to take a strategic 
overview of the agency. Not all of the recommendations were accepted by the 
Cabinet Office and it did not have much force across the civil service (interview with 
Next Steps Team). In the case study agencies the arrangements which utilised 
some form of Board were in place and preceded the Trosa recommendations. 
Steering Boarcls 
Four of the case study agencies had a steering or advisory board whose role was to 
advise a Fraser figure, or departmental manager, and through that person, the 
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minister. These boards were set up to manage the relationship between agency 
and department acting on behalf of the ministerý. Their role varied between 
agencies and sometimes within the life cycle of an agency. Boards played an 
important role, however, in providing a timetable and an agenda around which 
communication between department and agency took place formally and informally 
(interview with senior agency officials). Three of the four agencies had a specific 
person or small secretariat whose job it was to service the boards and liaise with 
the department. 
In general, these bodies were thought useful in bringing a cultural awareness of 
private sector practices into agencies. The business acumen of non civil servant 
members was appreciated and the introduction of private sector language and 
disciplines was said to be helpful. In some instances the boards appeared to be 
passive, rubber stamping bodies which formalised pre-existing decisions. In one 
case, the board did not see the business plan before it went to ministers. In other 
cases the board had a substantial input to the preparation of documents and 
appeared to gain independent informational and legitimation resources, "everything 
that we'd done had got a good scrutiny before we gave our reports to the 
department and this undermined any attempts by the department to try to alter, 
change it or say it wasn't sufficient" (interview with former agency chief executive). 
Some Fraser figures who ran Boards saw them as assisting in providing external 
confirmation of Agency plans and progress. One 'Fraser figure' explained they 
gave an independent view on the situation "whether things were going well and 
whether things were going badly rather than decisions on that being simply a 
balance between conflicting pressures . (Interview with 
'Fraser figure'). In other 
cases those conflicting pressures were played out through the Board agendas. A 
former Fraser figure saw them as a means of putting pressure on the Chief 
Executive "to run it properly". And another saw the Board as a means of reassuring 
ministers that the department was giving 'official confirmation' to agency plans 
2 Steering boards had a different purpose to the 'management boards', (in the Prison 
Service, BA and CSA) made up of senior agency personnel and non civil servants with 
policy or management expertise whose role was to advise the ACE; and the 'departmental 
boards', (in the DSS and Home Office) which take a corporate approach to departmental 
management. 
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(interview with former and current Fraser figures). One ACE said "I can use the 
Board to twist the tail of the department". Another described his determination to try 
to operate the board as a link to ministers by telling the department "Its between me 
and my board how I spend the capital". 
In some instances the boards became the sites of fierce battles about the status 
and autonomy of agencies. This was seen particularly in the case of the IDTI 
agencies during the period of their prior options processes which coincided with 
strong pressures for privatisation and / or large-scale contracting out. The steering 
boards took part in the processes surrounding the prior options process, including 
drawing up specifications, scrutinising tenders and making recommendations to 
ministers. All of the steering boards had reservations about privatisation or 
contracting out. Their desire to make representations to ministers revealed 
confusion over their role and that of the Chair. In one case a Chief Executive 
thought the Chair covered up the concerns of the steering board from ministers, and 
attempts to appeal directly to ministers were blocked. In the other two cases, 
concerns of the steering board were conveyed to ministers via other ministerial 
routes. 
In all cases the steering boards thought they had greater authority to act in an 
advisory role than proved to be the case. For ACEs this highlighted the dominance 
of ministerial authority. It also pointed to the ambiguous role played by the Fraser 
figure as chair of the steering board, line, manager, ministers representative and 
'friend at court'. One senior civil servant reflected on the potential for contradictory 
pressures on a Fraser figure "I always think one of the prime requirements for being 
a civil servant is controlled schizophrenia". 
The importance of formal arrangements 
The formal arrangements expressed through framework documents, Fraser figures, 
steering boards and associated departmental processes are key in understanding 
how relationships operated, as they suggest rules and roles for the participants. 
One Permanent Secretary explained "whenever anything went wrong the existence 
of the formal relationship, the framework documents means that the Chief Executive 
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has the power, if I got too close, to say to me at any time, 'that is actually my 
business would you mind standing back a bit For Michael Bichard the expression 
of formal roles and responsibilities and governance arrangements in the framework 
document was of great importance in facilitating the development of relationships 
"the framework document gives the right to be involved in policy - agencies, 
especially big ones 
'become 
more confident in providing feedback ... we forged 
partnerships with Policy colleagues" (speech, Sheffield University 16/3/99). 
The Importance of Informal Features 
However it is not only the formal arrangements which are relevant. As chapter 
three argued, although the formal arrangements determine the allocation of 
institutional resources and prescribe some of the roles and rules of the game, 
informal understandings are also crucial. Informal features impact upon how intra- 
state network relationships are conducted for two reasons. Firstly, because 
informal understandings need to be shared, as Michael Bichard points out "[the 
framework document] does deal with relationships and at the end of the day those 
do depend upon a degree of trust and communication" (TCSC HC 27,1994,153). 
Secondly, because the skills and tactics chosen by actors in the networks will 
depend upon how well they understand the rules, roles and how to operate within 
them. Informal understandings influence and guide behaviour. One ACE doubted 
whether his framework document clarified his relationship with ministers and 
department, but explained "I am entirely clear in my own mind of how its going to 
work and I think that's all that matters really". 
Chapter three and chapter four suggested that, whilst the introduction of agencies 
had led to the introduction of new formal and informal rules and norms, these 
understandings were superimposed upon more traditional models of behavior. It 
was also suggested that the adoption of changed roles and rules of the game varied 
across departments. The next section of this chapter will look at factors which 
impact upon the ability of those involved within the networks to develop trust and 
communication and to utilise skills and tactics. It will examine the importance of 
informal networks and actors' understanding of the roles they had to play. 
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Informal networks 
Alongside the formal arrangements set up to manage the relationship between 
departments and agencies, it is very clear that most networks relied upon the 
maintenance or development of strong informal networks, long an important feature 
of Whitehall ways of working. Many interviewees, when asked how well the 
relationship worked between department and agency, responded by referring to 
pre-agency links and employment history "the fact I'd done administrative work for 
10 years and understood how the department worked and knew everybody was just 
enormously helpful" (ACE). Informal links between the Chief Executive and the 
Department arising from shared previous history helped, giving advance warning of 
problems. One Chief Executive said he rarely routed any enquiries through the 
formally appointed Fraser figure, but would use his extensive network of pre- 
existing contacts "you can't work without your contacts". Another Chief Executive 
was described as influencing policy "its not something he's directly operationally 
responsible to the S ecretary of State for, its part of the networking within the 
department". 
Those coming in to the civil service also realised, the importance of informal 
networks. Having staff in the agency with links to the department was very helpful 
in that they could act as an interpreter. Staff crossover was thought valuable and 
important in maintaining good communication, (interviews with former and existing 
ACEs). If informal links were not already developed it was seen as important to 
develop them. One ACE appointed from outside the civil service said he realised 
he would have to cultivate links with the Finance and Resources Section of his 
department. He commented 
"it is actually quite difficult for an outsider, you forget, civil servants forget, how 
used they are at dealing with Ministers, dealing with procedures and so on 
they know the ways to do things and the ways 'round here' of doing things, 
but for an outsider its all rather intimidating". 
These informal links existed personally between the first ACEs and their parent 
departments in the DTI agencies and the FSS. In the Benefits Agency, the first 
Chief Executive was appointed before the launch of the agency and was involved in 
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drawing up the framework document. In addition there were deeply embedded 
informal links at all levels in the respective organisations which were encouraged to 
develop. One IDSS ACE attended a Select Committee with his 'policy relation' from 
the IDSS, he explained "Whenever there is a policy issue, Anna is basically the 
person I would go to to seek clarification. In the past it was the sort of relationship 
we would have needed to use frequently, but in more recent years most policy 
issues have been clarified and it is a more informal relationship" (Social Security 
Select Committee, 1995,13). 
There is evidence however that the development of informal links between the 
CSA, the PSA and their respective departments was problematic, both institutionally 
and individually by the ACE. For the CSA, as a completely new agency operating 
from scratch, with the majority of its staff and its ACE recruited from outside the 
DSS, informal links did not exist. Further, although Ros Hepplewhite was appointed 
to run a shadow agency for a year before the formal launch, there is evidence that 
the development of informal links was not a priority. One former senior DSS official 
suggested, "she didn't as an individual make any real attempts to sort of blend in 
and learn from the civil servants. So I don't think there was the same organisational 
loyalty if I can put it that way that there might have otherwise been. I think she was 
sort of needlessly tactless on occasions with colleagues". Another former official 
suggested "Ros's problem was she wouldn't heed the signals because she was 
arrogant and thought she knew it all. She was an example of somebody coming in 
from the outside" (interviews). 
Similarly, the Prison Service had a history of there being poor communication 
between operations and HQ (see chapter four; Lewis 1997,22 - 24) because of the 
traditionally separate' cultures of administrative grades, Governors and Prison 
Officers within the Service itself and little movement of staff between HQ and the 
field unlike in Social Security, (interviews with Home Office and Social Security 
officials; Home Office 1995,102 - 105). The first ACE Derek Lewis did not develop 
informal links with the department (interview with senior agency and Home Office 
officials). Much of his energy went into working with the Prison Service 
Management Board, which had no links with the Home Office (Lewis 1997,19,75). 
His only contact with the Home Office was through a fortnightly meeting of the 
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Deputy Secretaries. His description of the agenda of these meeting as "structured 
gossip" (Lewis 1996,36) provides a flavour of the value he placed on contact with 
his peers in the Home Office initially. The existing links between the Agency and 
Department were not utilised and in fact Hidden Agendas suggests a poor 
relationship between Lewis and the Deputy Directors who had Home Office 
backgrounds (Lewis 1997,18). A senior Home Office Official suggested "He had 
not a lot of patience for either the Home Office or the political side of the business 
and I think that's probably in the end why he was dismissed". 
For the Chief Executives who replaced the two outsiders, Hepplewhite and Lewis, 
the cultivation of informal networks was stressed as important. One suggested "one 
needs to see those links and make sure they are being properly worked through" 
(Interview with former Chief Executive). Richard Tilt, stressed the necessity of a 
close relationship with the Permanent Secretary in the Home Office (Home Affairs 
Select Committee HC 57-11,1996,12). Lewis latterly recognised the importance of 
informal networks and acknowledged that if starting again, he would have given 
priority to developing contact with the other Grade Twos in the Home Office 
(interview with senior Prison Service Official). This difference between the outsider 
ACEs and ACEs appointed from within the civil service is also seen when looking at 
how they managed the role of Chief Executive. 
Understanding the role of chief executive 
The agency arrangements prescribed new roles for ACEs. The ACE was expected 
to provide visible ledership and to manage operational autonomy with the 
requirements of being a civil servant operating under the auspices of ministerial 
responsibility. This was unproblematic for ACEs of the smaller, less sensitive 
agencies. As noted earlier, looking at arrangements like the steering boards, one 
model of relationship which actors drew upon, and which the agency concept drew 
on, was that of the corporate 'business-like' arrangement. Thus department or 
minister was seen as chairman, and ACE as chief executive. One chief executive 
explained I play it very much as one would in the private sector between chief 
executive and non executive chairman and our steering board I treat very much as 
one would the board of an ordinary company". This was found not only with those 
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ACEs who came from the private sector but also was adopted or used to explain 
their pattern of behavior by ACEs who had previously been civil servants. This type 
of understanding of how the relationship should work was described by Derek Lewis 
when talking about his relationship with Kenneth Clarke. Clarke described his role 
as that of 'non executive chairman, Lewis writes "[h]e was someone I felt I could 
work with in a relationship with which I was already familiar", (Lewis, 1996,11). 
This type of relationship appeared to work, where its limitations were recognised. 
Most ACEs were aware of these and related the successful adoption of a 
businesslike relationship either to the fact that the agency was not involved in highly 
sensitive work, and or to its adoption alongside traditional ways of working. 
Managing the role of chief executive involved a far greater degree of dexterity for 
the ACEs of the larger and more sensitive agencies. It required a clear sense of the 
boundaries of the role of ACE and an appreciation of where the distinction between 
policy and operational matters might be drawn. All the ACEs interviewed stressed 
the degree of autonomy they felt the role of ACE gave them. One stressed it 
provided the ability to 'surface issues' in different arenas. Another suggested "the 
Chief Executive of the agency is able to use avenues that you couldn't use if you 
were just sort of part of the main civil service" but stressed it was crucial to be 
careful and use this ability sparingly. 
The balancing act ACEs were required to undertake was demonstrated in Select 
Committee hearings as committee members asked probing questions about their 
involvement in policy and accountability. At an early TCSC Committee, Bichard 
was questioned about the operation of the Social Fund and the take-up of benefits, 
at the time very politically sensitive issues, and the agencies' input into policy 
decisions. Bichard replied "... it is part of our task to draw these sorts of cases and 
problems of budgeting to the attention of ministers and that is what we are doing", 
he continued later I will operate this system on the framework laid down for me, it is 
a political decision for others to make and I will manage within it" (TCSC HC 496, 
1991,29 - 34). Although coming from outside the civil service, 
Bichard had a 
background in local government and was familiar with working within a political 
framework. 
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in a similar vein, Ann Chant, the second Chief Executive at the CSA was 
questioned repeatedly about whether ACEs should be responsible to Select 
Committees, an issue upon which the Government had expressed a contrary view. 
Chant replied "I would be very happy to do whatever ministers or Parliament called 
upon me to do" (Public Service Committee, HL 68,1996 - 97,125). 
Richard Tilt, similarly, was questioned in a Home Affairs Select Committee about 
which category of prisoners should be sent to prison, given the increasing pressure 
on the prison population and was urged to answer because of the independence 
accompanying agency status. In response Tilt delicately replied "I do not think it 
gives us a licence to express views on matters of political controversy .... I devote my 
expertise to managing the system and dealing with the people who are sent to us in 
proper way" (HC 57-11,1997,5). At the same hearing he suggested that in trying to 
interpret the boundary between policy and operations he would 'err on the side of 
caution'. 
One ACE who came from the civil service explained I think I am personally fairly 
clear about what decisions I take, what I inform Ministers about, which decisions I 
should involve the minister in or ask the minister to make those decisions" 
(interview with ACE). One of the problems for the early 'outsider' ACEs was 
confusion about the role and the ambiguity between the agency rhetoric and the 
realities of working in a system still dominated by ministerial responsibility. A senior 
Home Office official suggested that Lewis did not pay heed to the imperatives of 
working with ministers on matters of political sensitivity I don't know whether he 
appreciated the need for it, but he certainly didn't give much time to it". 
This is illustrated by two incidents recorded in Hidden Agendas where Lewis 
records how he interpreted his role with far less caution. In one incident he and 
Howard disagreed over the publication of operating standards in prisons and Lewis 
walked out of the meeting. Later he commented "[o]thers told me afterwards that 
civil servants do not walk out on Home Secretaries", (Lewis, 1997,118). Lewis's 
more autonomous interpretation of the extent of his authority is also demonstrated 
by an incident involving the return of IRA prisoners at a sensitive time during the 
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peace process. Howard had approved the transfer of the prisoners but Lewis took 
the decision on the timing of the transfer without consulting Howard. Lewis, reports 
a conversation between himself and Richard Wilson, the new permanent secretary, 
after they briefed the Prime Minister on the incident I'we reflected on the main 
differences between us. I was used to taking decisions [Wilson] said, while he 
believed in passing the most difficult decisions on to ministers. Civil servants were 
not paid well enough to take risks like that" (Lewis, 1997,148). These incidents 
provide examples of the contradictions inherent in the agency concept where the 
autonomy of a chief executive is set alongside the overall doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility. 
Ros Hepplewhite was also said to have interpreted her role too literally and in doing 
so to have encroached upon the role of ministers and become too personally 
identified with the policy. Her background was in a campaigning organisation. One 
senior civil servant in the DSS commented that Ros Hepplewhite went "too far in 
public and therefore incurred the wrath of ministers". Another explained "if I was 
sifting in front of a parliamentary committee I would instinctively say, because I've 
been trained in it since I was an administrative trainee 'that's really a matter you 
need to talk to ministers about, I can answer you on this, this and this'. And I think 
[Ros Hepplewhite] just hadn't got that sort of basic instinctive training". When her 
successor, Ann Chant was appointed a newspaper reported colleagues as saying 
"Ann Chant is an outstanding civil servant who understands Whitehall, how to 
prompt ministers and how to present ministerial policies to the public" (Guardian, 3 
September 1994), underlining the traditional civil service skills she would bring to 
the job. 
Departments' understanding of their role 
Although the agency arrangements focus on the relationship between minister and 
ACE, the reality is that departments faced the biggest change to their role and had 
a high involvement in policy making (Smith, Marsh and Richards 1993). 
Departments in theory at least were expected to move from what Barberis calls 
policy management' to a role of 'policy orchestration' (Barberis, 1995). Under the 
agency orthodoxy, departments were meant to help ministers be informed 
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purchasers (Kemp 1998, interviews with Next Steps team). It is clear that civil 
servants have adapted to new roles of tendering, contracting out, setting targets 
(Newman, Richards and Smith, 1998). Departments were expected to move away 
from their traditional skills of 'speaking truth to power, providing policy continuity, 
smoothing the policy process and protecting ministers. This partly however depends 
upon ministers playing their role as active policy managers. One former member of 
the Next Steps Team commented 
"looking at Next Steps over the years I think a fundamental problem has been, 
although the theory says that there's a minister and a chief executive, and for 
it to work properly means that there's two active players. The minister isn't in 
most cases an active player. So at the start you're handicapped in clarity and 
accountability, in lines of accountability, because the minister isn't [an active 
player] which turns it over to the department". 
The whole concept relies upon ministers having the personal and political resources 
to match the authority granted by their office. As suggested in the last chapter 
looking at resource dependency, ministerial attention, interest, ability to understand 
the complicated technical and legalistic output of agencies and the time to become 
more informed, can be limited, constraining their ability to exercise authority. In 
these circumstances, departments continue to fulfil a 'policy ballast' role (Foster and 
Plowden, 1997). 
In addition, the ability of Ministers to stand back from the operational issues in 
highly politically salient policy areas is 'unlikely, because of the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility. So again departments see a perceived need to utilise 
their policy skills heavily, especially given the high turnover of elected 
representatives. As one former senior civil servant in the DSS stated 
"That's why civil servants stay, because they are the experts, and that's why 
they have to learn political skills and being able to work with different Ministers 
at different times .... 
Ministers know they depend entirely on the civil servants, 
there are no outside experts in the world of social security, the experts are all 
in the department... so you've got to trust them and use them and try to have 
a constructive relationship with them 
Departments were also required to adapt to new 'rules of the game' whilst retaining 
and practicing their existing traditional skills because agencies still operated under 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. This ambiguity was recognised by the Next 
Steps Team. 
197 
"Departments have yet to master getting the information they need to offer advice and actually trying to tell chief executives what they should be doing 
and like so many things, these things will never happen because the joker in the pack is politics and human nature and we just can't legislate for that or we can't put that down in the framework. At'the end of the day ministers can still do what they want' (former member of the Next Steps Team). 
Therefore for both departmental and agency staff, the new arrangements required a 
mix of new and traditional skills and ways of working. The extent to which these 
new roles were understood and guided behavior varied considerably across the 
agencies and departments studied. 
The DTI and the DSS both made considerable department-wide arrangements 
(reviewed earlier in the chapter) to supplement each individual framework 
document. These permitted these departments to retain enough control to facilitate 
their'ballast role'. The development of these arrangements strengthened their role 
understanding. In the Home Office, however, there was no department-wide role 
understanding at the outset because of its compartmentalised nature. Role 
understanding by the Police Division in respect of its relationship with the FSS was 
good. The Home Office's understanding of, its new role in response to the move of 
the Prisons Service to agency status appeared less clear. It assumed the role of 
Director General to carry a greater degree of autonomy, for example, than the DSS 
conceived for the Chief Executive of the Benefits Agency. It envisaged that its 
policy management and policy ballast roles could be fulfilled by the Permanent 
Secretary acting as the Home Secretary's 'principal policy adviser. 
Understanding roles across agencies and departments 
To operate an agency arrangement required ACEs, departments and ministers to 
subtly appreciate the balance between the agency rhetoric, drawing on a business 
model, and the constitutional imperatives of a system dominated by ministerial 
responsibility. This complex interplay of the new rules and roles with traditional 
ways of working - 'quasi government' and yet of the realities of ministerial 
responsibility - was understood instinctively by 'insider chief executives and by 
Bichard with his local government background. It was not understood by 'outsider 
chief executives. For Hepplewhite and Lewis, working in politically sensitive 
agencies, the contradictions left them very exposed. Several officials in both the 
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Prison Service Agency and the Home Office commented that Lewis could not read 
the subtext, he went by the book, he believed in the 'rhetoric of Next Steps'. 
it is possible to see how this occurred. The agency concept was ambiguous and 
based on compromise (see chapter four). The circumstances of Lewis's 
appointment fed into this picture. Lewis describes being advised not to visit the 
Prisons Minister because the Home Office was unsure how the role of ACE would 
cut across the junior minister role, providing a confusing picture of the degree of 
delegation and accountability which went with the post (Lewis, 1997,14). In his 
relationship with Clarke he was promised autonomy and it was delivered (Lewis, 
1997). Lewis did not have the public sector background to provide the experience 
of working with politicians and the imperatives of political life. Likewise, Ros 
Hepplewhite came from a campaigning background. The appointment of two 
outsiders to these posts was deliberate (interview with Next Steps and DSS 
officials). Both appeared to have been given the job in order to draw attention to 
the autonomy of the new role. Neither had the informal networks to mediate or 
provide assistance. 
Policy learning 
In examining the processes of exchange between departments and agencies, it is 
clear the understanding of roles and rules of the game has changed over time. This 
has arisen through deliberate changes to the formal rules. In addition, the 
interpretation and understanding of roles, appropriate behavior, the boundaries and 
possibilities of action have also been shaped by changes in the informal 
understanding. In particular, the very public experience of Ros Hepplewhite and of 
Derek Lewis between September 1994 and September 1995 were symbolic events 
which shaped beliefs and role understanding. Ros Hepplewhite was seen to have 
become over-involved in the policy agenda, and her abrupt departure served to 
illustrate the boundaries of ACEs ability to show leadership in respect of the policy 
area in public at least. Derek Lewis's sacking further pointed to the limits of ACE 
autonomy and highlighted the ambiguity of the policy/operational split. In both cases 
it was widely interpreted that ministers utilised the agency arrangements, and the 
policy and operations split, to avoid responsibility for policy problems. Nearly all 
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those interviewed referred to these incidents to explain the rules they operated 
under and how they understood their role. One ACE explained I think its 
understanding the Secretary of State is the owner of the agency,,. Actors were 
reminded of the overarching dominance of ministerial authority and responsibility 
and this led to a gradual retreat from expressions of ACEs freedom to act. 
This 'policy learning' included politicians. One Secretary of State recounted how 
he'd asked his officials to clarify his position upon hearing of the difficulties that 
Howard professed (interview former Secretary of State). One of the first actions 
taken by the incoming Labour Home Secretary in May 1997 was to announce the 
resumption of his responsibility for answering parliamentary questions (Hansard 19 
May 1997, c396w). Just as with developments in formal arrangements, the informal 
understandings that support the rules of the game developed and changed over the 
ten years since the launch of agencies. The way in which agencies and 
departments conduct their relationships has not been static over time. 
Informal v formal 
This section of the chapter has illustrated that overlaying formal processes of 
exchange, reflecting the degree of dependency between department and agency 
and the departmental context, informal factors impacted on the way in which actors 
within networks operated. All interviewees were asked which were most important, 
the formal or the informal mechanisms. Whilst the importance of formal 
mechanisms was acknowledged, particularly in the breach, for example with the 
Prison Service, most respondents held the view that the informal was the most 
critical 'process of exchange' to get right. One ACE suggested "the Framework 
Documents in my experience are very rarely referred to and if they are its because 
you've got a real problem at the informal level". A senior official in the Home Office 
explained 
I would always go with the informal rather than the formal as being 
truly significant. But I think the formal have their significance 
particularly for newcomers. You know if you are a newcomer to an 
organisation you have to start by looking at the what the book says, if 
you're not a newcomer, then you're not interested in the book. 
People give it to you but you just stick it in a drawer and you don't 
read it and you know all that stuff, but more important is a whole 
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network of relationships and you begin to rebuild them if you've been somewhere else for a period". 
Another departmental official stated "The thing about the relationship that made me 
confident that it was delivering the goods was my direct relationship with the Chief 
Executive which was more important than my relationship with the Board. The fact 
that I could trust the Chief Executive and I think he could trust me and seek help 
from me" (interview with Fraser figure)". A chief executive of a large agency talked 
about the formal and informal arrangements supporting his relationship with the 
parent department and said, "But you are going to get it wrong sometime, the thing 
is hopefully with that environment and with that willingness to have that 
communication and that dialogue the chances of something major going wrong or 
certainly building up a head of steam are much reduced". 
The Arrangements in Practice - Managing the Arm's length 
Relationship 
Having looked at formal and informal 'rules of the game', at the operation of 
informal networks and at the perception of roles, it is possible to summarise the key 
features of each of the department-agency networks. The next section will look at 
how relationships between ministers, agencies and departments in the case study 
agencies worked in practice. The material for this section is drawn from primary 
sources (agency annual reports) and interviews. In order to preserve Chatham 
House rules direct quotes are used very little. 
Networks between the case study departments and agencies. 
Companies House 
Companies House was an early and enthusiastic partner in the agency concept with 
traditional ties with the department. The work of Companies House is fairly 
rountinised although of a statutory nature and contact between the Chief Executive 
and Ministers is very infrequent. The primary contact is with the Department 
through the Fraser figure (line manager). Companies House has a Steering Board 
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made up of DTI staff, outside non-executives from the private sector, the Chief 
Executive and chaired by the Fraser figure. - The Agency has a Policy section which 
acts as a policy secretariat to the Steering Board and liaison point between 
departme nt and agency. 
In the early days of the agency, the line manager was a Grade Three who headed 
the companies policy division within the DTI. The second ACE David Durham 
described her as his "ally within the department' (TCSC, HC 496,1991,21). 
Following the Senior Management Review, the line manager became a deputy 
director in the DTI who is also the current line manager (and Fraser figure) for the 
Insolvency Service and (before privatisation) the LGC. Contact between the current 
ACE, recruited from the private sector and Fraser figure is good and based on a 
shared understanding. Most of the communication between department and 
agency is routed through the regular Board meetings. Both formal and informal 
links between department and agency are strong and there was and has remained 
a shared understanding of the agency concept and department and agency roles 
and how they should work together. 
LGC 
LGC became an agency with the keen support of the chief executive (the 
'Government Chemist') and the Chief Engineer and Scientist, his line manager (a 
former Government Chemist). There was a shared understanding of the needs of 
the agency and the context in which it operated. The Chief Engineer and Scientist 
was keen that reporting should be directly to ministers and ensured (unlike the 
earlier Companies House Framework) that this was built into the Framework 
Document. However, as most of the work the LGC did at this time was for other 
departments, contact with ministers was infrequent and the main contact was with 
the department via the line manager. The Chief Engineer and Scientist chaired a 
Steering Board, whose role was to advise on the workings of the agency. This body 
is unusual in that it had representatives from other government departments 
representing their customer interests. Initially there were strong formal and informal 
links between Agency and Department and a shared understanding of roles and 
how the relationships should operate. 
Following the retirement of the first ACE, the current ACE (or Government 
Chemist) was appointed from the private sector. His initial line manager was the 
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Chief Government Scientist and Engineer who provided helpful informal links to the 
DTL Following the retirement of that post holder, these informal links weakened 
although the presence of former DTI staff in the agency proved valuable to the 
Chief Executive on key occasions. Contact was routine, mainly about the 
administration of the agency as the agency did very little work for the department, 
although towards the end of the agency's life in the public sector it did win a 
contract as part of the DTI measuring initiative. 
During the Agency's prior options process, as it was considered for privatisation, 
contact was primarily between the Department and Agency and was both formal, 
through the Board and regular meetings, and informal. In the final part of the 
Agency's period in the public sector formal relationships were well organised but 
reflected the weak dependency between department and agency. Informal 
relationships were weaker than at the Agency's inception. At the point of 
privatisation there was a shared understanding between the ACE and current line 
manager of how the agency would operate on a customer contractor basis to 
undertake the measuring work and how the Government Chemist would continue to 
oversee the small amount of statutory work involved from outside the public sector. 
Insolvency Service 
The Insolvency Service has a very strong professionalised staff group which has 
always led to a separate culture from the mainstream DTI. The ACE was appointed 
from within the Service and has a long history of contact with the Department and 
there were strong informal links. The Insolvency Service has more of a policy role 
than the other DTI agencies because of its specialised and statutory nature. 
However contact with ministers was still infrequent, (reflecting the low salience of 
the policy area) and the primary contact was between department and agency. 
Like the other DTI agencies the formal arrangements involved reporting to a line 
manager who chaired a Steering Board. The Service was an unwilling recruit to the 
Agency experiment. Although welcoming the freedoms agency status offered, the 
lack of control over its inputs led to doubts about how provision could be delivered 
within the relatively inflexible constraints of a Framework Document. There was not 
a shared understanding of the agency concept in relation to the agency at the 
outset. These new arrangements were tested during the critical NAO investigation 
into the Insolvency Service. 
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During the period of the agency's prior options process, when Michael Heseltine 
sought to contract out large parts of the Service, there was initially conflict 
between department and agency. Currently however, there is a good informal 
relationship between the current Chief Executive and Fraser figure, there is a 
shared understanding of the roles and relationships required and strong formal and 
informal links between the department and agency are maintained. 
FSS 
FSS has always been headed by a former scientist, who also had a long history of 
administrative work in the Home Office and was an enthusiastic recruit to agency 
status. Although accountable under the terms of the framework document (which 
she had a great personal involvement in writing) to the Home Secretary, her main 
contact is with her line manager in the Home Office, who also chairs the FSS's 
Advisory Board. The function of the Advisory Board is to provide independent 
advice to the chair to support his role in advising the Home Secretary. In practice 
their main role appears primarily in the provision of private sector experience to the 
ACE and as a 'cipher in rubber stamping formal submissions to the Home 
Secretary as part of the business cycle of the agency. The key line of accountability 
and decision making relationship appears to have been a direct one between the 
ACE and the Deputy Director, who was her line manager and head of the police 
division. Informal relationships and understandings between the Chief Executive 
and her line manager were close and based on a shared Home Office culture. 
These informal arrangements were backed by formal arrangements. 
Prison Service Agency 
The establishment of the Prison Service Agency was controversial and not 
uniformly welcomed by politicians or civil servants, although it did have the backing 
of the Director General at the time. Much of the preparation for becoming an 
agency was undertaken by this official, who was a Home Office civil servant. Derek 
Lewis was appointed three months before the agency's launch and completed work 
on the framework document, specifically in drawing up targets for the Agency's first 
year of operation (Lewis, 1997). The Framework Document highlighted the 
relationship between Chief Executive (or Director General) and Minister and did not 
set down formal arrangements to outline the role of the department or how the 
agency and department should work together. 
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There were therefore no arrangements for communication between the Agency and 
the Department. Thus despite the high level of dependence between the Home 
office and the Agency (see chapter Five), at the outset, the formal arrangements to 
manage the relationship between the Home Office and the Agency were weak. 
They relied on the agency rhetoric, as expressed in the Ibbs Report and that the 
Framework Document said that the Permanent Secretary was the Home 
Secretary's 'principle policy adviser'. These vague terms were not supported by 
formal arrangements. Informal relationships were also weak at the time of the 
agency's launch. Lewis as an outsider had no previous contacts and did not share 
'insider' knowledge of how the governance arrangements should work, given the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility, or the experience of working in a political 
environment. Although two of Lewis's deputies were Home Office civil servants, 
neither was highly regarded by Lewis or their experience and contacts used (Lewis, 
1997,90). There were fewer informal links between the rest of the Agency and 
Department as responsibility for policy stayed with the agency and there was little 
cross-over of staff. 
During the first few months of the Agency's existence there was a good shared 
understanding between Clarke and Lewis; of role expectation, how the relationship 
should be conducted and how this related to the agency concept. Clarke had a 
high degree of personal security and authority within the Government. He was 
prepared to take the required 'arm's length' approach to prison service operations. 
Lewis saw the relationship as a replication of the chairman - chief executive role in 
the private sector and felt familiar and comfortable about how he should operate. In 
some senses this very direct relationship between Secretary of State and ACE 
represents the agency concept in its purest form. It also illustrates the vulnerability 
of the concept to personnel changes. Whether the relationship worked depended 
upon the understanding of these two individuals and was not embedded in the 
wider Home Office or civil service culture. Their understanding was not backed up 
by formal or informal arrangements to support the dependency between Minister, 
Department and Agency. Following Michael Howard's appointment to Home 
Secretary the fragility of the relationship became increasingly exposed. As Sir Peter 
Kemp argues, problems with the Prison Service arose because "the two individuals 
chiefly concerned - the Home Secretary and the Director General - failed to 
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understand and/or failed to want to make work, the delicate system with which they 
had been entrusted" (Public Service Committee, HC 313,1996,110). 
Howard was ambitious and sought to use his law and order platform to boost his 
standing with the right wing of his party (Guardian, 7 March 1997; Lewis, 1997, 
119). The McNaughton Study, (commissioned as part of the Home Office senior 
management review and written by Howard's former Principal Private Secretary) 
provides an insight into Howard's perception of how well the relationship was 
meeting his requirements. It said the Prison Service was perceived as lacking in 
responsiveness to the Home Office and Ministers; that Ministers did not trust 
information and did not feel advised; there was failure to recognise "the legitimacy 
of political imperatives". It argued that a highly centralised management style of the 
Prison Service was impeding joint working with the rest of the Home Office (Home 
Office, 1995). 
The relationship between Howard and Lewis quickly began to deteriorate and both 
the formal and informal links between them weakened and became increasingly 
strained (Lewis, 1997,103). There was little personal contact and formal meetings 
became large events with little opportunity for positive communication. Lewis's main 
link with Home Office officials was through Howard's private office staff with whom 
he had relationships of varying warmth (Lewis 1997). Two initiatives were taken to 
provide additional formal arrangements to support the Framework Document. The 
new Permanent Secretary established a Departmental Management Board along 
the lines of the DSS model but the agenda was largely about 'housekeeping' 
matters (Lewis 1997,122). Secondly, and following the Whitemoor prison escape 
(see chapter five), a Prison Service Management Unit (PSMU) was set up to 
support the Home Secretary and Permanent Secretary monitor the Agency's 
activities. Far from improving relationships, the PSMU added to the delay in 
communication between Agency and Minister. The arrangement became entrapped 
in the lack of trust between Lewis and Howard, and the Unit got bogged down in 
double checking submissions from the Agency to the Home Secretary, adding to 
frustration and lack of communication on both sides. 
The Learmont Inquiry, reporting on the disastrous second prison escapes from 
Parkhurst Prison also urged improved arrangements to support the relationship 
between the Director General and the Home Office. Following the ideas of the 
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Fraser Report (Efficiency Unit 1991) it urged that an 'owner should be nominated 
for the Service to fulfil the line manager role for the Director General and that this 
'owner' should be supported by a policy unit staffed by those with operational 
experience. These arrangements were not put in place, but Howard used the 
Learmont Report as the basis for sacking Lewis. He argued it pointed to 
operational and not policy mistakes and therefore he was not responsible. Although 
Lewis was later to receive compensation, and clearly had the support of members 
of the Prison Board, the Prisons Minister, and the sympathy of the Permanent 
Secretary (Lewis, 1997; Hansard, 19 May 1997, c398w), the legitimacy of the 
Home Secretary's action was not questioned. This serves to show the underlying 
strength of ministerial authority in the perceptions of those involved, if not in legal 
reality. 
Lewis was not aware of the primacy of ministerial authority, and mistaken in is 
assumption of the degree of authority his role as Director General provided for him. 
Yet as head of the Prison Service he did control informational and organisational 
resources. The Home Office and Howard had at the outset underestimated the 
degree of dependence they had on the Agency. Formal and informal arrangements 
for supporting the dependency relationship were weak. The relationship between 
Minister and Director General was primary and the link between Agency and 
Department weaker than in other agency arrangements. One senior Home Office 
official suggested "the decision on where the border lay between executive and 
policy making responsibilities was less clearly thought out". More precisely it relied 
on an appreciation between all parties of the new and traditional 'rules of the 
game'. The incoming Chief Executive did not have this knowledge. There had not 
been the same degree of collaboration over developing arrangements in the 
framework document to manage the relationship and build a shared understanding 
of the agency concept as was the case in the DSS (interviews with Agency and 
Departmental officials). 
Following Lewis's departure Richard Tilt, a former Governor who had worked at 
Prison Service HQ for a number of years, was appointed. He was more aware than 
Lewis of the importance of working to ministerial authority, (Home Affairs Select 
Committee, HC 57,1996,11). During his period in charge of the Agency, attempts 
were made to improve both formal and informal arrangements for consultation with 
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the Home Secretary and the Home Office. The Learmont Report had 
recommended that the Home Office should look at its relationship with the Prison 
Service. This recommendation was not followed, and instead the Home Secretary 
announced that an Advisory Board would be established in line with the Lygo 
recommendations (Home Affairs Select Committee, HC 57 1996-97). However no 
further progress on establishing such a Board was made until the general election. 
Tilt's relationship with his Home Office contemporaries was warmer and more 
valued. During this period, all parties in the dependency relationship, Ministers, 
Home Office, and Prison Service, were far more aware of the dependency they had 
on each other. Despite the existence of difficult issues, such as the unexpected 
early release of prisoners serving concurrent sentences, there was a more 
successful relationship between all parties. 
Following the election the incoming Home Secretary announced he would resume 
responsibility for answering parliamentary questions and MPs letters. This change 
underlined the informal re-adjustment in understandings of both the agency concept 
and of the role of key players which had taken place since Lewis's sacking. This 
was a symbolic assertion of the reality of ministerial responsibility for prison matters 
and an expression of the limits of agency autonomy. Additionally, the Service 
underwent a number of internal and Home Office-led reviews including a formal 
prior options process (Hansard 30 July 1998). An internal review announced that, 
in place of an advisory board, a quarterly meeting chaired by ministers would 
formally review the performance of the Prison Service and within the Service there 
would be training for staff on political awareness (Lords Hansard, 10 November 
1997, col 8). Relationships were far better at both the formal and informal level with 
the new administration with the Home Secretary actively pursuing an agenda to 
reduce prison numbers and support community sentences (Home Office Press 
Notice, 18 September 1997; Guardian Society, 30 September 1998,6). Although 
the Agency's prior options process confirmed its agency status, the drift back to a 
more traditional relationship between the Prison Service and the Home Office was 
confirmed when a replacement for Richard Tilt was not appointed through open 
competition but sought from within the civil service. 
Martin Narey, the current Director General, had experience as a Governor but also 
a high flying career within the Home Office. In his first interview on appointment he 
set out a personal and very liberal agenda for improving literacy and reducing 
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suicide rates in prisons, and cast doubt on the future private status of two 
institutions (Guardian, 14 April 1999). That he could offer such policy opinions 
indicates a degree of trust and co-operation between Director General and Home 
Secretary which would have been unimaginable immediately following Lewis's 
sacking. Thus over the six years since the establishment of the Agency there has 
been improvement in both the formal and informal arrangements for managing the 
relationships, as well as considerable alteration in how that relationship is perceived 
and in the roles key actors are expected to play. 
Benefits Agency 
The establishment of the Benefits Agency was linked with the DSS's pre-existing 
plans to reform and was welcomed by the Permanent Secretary. Much thought and 
planning went into setting up the arrangements to manage relationships between 
the Department and its agencies. Good communication was important because of 
the integrated and legalistic nature of social security provision. These 
arrangements were extensive and at all levels of the Department. The 
arrangements in the Benefits Agency Framework Document were the result of close 
co-operation between senior members of the DSS and the newly appointed future 
ACE. Michael Bichard joined the Department six months before the launch of the 
agency and was involved in these discussions. This process ensured the details of 
the Framework Document were agreed in advance by both the department and the 
incoming Chief Executive, as one involved in the discussions put it "we both knew it 
by heart" (interview with DSS official). Bichard's local government background 
provided an awareness of working in a political environment. There were regular 
review meetings between Permanent Secretary and ACE, and between ACE and 
Secretary of State. The ACE was a member of the Departmental Management 
Board. Arrangements such as 'Benefit Boards' and 'policy groups' ensured active 
and regular communication between Department and Agency at all levels. Agency 
staff were provided with training courses in political awareness and sensitivity 
(Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1994, HC 27,233). These formal 
mechanisms were supplemented by good i, nformal contact at all levels. There was 
traditionally a great deal of staff mobility between HQ and the operational arm with 
good understanding of each part of the Department's work. 
Part of Bichard's aim was to develop a strong agency culture based around the 
Agency's core tasks. He was keen to enforce as much delegation as possible. 
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Privately there was undoubtedly a great deal of adjustment and friction between the 
ACE and parts of DSS HQ (the Finance and Personal section in particular). One 
agency official commented "it was a fairly rough ride on many occasions". A DSS 
official remembered I can remember some pretty awful meetings of the Board with 
... 
Michael Bichard hunching his shoulders and looking like a cross gorilla, ... we 
had to try again and again and again". Nevertheless these disagreements were 
over relatively minor issues. One cited in interviews was the use of the Benefits 
Agency logo on benefits books instead of the DSS logo; and the most serious 
anyone can recall is over the development of mutually acceptable appraisal 
systems. They also remained private. Given the highly politically salient nature of 
social security policies, despite the Agency's desire for autonomy, these tensions 
in no way undermined what were basically 
, 
strong formal and informal links based 
on a clear and shared understanding of the relationship required between 
Department and Agency and the roles each should play. 
Following Bichard's promotion to Permanent Secretary at the Department of 
Employmene, the agency was headed by a temporary ACE. A prior options review 
changed little in the formal arrangements to manage the relationship. The new 
(permanent) ACE Peter Mathison came from one of the smaller DSS agencies. 
Over his period of leadership, a new Permanent Secretary was appointed and the 
1997 election provided a change of Government. 
Over this period there has been a change in the processes of exchange between 
Agency and Department and a reduction in Agency autonomy. Meetings between 
the Secretary of State and ACE are less frequent and the practical requirements of 
delivering changing social security policies, (especially with the Labour 
Government's focus on 'joined-up thinking' and outcome-orientated objectives), 
means Department and Agency are working together in a far less distinguishable 
way. One senior minister explained I never knew who was from the 
Department 
and who was from the Agency". This does not however undermine 
the power 
potential that the Agency can exercise given its control over the 
implementation 
process. The formal and informal processes of exchange are embedded 
in the 
current working culture. There is clarity about the way the relationship should 
be 
managed and the roles which should be played. 
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Child Support Agency 
The CSA, was a new organisation. As the Agency was not operational when 
legislation was drawn up, there was no input from existing operational staff to 
drawing up the Agency's framework. Its new ACE, coming from the voluntary 
sector, was appointed to run a shadow agency for a year before it went 'live '. She 
became involved in discussions about the shadow agency's targets and in drawing 
up the future Agency's targets after her appointment in the Spring of 1992 (IDSS, 
Cm 1914,1992,33). There was not the same degree of shared understanding of 
the activities of the Agency, as in every other agency, before being set up. 
The formal arrangements established to manage relationships were similar to those 
for the Benefits Agency, although access to Ministers was less frequent. Initially 
she met ministers monthly whilst providing a weekly written report (Social Security 
Committee, HC 69,1993-4). The ACE was a member of the Departmental Board 
and she had regular quarterly review meetings with the Permanent Secretary. The 
Agency had regular contact with the relevant policy group and quarterly review 
meetings. 
The informal links between the Agency and Department however were less 
established or embedded into the day-to-day operations of the Agency. Most of the 
staff in the six processing centres of the Agency were newly recruited. There were 
less informal points of liaison and contact. Quite early on in the Agency's history a 
DSS 'insider' was - appointed as Head of Operations to improve Agency 
performance (Social Security Select Committee, HC 470,1993-94 Session, 139). 
There was considerable criticism of Ros Hepplewhite in the press and in Parliament 
for her handling of the operational problems which beset the Agency. 
Parliamentarians were angry that their letters were not given priority (Hansard 31 
March 1994, col 1083 - 1090) and she was seen to become overly identified with 
the policy aims of the Agency (interviews). This suggested Ros Hepplewhite was 
ignoring both the reality and rhetoric of ministerial responsibility and pointed to a 
lack of clarity in the role of ACE. 
Now the Department of Education and Employment 
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Like Lewis, Hepplewhite appeared to follow the 'Next Steps' rhetoric of 
demonstrating leadership, showing 'ownership' of an agency's policy aims and 
defending the organisation from attack. At the same time, like Lewis, Hepplewhite 
appeared to ignore, or be unaware of how to use, more traditional civil service skills, 
such as caution, co-ordination, and consultation. It was announced that Ros 
Hepplewhite had resigned in September 1994. She undoubtedly 'carried the can' 
for problems that were beyond her operational responsibilities. It was convenient 
for ministers and the DSS that she was perceived to be responsible. Part of the 
explanation lies in the fact that neither ministers, Department or Agency Chief 
Executive realised the dependency they had on each other and, although formal 
arrangements were in place, informal arrangements to manage this high 
dependency were weak. 
Ministers and the Department were taken by surprise at the controversy caused by 
the Agency activities. The high level of policy consensus within the department and 
in Parliament led them to underestimate the degree of opposition to the changes 
(interview with minister). Ann Chant suggested in a letter to the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, "I do not think it was fully appreciated that the agency's intervention 
into the most personal and sensitive areas of people's lives would make such a 
negative impact; nor was it realised how many people would actively resist or reject 
prioritising child maintenance above nearly all other financial commitments" 
(Guardian, 19/1/95). They were not prepared for the dependency they had on the 
Agency to use it resources to deliver. Ros Hepplewhite was not aware of her 
dependency upon Ministers for legitimacy and authority and on the Department for 
information and policy making expertise. She was also not aware of the 
Department's dependency on her. One former DSS civil servant said that as an 
outsider, the pressure was on Ros Hepplewhite to conform in her first few months 
"All that time she needed to be saying you know you can't deliver this or you can't 
deliver it in this timescale . 
She did not have the role understanding to make 
demands upon either Ministers or the Department, as did the ACE of the Insolvency 
Service, (also offering a statutory provision with no control over inputs). Neither did 
she have existing informal contacts, nor did she make them in order to learn how to 
manage the very difficult situation she was facing. 
212 
Ann Chant's subsequent period of leadership is spoken of with universal praise both 
within and outside the Department and in Parliament (Daily Telegraph, 2 February 
1996). Her role awareness was based on traditional mandarin skills and her 
sensitivity to the political arena is demonstrated by the institution of an MPs' 'hot 
line' to answer constituency casework speedily. Her appointment, and that of her 
successor, Faith Boardman, also a civil servant with a long history of administrative 
work, has not led to significant changes in the formal mechanisms for managing the 
relationship with the Department. There is now however a DSS ACEs meeting and, 
since the Labour Government, there have been far more cross-agency initiatives 
requiring much greater consultation. 
There has been a change in the informal arrangements supporting the relationship 
between DSS and Agency. The CSA has continued to have grave difficulties in 
implementing the Government's policies for child support. The two subsequent 
ACEs used their existing contacts to create a shared perception of the policy and 
operational problems facing the Agency. They were both more confident in their 
role and in how they should operate at arm's length but under the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility. Giving evidence at the Social Security Select Committee, 
Ann Chant declined to comment on the role the Treasury played in setting 
impossible targets for the Agency at the outset, but explained 
IL what we have found its that you will never stop Ministers, that is their right 
and their prerogative, wanting to bring in legislation, which they think is good 
they want as quickly as possible. But there are ways you can help them and 
one the of the ways you can do that is to get all parties involved at the 
planning stage to contribute in a constructive way to what can be done and 
what cannot be done" (Social Security Select Committee, HC 282,1996/97, 
8). 
Both recognised the importance of having a good relationship with the Department. 
It is acknowledged that both organisations learned from the early problems faced by 
Ros Hepplewhite.,, 
' 
Ann Chant expressed the view that "Our relationship with the 
DSS is a very good one. It is worked at very hard. It does not just happen and 
there was quite a lot of learning going on in the very early days" (House of Lords 
Committee on Public Service, 1996, HL 68,123). The amount of learning required 
was far greater and the problems in the relationship far more problematic because 
of the informal process of exchange between department and agency were not 
satisfactory during the first period of the Agency's existence. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter examined how department-agency networks managed their 
dependency relationships. Partly these processes of exchange were informed by 
arrangements representing changes in the formal rules of the game and roles to be 
played, set out in each Framework Document. These were supplemented by 
specific departmental structures and updated by cross government initiatives, such 
as 'Fraser figures'. Comparing agencies in the case study, it was noticeable that the 
Home Office and its Permanent Secretary did not have a clear role and had no 
formal arrangements to ensure access to information from the Prison Service. 
Informal features were also key to how departments and agencies managed their 
relationships. Informal networks were key to the exchange of information, the 
development of trust and the transmission of awareness of the rules of the game 
and roles played. These type of contacts were not as strong in the CSA and the 
Prison Service. ACEs understanding of their role was a key factor in managing the 
transition to the new 'rules of the game' within the tradition of ministerial 
responsibility. This was difficult for Ros Hepplewhite and Derek Lewis, both 
coming from outside the public sector, who did not appreciate the dominance of 
ministerial authority in the exchange relationship. Following their exit, it is 
suggested that through 'policy feedback' (Pierson, 1993,603), the appreciation of 
roles and rules of the game gradually changed so as to restrict the autonomy of 
agencies. This process has continued since the election of the new government. 
This chapter has examined how department-agency relationships operate, how they 
vary and how and why they develop and change over time. Networks arising from 
power dependency operate through formal and informal processes of exchange. 
They vary according to degree of dependency, the departmental context and the 
type and nature of informal links. They change and develop due to changes in the 
dependency relationship, in perceptions of that dependency and in response to 
policy learning and policy feedback. 
One question in the literature on networks has been whether they have an 
institutional or structural basis (arising from formal organisational and constitutional 
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arrangements determining roles, rules and the allocation of institutional resources), 
or an interpersonal basis (personal, shared, cultural networks that that structure, 
influence and guide behaviour) (Marsh and Rhodes 1992b). The analysis here 
suggests both institutional and interpersonal features are important to 
understanding these intra-state networks. The networks exist only because of new 
formal arrangements which alter the distribution of resources, rules of the game and 
roles played. The, changed distribution of resources leads to power dependency 
relationships. The way those relationships are managed relates in part to the 
degree of dependency and is informed also by the changed rules of the game and 
role expectations. In-this sense it is possible to view department-agency networks 
as institutional, reflecting institutional structures and changes. 
However, it is also clear that the sort of informal networks traditionally associated 
with the 'Whitehall village' (Heclo and Wildasky, 1974) have had an equally defining 
impact on the processes of exchange between departments and agencies. Informal 
networks were used to smooth the policy process and led to shared understandings 
of the 'rules of the game'. In this sense they encouraged the development of trust 
and communication in the networks. They informed actors' perceptions of the roles 
they should play and of the skills and tactics available to them. It is argued that the 
case study networks were driven by both institutional (or structural) and 
interpersonal factors. A 'historical institutionalist' analysis argues that both the 
formal and the informal are crucial to understanding how 'the organisation of 
political life makes a difference' (March and'Olsen 1984,747). 
In particular, this chapter shows that the Prison Service Agency did not have the 
kind of formal arrangements which matched the power dependency between 
department and agency. Also there were problems in the informal arrangements 
supporting the relationships between both the Prison Service Agency and the CSA 
and their Departments. Existing informal networks were weak and the two 'outsider 
Chief Executives did not have the same understanding of the rules of the game and 
the roles they should play as other ACEs in the study. A policy networks approach 
would identify these factors as important in understanding why some networks work 
well and others face implementation difficulties. The next chapter will explore this 
approach. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DEPARTMENT-AGENCY NETWORKS AND POLICY 
OUTCOMES 
Introduction 
Earlier chapters examined the institutional context in which department-agency 
relationships were established, agency goals, and power dependency arising from 
the exchange of resources. The last chapter looked at the processes of exchange 
or the way in which the power dependency was managed. This chapter will explore 
what kind of department - agency networks have become established and how 
these networks impacted on outcomes. It will seek, in particular, to address the 
question of why the Child Support Agency and Prison Service Agency faced 
implementation problems when the Benefits Agency did not. 
Initially, information from the three earlier fieldwork chapters on history, goals, 
dependency and processes of exchange will be amalgamated to provide a 
comparative picture. Information on these areas will be linked to the Marsh and 
Rhodes typology (1992,251) and used to discuss what type of networks were 
found. It will look at whether fieldwork in the case study agencies confirmed the 
expectations of the multiple case study. In particular, the degree to which there 
were shared values, goals and institutional support, will be examined to see 
whether these factors, rather than the saliency of the policy area, are more closely 
linked to problematic implementation. 
Secondly, the ways in which networks impact on outcomes more generally will be 
discussed. This question was not the primary focus of the thesis and these 
observations are speculative. It is suggested here that, in some circumstances, 
department-agency networks influence operational outcomes, pursue policy 
paradigms and act to defend the network. The chapter concludes by suggesting 
department-agency relationships resemble policy communities and implementation 
difficulties were related to the level of integration of the network. 
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Viewing Department-Agency Relationships as Networks 
Chapter three introduced the idea that department-agency relationships could be 
viewed as power-dependent networks arising from resource exchange. it 
discussed the difficulty of using the Marsh and Rhodes typology of network 
characteristics in relation to department-agency networks (1992,251). These intra- 
state relationships were set up to exchange resources to deliver ministers' goals at 
arm's length. Membership is closed and institutionally linked. The policy and 
resources framework document which set. out the formal rules applying to each 
relationship determines the roles and relationships each party should play and the 
governance arrangements. 
Thus, according to the 'diagnostic criteria' put forward by Marsh and Rhodes, the 
dimensions of membership (number of participants, type of interest), resources 
(distribution within and without of network), and power, although varying, should 
show characteristics of policy communities. However, it was expected that the 
degree of integration - the amount of interaction, continuity and consensus - would 
vary between networks. It discussed how empirical work concerned with both intra- 
state and inter-state networks suggested that the degree of integration of a network 
could impact on policy implementation. It proposed the following hypothesis - 
"where closed policy communities, based on shared values, goals and institutional 
support exist between agencies and departments, agencies will be successful in 
implementing government goals". 
A number of agencies were identified, of varying sizes, types, funding regimes and 
previous institutional history, to provide a multiple case study. Four of these 
agencies were chosen in the expectation that they would provide literal support for 
the hypothesis and two, the Prison Service Agency and the Child Support Agency, 
were chosen in the expectation they would provide theoretical support for the 
hypothesis (i. e. would not support the hypothesis but for predictable reasons). The 
Benefits Agency was added to challenge an alternative explanation for problematic 
implementation, as being related to the political saliency of the policy area. The first 
section of this chapter will look at what type of networks between departments and 
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agencies can be identified using the Marsh and Rhodes typology and, in particular, 
whether fieldwork confirms the inverse relationship between the degree of 
integration of a network - the extent to which there are shared values, goals and 
institutional support - and problematic implementation. 
Fieldwork findings in the case study agencies 
Chapters four and five provided information about the institutional history of each 
agency and parent department. It also set out the goals of each agency, both 
primary policy goals and other coexistent, competing or informal goals. It looked at 
the saliency of the policy area and the degree to which there was agreement about 
the goals of the agency. Chapter six looked at the resource exchange between 
department and agency and the power dependency this created. Chapter seven 
examined the processes of exchange. The key findings from each of these 
chapters has been synthesised in Table 6 (over). This information assists in 
identifying what type of network exists and whether features of the network are 
related to problematic implementation. 
What type of networks were discernible? 
The agency arrangernents established the basis for a 'policy community' type of 
network according to the Marsh and Rhodes criteria. The relationship involved an 
exchange of resources and in all but one case, a positive sum power game ensued. 
Membership of the network was limited and based around government goals. 
Differences between the networks were discernible, however, in all these areas and 
particularly in the degree of integration. 
Low dependency networks 
Broadly, two groups were identifiable from this research (others may exist where 
the pattern of resource exchange is different). Firstly, the three DTI agencies and 
the FSS at the Home Office showed similarities in their relationships with the parent 
department in the first few years. This partly reflected the strong corporate model 
operating at the DTI but also indicates the similar size of these agencies and the 
low saliency of their policy goals. 
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Although these four (the DTI agencies and the FSS) provided statutory services, the 
nature of the dependency with the department was relatively low. Membership of 
the network, therefore, did not routinely include ministers but was with a Fraser 
figure, supported by a board. Direct contact with ministers, if at all, was usually to 
formally ratify agency documentation such as the business plan and targets. 
Contact with the Fraser figure was not frequent, usually three monthly, except at an 
informal level. 
All four had close informal links with their parent department at the outset. They 
also all had first chief executives who were internal appointments and two, the FSS 
and the Insolvency Service, have the same incumbent ten years after their launch 
although their departmental line manager (the Fraser figure) has changed. In the 
other two agencies, the first ACEs have been replaced by outside appointments. 
Although the Insolvency Service was initially uncertain of the benefits of agency 
status, across the four there was basically a shared understanding between the 
department and agency of the new roles they should play and of the agency 
concept at the outset. 
Three of these networks, those between the DTI and Companies House, the IDTI 
and the Insolvency Service and between the Home Office and the FSS, could be 
said to have had from the outset and throughout their history, all the characteristics 
of closed policy communities, namely a shared commitment to meeting government 
goals (in all these cases statutory goals) leading to an exchange of resources and 
positive sum balance of power, limited membership, high quality interactions, 
continuity and consensus. 
This was not the case for the Laboratory of the Government Chemist. It was 
notable that, although the LGC's governance relationships were with the DTI and 
therefore followed the DTI's corporate style, its dependency relationship was with 
several departments. The Agency had strong formal links with the Department 
through a steering board, and initially close informal links, which became less so 
with a complete change of personnel. There was a very low level of dependency as 
the Department did not need the LGC to fulfil its policy goals and the LGC did not 
depend on the Department entirely for funding or authority. Agencification exposed 
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the lack of dependency and, gradually over time, as the informal links between the 
two became less strong, the shared understanding that the LGC's functions should 
be provided in the public sector, also became less central to the way the Agency 
was perceived by both Department and Agency. With the Secretary of State 
introducing privatisation as a key goal in the DTI, the Agency eventually moved into 
the private sector and assumed a fully contractual relationship with the DTI for the 
work it provided. 
The agency had moved from having the characteristics of a close intra-state policy 
community, to a purchaser provider relationship on a fully contractual basis. This 
relationship also could be described as a network, with some exchange of 
resources leading to a type of dependency and operating under different rules of 
the game. At the point of privatisation, the Department and Agency had again 
developed a shared understanding of the way in which the LGC would maintain its 
relationship with the Department and how the Chief Executive could continue to 
carry out his role as the Government Chemist from within the private sector. 
High dependency networks 
The remaining three case study agencies (the Benefits Agency, the CSA and the 
Prison Service Agency) had a different pattern of relationships with their parent 
department. This dependency reflected their size, the saliency of the policy area 
and consequent higher dependency between department and agency. Again 
membership was limited according to the formal rules indicated in the Framework 
Document. However contact with Ministers was far greater, particularly for the 
Benefits Agency and the Prison Service Agency. As well as contact concerning the 
annual business cycle of the agency, such as ratifying the business plan, setting 
targets etc., ministers also received regular reviews of performance directly from the 
ACE, and had ad hoc contact about particular policy issues as and when required. 
The nature of this contact has changed over time and particularly since the election 
of the Labour Government. The amount of direct contact between the Chief 
Executive of the Benefits Agency and the Secretary of State became less, and 
contact with junior ministers greater. Co-ordination of policy information through 
the 
departmental policy machinery had become more routinised. In the Prison 
Service, 
there has been an assertion of ministerial responsibility symbolised by the Home 
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Secretary's decision to answer parliamentary questions. Formal links between 
Agency and Department were strengthened, for example, by the introduction of a 
quarterly performance review meeting, chaired by ministers, and at the informal 
level relationships were better. 
So like the first four agencies, the conditions for the development of a close policy 
community were established by the policy and resources framework in these 
agencies. There was a formal agreement to achieve stated government goals, 
requiring an exchange of resources, a defined and limited membership and a 
positive sum power dependency. The frequency of interaction of these three 
networks was greater than in the earlier four reflecting the higher dependency in the 
network. There were differences however in the level of integration within these 
latter three networks, particularly the level of continuity and consensus and it is 
these aspects that are explored next in relation to the expectations of the multiple 
case study. 
Network features and implementation difficulties 
The argument presented in chapter three was that for implementation to be smooth, 
there needs to be shared values, shared goals and institutional support. These 
features of the network concerned with the level of integration seemed to have 
impacted on how well other networks had managed policy implementation. The 
establishment of agencies set up the conditions to create close policy communities. 
Nevertheless it was anticipated that integration of the network would be difficult if 
the agency was new and thus having no established links, as with the child support 
agency, or headed by an outsider, who would be unaware of the rules, values and 
customs of government. 
Companies House, Insolvency Service, LGC and Forensic Science Service 
The first four agencies above (Companies House, the Insolvency Service, LGC and 
the FSS) seemed to bear out the hypothesis providing literal replication. The 
history of the agencies - all formerly parts of their departments - coupled with the 
fact that the first ACEs were appointed from inside the civil service (indeed, inside 
the organisation) led to an understanding of the new roles required and, crucially, a 
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shared understanding of the agency concept itself. In all four there were strong 
formal and informal links. There were shared values, shared goals and institutional 
support. In these agencies implementation - the delivery of government goals 
through the agency arrangement - was largely unproblematic. 
There were some difficulties as departments and agencies sought to test out their 
changed power potential and establish the boundaries of new roles and rules. For 
example, the Insolvency Service and the DTI did have early difficulties in agreeing 
the level of the resources required to deliver policy goals in the face of escalating 
insolvency cases. These difficulties were exposed by a critical NAO report inquiring 
into the backlog of work (NAO, HC 907,1993). None the less, although this 
indicated a problem in the agreement of these operational goals, partly due to the 
complexity of the policy area, there was a shared understanding of the policy 
problem faced, and a degree of understanding of how it should be resolved. This 
included skilful interpretation by the Chief Executive of how to operate in his role, for 
example, appearing at the Public Account Committee hearing, or utilising the 
agency accounting officer provisions, within the overarching framework of 
ministerial authority. 
To this extent there may have been temporary difficulty in operating goal 
agreement, but there was agreement about the need to sort it out and achieve the 
required outcome - the delivery of government goals. There was a shared 
understanding about the process of implementing those goals, of the legitimacy of 
the administrative goal of operating as an agency, and of the complexities this 
caused and the changes to roles and rules involved. This shared understanding 
was based on shared'values within the network and supported by institutional links. 
These early difficulties did not lead to the kind of breakdown in relationship seen at 
the Child Support Agency or the Prison Service Agency. The agency has not faced 
major change in its operating environment, the same Chief Executive is still in post 
after ten years and currently the network with the Department is strong. 
Benefits Agency 
This type of shared understanding of the policy problems faced and how to deal 
with them was also found in the Benefits Agency, despite having an outsider 
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appointed as its first Chief Executive and having highly politically salient policy 
goals. The agency was institutionally cohesive having been the former operational 
arm of the DSS. There had been a good deal of staff movement at a management 
level from HQ to 'operations' and vice versa, and a strong, shared and pre-existing 
culture. Training in political awareness was offered to Agency staff which supported 
this shared culture. Formal and informal links between the Agency and Department 
were very strong and had been planned with commitment on both sides. 
Consequently communication took place at all levels of the agency. Contact with 
ministers ran alongside a planning, reporting and review relationship with the 
Permanent Secretary. Meetings sometimes involved all parties, sometimes they 
were separate but supported by mechanisms for consultation. Sometimes policy 
issues were discussed with ministers without the ACE or Permanent Secretary in 
attendance. The relationship between department and agency was not totally 
reliant upon the most senior staff in each organisation. 
The saliency of the policy area did make goal agreement difficult at times, for 
example, with the operation of the Social Fund (Public Service Committee, HC 313, 
1996-87,154), over tension between value for money and the Agency's 
commitment to customer service (Social Security Committee, HC 382,1994/5, xxi). 
The agency also faced grave difficulties with the introduction of Disability Living 
Allowance (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Administration, 1992-93, HC 652; 
DSS Annual Report Cm 2213,1993,26; Social Security Committee HC 284,1992- 
93; Treasury and Civil Service Committee, HC 27,1994,240) and these difficulties 
remain to the present day (Social Security Committee, 1998, HC 641; DLA Advisory 
Board 1998). 
Yet, as with the Insolvency Service, despite private difficulties in agreeing operating 
goals in these areas, there was no fundamental disagreement over the 
administrative policy of operating through agency status to deliver government 
goals. There were tensions in negotiating the relationship between Department and 
Agency (see chapter seven). One senior agency official noted that the 
Agency 
developed its own approach "in the face of very considerable opposition 
from senior 
officials at the centre at the DSS". Early battles about spheres of control were 
reported as bruising by officials from both Department and Agency. 
There was 
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however a shared understanding about the primacy of ministerial authority and the 
importance of confidentiality. 
This was demonstrated when Michael Bichard was asked about how the Agency 
and the Department had dealt with the problems over the introduction of DLA 
(Treasury and Civil Service Committee). In response to a question about whether 
he had the resources to manage the introduction of the benefit Bichard replied "I 
understand my accountability to the Secretary of State and to Ministers and would 
always seek to achieve their objectives within the resources that we have got. I 
think it would be extremely difficult to retain credibility as a Chief Executive if one 
went public and said 'I don't have the resources"' (Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee, 1994,241). Bichard understood about the compromises and 
uncertainties of political life and decision making in the public sector from his local 
government experience. He had also spent time, when drawing up the Framework 
Document, negotiating and agreeing how the agency concept fitted with the 
existing departmental culture in the DSS and how it saw its existing policy 
problems. 
His successor, Peter Mathison, was previously Chief Executive of the War 
Pensions Agency. Prior to this, he worked in the private sector and had an 
engineering background. As an outsider and with no previous public sector 
background he had the opportunity to observe from a less salient policy area (on 
the Departmental Management Board) how to operate as the new arrangements 
'bedded down. He was initiated into his roles and responsibilities through the very 
strong corporate arrangements in the DSS. 
Because of these institutional links, shared values and goals, there was continuity 
and consensus in the department-agency network. This enabled the transition to a 
new operating arrangement to be relatively smooth. In private, there may 
have 
been considerable power play and manoeuvering to establish the boundaries of 
responsibility and flexibility. Nevertheless there was a shared understanding of 
what the agency primarily existed to do which was to meet ministers' policy goals. 
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Child Support Agency 
The Child Support Agency was also working in a highly salient policy area. To 
some extent, this came as a surprise to the departmental architects of the policy 
and politicians of all parties. There had been, (unusually) fairly comprehensive 
cross-party and bureaucratic agreement about the need for, and purpose of, a 
changed policy for child support. However the social policy aims of the policy were 
undermined by the tough financial targets for recouping benefits set by the Treasury 
(CPAG 1994; Social Security Committee 1996-97, HC 282) and by the speedy 
timetabling of its introduction (interviews with officials). The Agency faced 
immediate operational difficulties due to computer problems and lack of staff 
training (Hansard, 20 June 1997, col 527). The policy consensus crumpled rapidly 
when the implications of the new formula for absent parents (men) and second 
families became apparent and the benefits for parents with children (women) were 
seen to be eroded by the Treasury's 'take. Amidst intense media attention, 
politicians on all sides expressed alarm at the activities of the Agency. 
The agency faced both policy and operational problems which still persist. A new 
and radically simpler formula is about to be introduced to try to resolve these 
difficulties (Cm 4339 1999). This was a policy area of very high saliency and great 
sensitivity. To accommodate and appease parliamentary concerns, political goals 
were changeable, and the operational goals became political problems. Goals were 
multiple, changing and goal agreement was therefore very difficult. However, it was 
asserted earlier in chapters two and four that the difficulties faced by the CSA when 
it was established were similar to those faced by the Benefits Agency when it 
introduced DLA (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Administration, 1994-95, HC 
135; Select Committee on the PCA 1994-95, HC 199). Like child support, DLA 
presented both policy and operational problems. Computer difficulties and lack of 
training caused chaos when the benefit was first introduced, filling up MPs' post 
bags with letters from elderly and disabled constituents. The disability lobby was 
(and is) media-friendly and vociferous. Like the CSA, the Benefits Agency required 
extra resources to turn round the initial backlog. Like the CSA, the very 
basis of the 
benefit itself is thought to be problematic and is in the process of being reformed. 
Unlike the CSA, these problems, at the outset, did not lead to the same breakdown 
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in the relationship between department and agency or the same widely held view 
that the Agency had failed to implement government policy. 
The hypothesis surmised that implementation problems would be found where there 
was no institutional support, shared values or goals. Fieldwork findings on the CSA 
case study confirmed theoretical replication of this hypothesis. Although the CSA 
had the same formal links between the Agency and the Department as the Benefits 
Agency, it lacked good and strong informal links because it was a totally new 
organisation. The network focused upon key individuals at the top of each 
organisation operating under the new formal rules. A crucial difficulty was that, as 
an outside appointee, Ros Hepplewhite seems to have misunderstood her role and 
how to operate in an agency setting. She appeared to go beyond her brief as Chief 
Executive and was seen as being too closely identified with the policy at a time 
when ministers were trying to manage the considerable public furore (interviews 
with officials from the DSS and Next Steps Team). At the same time the scale of 
the difficulties the Agency faced was not conveyed to the Department or Ministers 
(interviews with senior officials). Trust and communication broke down. One senior 
Agency figure inside the DSS at the time suggested I don't think she properly 
realised the parliamentary perspective of it 
Although the agency rhetoric suggested that chief executives should show 
leadership for their agencies, it was essential to recognise how to operate within the 
wider political environment. Ros Hepplewhite did not come into the job with this 
experience or understanding and the lack of informal links, either institutionally or 
personally, meant she was unable to build up the skills to know how to deal with the 
very difficult policy and operational issues the Agency faced. She looked to the 
agency concept too literally to understand her role and responsibilities and 
misunderstood her dependence upon others. She became a convenient scapegoat 
for ministers. There were no shared values between the Agency and Department. 
Not only was there turmoil in the primary operational goals but no agreement of 
the 
administrative goal of making the agency relationship work. 
Following her 
departure, her successors have continued to face similar policy problems, but 
both 
have been able to draw on their 'insider' knowledge and existing skills to manage 
the network and build trust and confidence. The network became more cohesive 
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and based on a shared understanding of the policy problems faced and how to 
tackle them. 
The Prison Service Agency 
The goals of the Prison Service Agency were equally complex, multiple and rapidly 
changing. As with the other very salient policy areas, these goals were often 
ambiguous and deliberately so. Ostensibly, the Agency's operational goals were 
set out in the Framework Document and accompanied by performance targets. 
These were devised by Derek Lewis during the early period of his appointment in 
the three months before the Agency was launched. For Lewis this represented the 
'agenda' he had to work to, and the criteria by which his success would be judged 
(Public Service Committee, 1996, HC 313,100). At the time of his appointment the 
penal policy agenda was stable and was operating in a (post 'Woolf', post 1991 
Criminal Justice Act) mood of liberalism, optimism and when prison numbers were 
falling. 
After Kenneth Clarke's departure, Michael Howard introduced his 'prison works' 
agenda as part of his bid for higher office (interview with former Home Office 
official). This, like Lilley's focus on asylumseekers, scroungers and single parents 
at the IDSS, was calculated to appeal to the disaffected right wing of the 
Conservative Party. The impact was not only to fuel a rise in prison numbers to 
record levels but led to increased scrutiny into what happened in prisons and 
caused confusion within the Agency as to its purpose (Lewis, 1995 111; Woodcock 
Report, Cm 2741,1994; Learmont Inquiry, Cm 3020,1995). There was clear 
disagreement between ministerial, departmental and agency policy goals. Not only 
was there no concensus over the primary policy goals of the Agency, there was 
also a lack of agreement about how the agency concept itself should work. 
Formal and informal links with the Department were poor, impeding the lines of 
communication and the chances for development of shared understandings. 
Tensions in the relationship had been experienced many times previously and were 
anticipated in the Lygo Report but the formal institutional mechanism of a Ministerial 
Advisory Board to provide a policy ballastrole was not instituted. Neither did the 
Permanent Secretary and the Director General have any formal links tied into the 
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Framework Document. This mattered. One former Home Office official explained 
that the loss of the Ministerial Advisory Board was not significant but 
"what did matter deeply was the failure to have a Fraser figure other than the Home Secretary. In my view the relationship between the Permanent 
Secretary and the Director General is absolutely critical. Because when all's 
said and done you are going to have trouble in prisons at some point. When 
there is trouble the person the Home Secretary turns to is the Permanent 
Secretary and you want a Permanent Secretary speaking as it were behind 
your back who is well informed, has a real understanding in you and what you 
are trying to achieve and some sort of confidence in you, feels some loyalty 
to you and therefore, will put your case almost as well as you would put it 
yourself if you were there to put it on your own behalf. And you can only 
secure that by a relationship which involves the Permanent Secretary in your 
business. " 
The network in this case relied heavily upon the personal relationship between the 
Director General and the Home Secretary working. Again, as with Ros 
Hepplewhite, Lewis did not start out with an insider knowledge of how to deal with 
this rapidly changing agenda and did not, at the outset, recognise the need to pay 
attention to developing and learning these skills and building up trust and 
communication with both colleagues in the Department and with the Home 
Secretary. He relied upon the agency rhetoric and drew on his previous 
background experience working to a 'chairman' role as chief executive. Such a 
strategy worked well when the minister operating in a 'hands off' style but it was 
deeply problematic once Howard took over. Lewis did not recognise the primacy of 
ministerial authority or his and the agency's dependency upon this resource. 
Howard, equally, did not recognise his dependency upon his civil servants. As he 
pointed out to Lewis, his view was "all he needed to do was to state the direction 
clearly and be consistent about it. Eventually people would follow" (Lewis, 
1997, 
104). Within the network there was neither institutional support, nor shared goals 
and values. 
Network features and problematic outcomes 
The findings of these'seven case studies support the 
hypothesis and suggest that it 
is not the salience of the policy area which causes problematic 
outcomes. Rather, 
success or failure is more closely linked to 
features of the network. Where 
networks did not have institutional support, where values 
and (administrative) goals 
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were not shared, relationships did not work well and there were problems using the 
agency concept to deliver government goals. Using the Marsh and Rhodes 
typology (1992,251) there were problems in the level of integration of these 
networks as there was, initially, little continuity or consensus. This meant that policy 
problems, which always arise with politically sensitive or salient policies, were not 
recognised and dealt with as they were in the networks which were well integrated. 
All three factors, institutional support, shared goals and values are important and 
inter-related, making it difficult to separate dependent and independent variables. 
Whilst this explanation acknowledges the necessity of shared goals, it is not 
expected that the network will necessarily agree on the primary goals of an agency. 
Disagreement over the primary goals of an agency is expected and anticipated in 
some networks. Rather it is an understanding that although the agency concept is 
centred around an explicit policy and resources framework, multiple and conflicting 
goals are expected and crucially that, under the current 'rules of the game', goals 
are hierarchical with ministers' goals taking ultimate precedence. Ministerial 
authority is dominant in the resource exchange. What appeared to be key goals 
were shared administrative goals. Actors in the networks needed to share a view 
on how to operationalise the agency concept. 
This type of understanding stems from, and in turn feeds, shared values, that is, 
agreement about what are the rules of the game and the roles that are required to 
operate under the rules of the game. These rules and roles are those that apply 
both in the wider Whitehall and Westminster world, but also rules and roles which 
have developed specifically within the department and between department and 
agency. 
This type of world view or mind set, this consensus, is in turn linked to the type of 
institutional support of the department - agency network. Past history, being part of 
the department, formal arrangements and informal links all bind and nurture forums 
for developing the shared understandings of policy problems and how to face them. 
A network that already has institutional support has been the site of previous policy 
problems and actors from within the network, or from within the wider Whitehall 
network, learn from these issues how to deal with current problems. If outsiders 
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come into networks where these institutional links are good, their situational 
learning is facilitated. The cohesiveness of the network permits the generation of 
future understandings of how to deal with issues in the network. In this way 
continuity is vital to ensuring consensus. When outsiders come into networks 
where there is no institutional support, the establishment of shared values and 
goals is problematic. 
Many factors cause policy problems especially in salient areas, economic factors, 
demographic changes, catastrophic events, changing public opinion, political 
manoeuvering, and changing party ideology. The difference is that in a policy 
community, where the network is closely integrated and where there is good 
interaction, continuity and consensus there are mechanisms for coping with and 
resolving problems. Without continuity and consensus, the network cannot deal 
with change. In the case of the Prison Service Agency and the Child Support 
Agency, the networks formed did not have the level of integration to adapt to the 
changes introduced by the idea of agencies and policy implementation became very 
difficult. Policy problems, when they develop, as they do in all salient policy areas, 
are exposed when the network is not well integrated. In the case of the Child 
Support Agency and the Prison Service Agency, the network itself then becomes 
part of the policy problem. 
How Do Networks Affect Outcomes? 
The multiple case study suggests that the type of network did affect how well 
agencies were able to deliver government goals. These new department-agency 
networks can be seen to have impacted on outcomes because of the effect they 
had on implementation. In this sense the type of network either promoted or 
impeded stability. The next section of this chapter will discuss whether the 
department-agency networks examined impacted in other ways on other policy 
outcomes. 
Chapter three, discussed the ways in which the literature on networks suggests that 
government - interest group policy networks 
influence outcomes. These include 
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shaping agendas, keeping issues off the agenda or ignoring issues through the 
formation of shared ideologies and the development of standard operating 
procedures (Smith, 1993 226) and promoting stability and policy continuity (Marsh 
and Smith 1998). It is suggested here that, as well as impacting on implementation, 
department-agency networks influenced operational outcomes, led to the 
development of policy preferences and acted to preserve the network 
The question of how networks influence outcomes (stemming from the theoretical 
work on networks) also links to the normative questions about agency accountability 
and agency autonomy which were highlighted in the more general literature 
discussed in chapter two. For this reason, it will be considered here. Before doing 
so, however, three notes of caution need to be sounded about the evidence 
presented in respect of this broader examination of network impact on outcomes. 
These relate to the focus of the thesis, the institutional context of agency decision 
making and methodological difficulties. 
Firstly, the question of how department-agency networks impact on policy outcomes 
generally was not the primary focus of this'thesis (which was 'how to understand 
department-agency relationships' and 'why do some relationships work better than 
others'). To properly address the question more generally of how networks impact 
on outcomes, would have required a different research design and empirical 
material. The focus of fieldwork was on examining the dependencies and 
exchanges between department and agencies and the way in which these 
dependencies were managed. It was not intended to ask 'how have agencies 
influenced the policy process? '. However, fieldwork has made it possible to look in 
some detail at how department-agency networks may have influenced the policy 
agenda, beyond the question of their impact on implementation. This arose from 
the explanations interviewees gave about how they perceived their role and how 
they interacted with other members of the network. It was also possible to question 
those involved about issues raised in official publications (Annual Reports, Select 
Committee Reports) about policy areas and the direction policy took. 
The second 'rider, is. that, as mentioned in chapter three, the institutional basis of 
agencies was that they were to operate at a distance from policy making. 
The 
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whole purpose of setting up the arm's length relationship was to separate policy 
making from policy implementation. Thus in considering policy change or 
innovation, department-agency networks were not envisaged as usurping or acting 
in the same way as the existing government - interest group policy networks 
operating in the policy area. Nevertheless, in recognition of the fact that policy 
making needs to take account of operational factors, agencies did have a 
consultation role over operational matters built into their framework. The rules of 
the game for agencies was an expectation that they would be consulted, and 
involved, but not about the 'aims' of the policy but about how those aims could be 
carried out'. This aspect of agencies' impact on outcomes will be explored in the 
next section of this chapter. Formally then, at least, the involvement of agencies in 
the development of policy change and innovation is institutionally restricted 
although some examples of agencies' influences on these types of outcomes will be 
examined. 
Finally, there are methodological issues raised common to all studies of policy 
making about how far it is possible to observe the exercise of power (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962). For example, in relation to this area of questioning in particular, it is 
very difficult to get interviewees to talk about how they - and not ministers - may 
have policy positions to which they are committed. The 'rules of the game' say, 
firstly, that agencies are not to be involved in policy making, and secondly, that 
ministers make policy following impartial advice from their civil servants. For civil 
servants to suggest they influenced outcomes means a tacit admission that they 
broke the rules. It may also be difficult for civil servants to conceive of their actions 
as constituting framing the policy agenda. A good example of the instinctive 
response a traditional civil servant will offer to the suggestion of policy formulation is 
1 The one exception to this in the case study agencies and indeed across Government was 
the Prison Service Agency where the Director General was the minister's 'principal policy 
adviser on matters relating to the prison service' per se. Even here, though, prisons policy 
covers what might be described as operational policies. The most important policy which 
affects prisons is the legal framework covering who gets locked up and for how long. 
These types of policy decisions are formulated in the Criminal Justice Directorate of the 
Home Office and therefore, again, the agency is not institutionally involved in much of the 
primary policy making. 
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seen in Ann Chant's evidence to the Public Service Committee. She is asked 
whether she is consulted before the final decision is made as opposed to only being 
asked to report back and monitor. She responds "If that is what you mean by 
'formulation' my Lord Chairman, I am happy to sign up to that. What I do not have 
is any responsibility at all for the construction of policy and the development of 
policy" (Public Service Committee, 1996,123). 
Given these qual 
'ifications 
it is possible to make some comments about how 
department-agency networks influenced policy outcomes more generally. One area 
where it was expected that agencies would affect outcomes was in the development 
of operational policies. 
Influencing operational outcomes 
The influence of operational outcomes was most overtly seen in the high 
dependency networks. Here, agencies' influence on outcomes was in line with their 
framework responsibilities. Several chief executives expressed the view that the 
agency arrangements meant that operational considerations were being taken 
seriously for the first time. Ann Chant, when at the Child Support Agency 
suggested, "[flhere is a very well developed link certainly in the DSS and in other 
agencies and other departments as well, from my contacts in the chief executive 
network, that you can feed in ... and say 'This 
is practical. This is not. We could 
suggest this"', (Public Service Committee, 1996,123). Another ACE said the 
department and agency had formed "a sense of partnership so that we were 
consulted about new policy at an early stage. And when we gave feedback about 
... problems on the ground, you 
know, Ministers did, I think listen, and some notice 
was taken". This feeling of having influence, was directly linked to the power 
potential the agency had as a result of controlling resources. From the departmental 
point of view this power potential is recognised. One Permanent Secretary 
explained "it has made it much more difficult for the policy people to ignore the 
operational end because you have a more powerful operational end who can turn 
round and say, 'no you can't make me do that, I am telling you that this is how it is 
going to be done 
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In the Benefits Agency the policy making process was described as iterative 
"[p]roviding information and advice up to ministers and policy about the 
outcomes that are being achieved ... working with policy trying to do some analysis of the root cause... are there difficulties with delivering it ... or whether there are some fundamental issues around policy and feeding that 
back. That has been effective in terms of some changes in rules and 
regulations which make the delivery of policy easier, not just easier for us 
administratively but easier to understand as well" (interview with senior 
Agency official). 
It is clear, for example, that the Benefits Agency was involved in the development of 
Job Seekers Allowance in a way which had not been possible previously. Likewise, 
the proposed changes to child support reflect the CSA's concerns about the 
complexity of the existing system and the difficulty of administering the current 
legislation. At the Prison Service, an early initiative to reduce prison numbers, by 
combining tagging with early release, was an initiative that came from the Agency 
(interviews with department and agency officials). In addition, each of these 
agencies were also able to use their power potential to argue for increased 
resources at various times in their histories (interviews). 
Nevertheless, in these agencies ministerial authority was still the most dominant 
feature of the relationship. This was particularly noticeable following the 1997 
election as the new ministers joined networks. Their new policy agenda was not 
always in line with existing agency goals and targets. This was demonstrated in the 
Benefits Agency by the complete reversal of the focus of its targets from one of 
speed to one of accuracy. Whereas the target had placed the stress on paying 
beneficiaries 'the right benefit at the right time' (italics added), the new 
administration set new targets based on making payments of 'the light benefit' 
requiring a shift in the Agency's operational practices (interview with senior official 
in DSS). In the Child Support Agency, efficiency targets had led to plans to offer 
more telephone access and close some provision through local offices. This did not 
sit happily with Labour's commitment to improve service provision locally and the 
plans for closure were reversed (interviews with officials and ministers). 
These are examples of how department-agency networks were able to overtly 
influence policy outcomes, and of where they were not. In these high dependency 
networks, with complicated policy areas and multiple and conflicting goals, it is 
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important to stress again that department-agency networks were primarily centred 
around the administrative policy of implementation through the agency. Particularly 
in the Benefits Agency there were many other more typical government - interest 
group 'policy networks' based around policy issues and 'client groups, for example 
on pensions, disability, benefits for families and children, work-related benefits, 
which operated largely unrelated to the bureaucratic network. In the smaller less 
dependent networks however, it is possible to see how agencies played more of a 
part in determining the overall policy direction for their particular policy area. 
The development of policy preferences 
In networks where dependency was lower and ministers were less active, the 
development of a policy stance within the bureaucratic network could be found. 
This was discernible in the Forensic Science Service for example, in the 
commitment it had towards the extension of DNA analysis as a forensic tool. The 
Agency presented evidence to the Royal Commission of Criminal Justice about the 
potential of genetic testing. Through raising the profile in this way and through the 
informal mechanisms' operating in the department-agency network, the importance 
of DNA profiling was highlighted. Subsequently, ministers realised the practical and 
political value of the technique and it became a flagship policy. The use of DNA in 
British forensic science has increased enormously and the Forensic Science 
Service has a reputation as world leader and for international excellence in this 
area. 
At Companies House the development of a policy preference in the network was 
also apparent. In the first Annual Report published after the election (although 
largely compiled beforehand) the Agency had described its deliberate efforts to 
'Step up' its input to the policy area. It had been involved in revising the framework 
in which Companies House operated and legislative action was hoped for 
(Companies House Annual Report, HC 53,1997 - 98 Session). The following year, 
the Agency reported that this legislation had been lost, however, "[m]ost of what we 
want to do to bring about the electronic era for Companies House can be achieved, 
if with greater difficulty, within the current legislative framework" (Companies House, 
HC 82471997 - 98 Session). 
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These two examples suggest that where there is little ministerial involvement and 
few if any outside interests, department-agency networks can operate, like policy 
communities in government - interest group networks, to shape the policy agenda 
and steer the policy direction. What was far more common, however, and perhaps 
the most striking way in which these bureaucratic networks impacted on policy 
outcomes, was in respect of administrative policies, directed towards the network 
itself - 
Bureaucratic networks and administrative policies: the threat of privatisation 
It was in examining how the four less dependent networks responded to pressure to 
privatise that the operation of bureaucratic networks was most apparent. Not 
surprisingly, network -activity was most directed towards policies which threatened 
the preservation of the network. One of the main concerns at the start of the 
agency project was that the arrangements would be a pre-cursor to privatisation 
(Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1988). This concern had prompted 
governmental reassurances that functions provided through agencies would not 
normally be considered privatisation candidates and that, where this was the case, 
it would be made clear when the agency was set up (Cm 524 1988,7; 
Goldsworthy, 1991). However the first round of agency prior option reviews 
coincided with the first term of a Major government following the 1992 election and 
a noted change in emphasis in the prior options process, (Theakston, 1995,149; 
interviews with Next Steps Team officials). 
Heading a weakened and divided administration, Major was keen to enhance his 
radical credentials and placed administrative reform high on the agenda (Willman, 
1994,6Q). Following the election, government finances were in a poor state 
(Independent, 31 May 1992), privatisation had proved successful for previous 
administrations as it was seen to be effective and raised money. With the major 
concerns already sold and competition introduced into local government, attention 
turned to the civil service itself. Privatisation of government activities was high on 
the political agenda. Major strengthened the centre of Government by combining 
the Next Steps Unit, the Efficiency Unit and the Citizens Charter Unit under one 
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Office for Public Service and Science, headed by a new cabinet post, the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, filled by William Waldegrave. Waldegrave 
announced the extension of market testing into central government (Daily 
Telegraph, 2 June, 1992). At the Treasury, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 
Stephen Dorrell, announced in November 1992 that a review of Government 
activities would extend the privatisation programme in every area, "We are no 
longer looking for obvious candidates for privatisation. The conventional question 
was 'what can we sell? ' That question must now be turned on its head. 'Now we 
should ask ourselves 'what must we keep?, what is the inescapable core of 
government? ' " (Centre for Policy Studies 23 November, 1993). 
When the 1993 Agencies Review was published the presumption of privatisation, at 
the point of the prior options review, where possible was clearly spelled out (Cm 
2430,1993,14). An Efficiency Unit Review of Public Sector Research 
Establishments (Efficiency Unit, 1994) provided another bureaucratic mechanism to 
examine the possibility of privatisation for the two laboratories under consideration 
here. And at the IDTI, the LGC, Companies House and the Insolvency Service 
faced considerable pressure from the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
Michael Heseltine, for a change in their status. Heseltine had been sceptical of the 
benefits of agencification from the outset and was the most committed departmental 
minister to the virtue of privatisation (TCSC, 1987/88, HC 494; interviews with 
officials in IDTI and Next Steps Team). 
Companies House 
At Companies House, the prior options process began on Michael Heseltine's 
instructions in October 1992. The first stage involved a consultant's report into the 
feasibility of various options which ruled out full privatisation. The consultants were 
then recommissioned to examine the possibility of full contracting out of Companies 
House functions (DTI, SRU Report, 1994). This second report was equally low key 
about the value of changing the status of Companies House. It suggested that 
contracting out was feasible but unpopular with users (both companies providing 
information and users requesting information) who were concerned at the loss of 
integrity of the information if the operation moved out of the public sector. The need 
to avoid the creation of a large private sector monopoly pointed to contracting to a 
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'facilities management' company, and a prohibition upon some of the Agency's 
existing users from bidding. The consultant's report pointed out the considerable 
risks in permitting a contractor being involved at a time of rapidly changing 
technological possibilities and thus setting the future direction of the service and 
'crystallising the consequences' (SRU, 1994). 
Despite these less than supportive reports, the Minister was still determined to go 
ahead and in December 1994 a statement announced that although the core 
activities of Companies House would remain in the public sector some activities 
would be put out to tender. Pressure from the Welsh Office, concerned at the 
employment implications, excluded some services from the final tendering package. 
Also, the Steering Board' in their consideration of the bids, recommended that 
Companies House existing operations represented better value for money. The 
final outcome was that only the Cardiff post room was contracted out. This decision 
was confirmed by Ian Lang the new President of the Board of Trade, in February 
1996, after Michael Heseltine's departure to take the role of Deputy Prime Minister. 
The whole process had taken three and a half years and despite Michael 
Heseltine's determination, led to no significant change in the Agency's status. 
Insolvency Service 
In a similar fashion, at the Insolvency Service consultants were brought in to 
consider whether certain parts of the insolvency process could be contracted out as 
a way of coping with fluctuating levels of demand (IDTI, Stoy Hayward Consulting 
Report, 1994). Because of the complexity of the work, the Service had to assist the 
consultant in drawing up the specification. One key feature was to ensure 
contractors met the high standards of probity required. It emerged, for example, 
during the process that one of the bidders was found to be facing action by the 
Agency for unresolved insolvency issues (Guardian, 27 February 1996). The result 
of the contracting out exercise was that six bidders were considered by the Steering 
Board, which made their recommendation to Ministers that the work should remain 
in-house. The private sector bids were either too expensive but met the standards 
of probity set, or provided a cheaper service but without meeting the legal 
safeguards. The in-house bid provided the best value for money. This 
recommendation was. accepted, again, by Ian Lang. 
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in both these cases, the bureaucratic networks, based around the Agency Steering 
Board, were highly involved in the prior option process. Ministers did not play an 
active part in these networks. The Boards developed views on what were the best 
options. Because of their notional authority, stemming from the Framework 
Document (to advise the Ministers representative), they were involved in activities 
such as examining consultant's reports and preparing recommendations for 
ministers. They were able to put pressure on ministers to think of different options 
and to take account of value for money considerations. The agencies held the 
informational and organisational resources which meant they were involved in the 
tendering process. They were also able to exercise their power potential and the 
networks acted as a counterbalance to ministerial authority. Ministers had the 
ultimate authority to make decisions; however they were bounded by application of 
the rules and procedures to ensure probity and value for money. 
For the departmental civil servants who were acting as the 'minister's 
representative', the operation of these rules provided guiding principles in a 
situation where the Ministers wishes ran counter not only to those of the network, 
but the consultant's report and the agencies' customers' wishes as well. One 
official explained 
"we had to have a very clear basis for bids, and its at that stage you really 
need to make up your mind about all these various conflicting objectives. So 
our prospectus had to be clear what a bidder could do with the organisation 
and what it couldn't ... what rules 
it had to keep and by implication what rules it 
didn't have to keep. So writing the prospectus was a key task and for the 
steering board agreeing the terms on which it would be privatised, was a key 
task too" (interview with former official in DTI). 
In the end, the permanence of the network in comparison to ministerial tenure 
meant in both cases that the outcome was close to its preferred policy position. 
Laboratory of the Government Chemist 
At the LGC, the likelihood of privatisation was stronger, the Agency's statutory role 
was much smaller and most of its work was available through the private sector. 
Heseltine had ordered a review of the three laboratories in the DTI before the 
Efficiency Unit's multi-departmental review of laboratories across government 
(Efficiency Unit 1994). This formed the basis of the LGC's prior options process. 
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Again a consultant's report published in March 1994 suggested various options 
were possible (as noted in chapter five) and it was subsequently announced that 
the Agency would be transformed into a Non Profit Making Distributing Company 
(KPMG Corporate Finance, 1994). This option was acceptable to both Department 
and Agency. However, it was also stated that the Minister was still interested in a 
trade sale if a buyer with the required independence could be found (DTI, Press 
notice, 1994). 
The future of the Agency remained uncertain throughout 1995 and more 
consultants were engaged to assist in seeking a trade buyer. The Department and 
Agency were concerned to ensure that the statutory role of the Government 
Chemist was maintained, together with a reputation for impartiality and 
independence, and to support the DTI work placed there. The information 
memorandum for the sale was drawn up by the Department in consultation with the 
Agency. Purchasers were required to enter an agreement to "do all things 
necessary or reasonably requested to maintain the capabilities and infrastructure of 
the Laboratory as well as the standing of the office of the Government Chemist' 
(NAO, 1996). From 40 initial responses in November by June 1995, no firm bids 
had been received and into this impasse the Government Chemist (the existing 
ACE) submitted a consortium business plan for a management buy-out. This again 
was accepted by Ian Lang and the LGC is now privatised. 
Again here, the network was highly active in reaching a solution that was patently 
not Michael Heseltine's preferred position. Although the dependency between 
Department and Agency had always beep low, they had started with a shared 
understanding of the role of the LGC at the Agency's launch. But the relationship 
had moved closer to a customer / contractor basis by the time of the review, partly 
as a result of changing personnel and partly due to the introductions of charging 
and competitive tendering arrangements. In seeking to stay in the public sector the 
LGC had no strong overall backing from one department, even the DTI, its parent 
department, as its customers were diverse and becoming less dependent. At the 
same time, a trade sale raised concerns within the DTI about impartiality and 
independence and the ability to ensure continued supply from a contractor. The 
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DTI held an ambivalent attitude towards the privatisation of the LGC. One official 
commented, 
"The LGC were always potentially difficult - because I think most people felt 
as though there were arguments for having an independent Government 
Chemist, that they wern't so compelling that you'd force Customs and Excise 
to use them: and as soon as they started asking questions like 'I've got a 
million pounds to spend, can I get twice as much for my million by doing it 
differently, LGC was always likely to be a quite difficult operation" 
The dependency between Department and Agency was low; nevertheless they 
shared an understanding of the need to secure the future of the Laboratory and of 
the role of the Government Chemist. The management buy-out which finally took 
place ensured that the DTI were assured of the continuation of contracted work, 
other departments were satisfied that independence and impartiality could be 
maintained and the agency was able to secure continued DTI funding for the 
transition period. 
Forensic Science Service 
Finally the network associated with the Forensic Science Service was active in 
ensuring that the FSS was not considered for privatisation. Like the LGC, the FSS 
could have run as a business and sought greater autonomy. Yet after very little 
consideration it was announced the FSS would remain an agency in 1994. 
Ostensibly this was because the forensic market was thought to be too immature to 
permit self-regulation and that the impartiality and independence of forensic science 
advice was best retained under the jurisdiction and accountability provided by 
association with the Home Office. Although pressure from the centre of 
government was strongly seeking privatisation in this type of agency, Michael 
Howard, the departmental minister, benefited more from keeping the FSS as a 
government agency providing good publicity in the fight against crime and there 
was little support for privatisation from ministers. In addition, and unlike at 
the 
LGC, there was a greater resource dependency and stronger informal 
links 
between Department and Agency. 
For the Department, the FSS sustained and underpinned other Home Office goals 
concerned with the administration of justice. The Home 
Office also indirectly 
financed forensic work through the police funding mechanism, giving 
the Police 
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Directorate good reason to be concerned at spending implications at a time of 
rapidly changing forensic science capabilities with the development of DNA testing. 
Further, at the time of the review, the FSS was about to merge with the Metropolitan 
police Laboratory, a move which the Home Office wanted to see happen and which 
meant the FSS could complete its regional representation and gain a London base. 
Informal understandings between the ACE and the line manager were close and 
based on a shared Home Office culture. The network could be described as a 
close policy community with high dependency and strong shared goals and 
understandings and with a strong preference for the status quo at the time. As one 
official in the centre of Government explained "They managed to sell the pass by 
this merger... their argument was we need time to bed this down and in two or three 
years we'll look at it again - classic, play it long, by that time, ministers and 
governments will have changed". 
This section suggests that department-agency networks impacted in the policy 
process in four ways. Firstly, because the level of integration in the network related 
to how well the agency concept was implemented and this had a consequent 
impact on the delivery of government goals . This was particularly the case in high 
dependency networks where there is high political saliency as this saliency 
exacerbates the tensions between the agency concept and ministerial 
responsibility. Secondly, because, in line with the policy aims of Next Steps, 
agencies are influencing the development of operational goals. This again is 
particularly seen in the high dependency networks associated with the large 
agencies which have complex and multiple goals and a high political saliency. Here 
agencies' monopoly of implementation resources gives them a high power potential. 
Thirdly, in the networks with lower dependency where ministers were less actively 
involved, the development of policy preferences is identified. Finally, these lower 
dependency networks, undertook activity to maintain the administrative 
arrangements supporting the network and ensure the maintenance of the status 
quo. In this latter example, the one network where there was virtually no exchange 
of resources, and consequently very low power dependency, was unable to find a 
positive sum outcome and the agency was privatised. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine department-agency relationships as networks and 
to see how these networks impacted on Policy outcomes. The agency 
arrangements have created the conditions for the development - or continuation in 
some cases - Of Policy community-type networks between departments and 
agencies. The establishment of an agency operating at arm's length from ministers 
(usually) creates power dependency and positive sum power games. Membership 
is limited and institutionally defined, goals are agreed through a framework 
document. Interaction is assured through the rules of the game. These networks 
are not like traditional government - interest group policy communities: agencies do 
not operate like interest groups with an overt policy agenda. This is not to say that 
policy preferences do not develop within agencies and within the networks. These 
preferences may be policy - or operationally - orientated. They are not like inter- 
governmental networks as agencies, unlike local government, cannot look to a 
separate source of political legitimation. They are bureaucratic networks whose 
twin policy aims, within the overarching dominance of ministerial authority, are to 
deliver the agreed goals and to maintain the network. Where dependency was not 
found in the LGC, privatisation, resulted following pressure from ministers. 
Different types of network were discernible, with differences associated with the 
saliency of the policy area (related to the sensitivity of the policy, the size and type 
of agency), whether the agency was operating as a monopoly, and what type of 
funding regime operated. Broadly two types of network were identified in the 
multiple case study. Low dependency networks met less often and ministers were 
far less involved. Contacts took place in a mixture of formal and informal settings. 
High dependency networks tended to meet more often, ministers were 
involved 
and, again, contacts varied between formal and informal mechanisms. 
One of the claims in the literature on networks is that 
they impact on outcomes. 
This chapter has examined where and how this has 
been found in the case study 
agencies. Firstly, fieldwork suggested that implementation 
difficulties were related 
to the degree of network integration. Where there was 
institutional support, shared 
goals and shared values, the network had a shared view 
of the policy problems it 
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faced and how to deal with them. The implementation process in these agencies 
was smooth. Network integration was problematic where the agency was new, or 
there were poor formal and informal links and where the chief executive was 
appointed from outside the civil service. Where there was no continuity or 
consensus in the network it was difficult for outsiders to learn the new and 
complicated hybrid roles demanded. In these circumstances the network did not 
share values and agreement about the agency concept. It also led to a failure to 
develop a shared perception of policy problems and how they should be faced. The 
difficulties with integration meant that policy problems became exposed and led to 
publicly visible difficulties with implementation. 
In both the Child Support Agency and the Prison Service Agency, the way the 
network itself operated became part of the 'policy' problems. In both cases, once 
civil service 'insiders' took over, the network became more integrated. In particular, 
there was a better understanding of the dependency between department and 
agency and the constitutional context in which the network operated. Despite little 
change in the policy problems faced in both agencies, implementation through the 
agency concept has become less problematic. 
This refutes the arguments that politically salient policy areas are not suitable for 
agencification, and that agencies operating in salient areas will inevitably face 
difficulties because it is impossible to separate policy from operations and this will 
lead to role confusion. The Benefits Agency, operating in a highly salient policy 
environment, with an outsider appointed 'as its first ACE, worked satisfactorily 
because there were, shared values, agreement about the agency concept and 
institutional support. The network was well integrated and the policy problems 
faced, and how to address them, were shared. 
As well as networks impacting on implementation, fieldwork also suggested that 
these bureaucratic department-agency policy networks could be seen to impact on 
policy outcomes in at least three other ways. First, through influencing operational 
outcomes as policy making has become more iterative. Second, through the 
development of policy paradigms, particularly in networks where ministers are less 
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active. Finally, through network activity around administrative policies designed to 
defend the status of the network. 
This chapter closes by suggesting that department-agency relationships can be 
seen as intra-state networks which impact on the policy process in all its iterative 
stages. Given these assertions, the final chapter of this thesis will, in concluding, 
return to the case study questions set out in chapters two and three to review more 
broadly some of the normative and theoretical questions outlined in the literature. It 
will suggest implications which can be drawn, for the use of the theoretical 
framework employed, for policy making in the core executive and for questions of 
governance. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING DEPARTMENT-AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Introduction 
This thesis has looked at the profound changes in the organisation of central 
government through the creation of Next Steps agencies to deliver government 
goals at arm's length. It addresses the question of what has been the impact of the 
introduction of agencies on relationships in government and on the policy process, 
particularly policy implementation. Much of the existing literature focuses on the 
relationships between ministers and agencies and therefore underplays the role 
played by departments. This research has focused on the relationships that have 
developed between departments and agencies and how they can be understood. It 
has also been concerned to explain why some relationships worked better than 
others. 
To examine these questions, the thesis looked beyond either the constitutional 
framework or managerial models. Both were felt to be primarily normative 
understandings, reflecting pictures of what ought to be and not depicting how intra- 
governmental relationships worked in reality. Instead, the thesis draws on historical 
institutionalism, power dependency and policy networks. Initially, this chapter will 
draw on these theoretical frameworks to outline the key findings to the questions 
the thesis sought to explore: what has been the impact of agencies on government; 
how can department-agency relationships be understood; and why have some 
relationships worked better than others. 
These empirical questions are linked with both theoretical and normative issues 
which are discussed in the second and third part of this chapter. In concluding, the 
chapter will close by looking at what implications this research into department- 
agency relationships has for the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism, 
dependency and networks, for policy making in the core executive, and for 
questions of governance. 
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The Impact of Agencies on Government 
The introduction of agencies in government must be seen as 'path dependent', with 
new institutional arrangements developing out of, and from, the current established 
formal and informal rules. Historical institutionalism suggests that existing formal 
and informal institutional arrangements provide opportunities to facilitate change 
and act to constraint change, in response to exogenous and endogenous factors. 
Here, the introduction of a more managerial approach to the delivery of central 
government goals took place in a changed economic, ideological and technological 
environment. Fiscal rectitude and the dominance of new right philosophies coupled 
with increased technological capabilities for oversight and monitoring were the 
exogenous drivers for change. The endogenous pressure for change came in 
response to political and managerial critiques of the existing constitutional 
arrangements. Civil servants were seen as too powerful by politicians on both left 
and right and yet, at the same time, the existing bureaucratic (and hierarchical) 
arrangements were seen to prioritise servicing ministers and neglect the effective 
delivery of government goals. 
The agency concept became accepted in the core executive because of the 
backing it received from the Prime Minister. Yet in order to assemble the political 
coalition necessary to achieve its introduction, the concept had to meet the 
concerns of politicians and civil servants. Thus, the set of ideas which came to be 
associated with the agency concept involved a marrying of both principal agent and 
constitutional concepts. The development of the 'Next Steps' policy was 'path 
dependent' and the arrangements created, the potential for considerable tension. 
Agencies were to operate both at arm's length and yet under the overall guidance of 
the responsible minister. 
The new arrangements involved changes in the formal and informal understandings 
that structure and guide decision making in the core executive. Some of the 
changes were tangible emanating from changes in written rules and procedures. 
Some were, in the words of one chief executive, "in the air of perceptions" and 
these perceptions were dynamic, developing from existing understandings, 
responding to the new arrangements and in reaction to critical events. Institutional 
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arrangements provide the 'rules of the game' and allocate roles and resources. 
The introduction of agencies involved a huge transfer of resources, changes to the 
'rules of the game' and to the roles policy actors were expected, and expected, to 
play. In so doing, it fundamentally altered relationships in the core executive and 
how these relationships were conducted. 
Understanding department-agency relationships 
The finance and resources framework under which agencies were established 
specifically created the conditions for an exchange of resources between 
departments headed by ministers and agencies. The transfer of resources from 
departments to agencies provided agencies with power potential. Control of 
informational, organisational and sometimes financial resources moved out of the 
pre-existing departmental hierarchy and passed to the new agencies operating at 
arm's length. Ministers retained political resources, legitimising the operation, and 
the authority to act. Departments still held some organisational and informational 
resources. Sometimes agencies looked to departments for authority and to seek 
financial resources. 
This exchange of resources has led to the development of new power dependent 
networks within government. Ministers, depend on the organisational and 
informational resources held by both departments and agencies. Departments and 
agencies depend on ministers ultimately for the authority and the legitimacy to act 
where authority is exercised. Departments depend on agencies to deliver 
successfully to protect their ministers and agencies need departments for the 
organisational and informational resources still held there. 
The type and level of dependency in these networks varied. Large or monopoly 
agencies, salient agencies, agencies with complicated and multiple goals, create 
high dependency. In less complicated policy areas, the ability of an agency to raise 
its own finance, or being one of a number of providers, lessens the degree of 
dependency. The exchange of resources creates dependency relationships 
between all three parties. It does not represent the type of zero sum power 
relationship envisaged in the principal agent model or in constitutional theory. They 
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are each dependent on each other, power is relational. Ministers' traditional 
dependence upon departments is now extended to agencies. For departments$ 
however, their dependence upon agencies is new. The change in the distribution of 
resources has created new power dependent networks and has altered the power 
potential of participants in those networks. 
The networks had two policy aims or goals. The first was to ensure the delivery of 
the operational goals set out in the Framework Document. In general, agencies 
became more powerful participants in the policy process because of the knowledge 
and operational expertise they controlled in relation to operational goals. Secondly, 
these networks had the administrative goals of sustaining the network, of 
operationalising the agency concept itself. How department-agency relationships 
were managed is revealed by looking at the processes of exchange. 
Managing intra-state networks 
The agency concept introduces formal processes to establish and maintain the 
arm's length relationship. These formal processes and the roles participants are 
expected to play are set out in each agency's framework document, for example, 
arrangements for consultation and governance and the roles and responsibilities 
ascribed to each party. These were supplemented by department-specific 
procedures, and cross-government initiatives. These formal arrangements and 
what happened in practice were largely related to the pattern of dependency that 
agencies have with ministers and departments. The small, executive agencies 
rarely saw ministers: most contact was with departments. However, for the larger, 
more salient agencies, there was contact with ministers and contact with 
departments and/or ministers was more frequent. 
Informal processes were also influential in how department-agency networks 
worked. Existing informal networks were key to the exchange of information, the 
development of trust and the transmission, of awareness of the rules of the game 
and roles played. These informal networks related to the history of the agency and 
were found where it had previously been part of the department. 
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Another informal feature of how the new relationships were managed was 
participants' role understandings. Agency chief executives' understanding of their 
role and the rules of the game was an important factor in managing the transition to 
operating in the new power dependency networks. Chief Executives were required 
both to provide a new visible form of leadership and ownership of operational goals, 
yet needed to be able to operate within the tradition of ministerial responsibility and 
recognise the dominance of ministerial authority in the exchange relationship. This 
was more difficult for those appointed from outside the public sector. Over the 
history of the agency concept, the experience of Ros Hepplewhite and Derek Lewis 
led to policy learning by those involved in power dependency relationships based 
around agencies. These critical incidents re-inforced the dominance of ministerial 
authority and changed the extent of freedom that the agency chief executive role 
was thought to possess. 
Departmental understandings of roles varied across departments. The DSS was 
keen, the agency concept was moving in a direction the Department was already 
going and it had given institutional consideration to its role. In the DTI, a strong 
model of corporate governance was imposed reflecting its business links and it also 
was pro-active in determining its role. In the Home Office, where decision making is 
very compartmental ised, there was not the same departmental view of its role. It 
was assumed that the Department's 'policy ballast' role (to borrow from Foster and 
Plowden) (1996) could be provided through the office of the Permanent Secretary. 
How the networks managed their new power dependent relationships was linked to 
the level of dependency, the departmental context, formal and informal rules of the 
game, role understanding and understanding of the rules of the game. 
Understanding department-agency relationships as bureaucratic networks arising 
from the exchange of resources provides an explanation for why some relationships 
worked better than others. It suggests that whilst the exchange of resources 
establishes the networks, it is the degree to which the networks are integrated i. e. 
how well they manage the processes of exchange, that links to how well each 
network coped with the delivery of government goals through the agency concept. 
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Why have some relationships worked better than others? 
Within the new institutional arrangements these new power dependent networks in 
turn act further to facilitate or constrain change in the policy environment. Policy 
actors within networks were operating in a path dependent structured environment 
which sets the rules of the game, and allocates roles and resources. In particular, 
they had to learn new 'principal agent' roles alongside traditional bureaucratic roles. 
The development of power dependent networks based on resource exchange 
create the circumstances for actors to develop, or not develop, shared perceptions 
of policy questions and solutions. Where network integration was good, with 
continuity and consensus among participants, this facilitated the development of 
shared understandings. Implementation of the agency concept depended on how 
well each network adapted to these changed circumstances, had institutional 
support for their dependency and shared policy goals and values. 
These findings support the expectations of multiple case study and suggest the 
hypothesis can be sustained. Implementation was not problematic in the three IDTI 
agencies and the FSS. The networks between these agencies and their parent 
departments have changed over time but were based on strong links and shared 
values at the outset. The networks relationships around the Prison Service Agency 
and the Child Support Agency at the outset were problematic. There was high 
dependency arising from the resources exchanged and salient policy goals, but 
poor institutional links and no shared agreement about values or goals. In the 
Benefits Agency, whilst there was also high dependency and salient policy goals 
there were very strong institutional links and a shared appreciation of the agency 
concept and role understanding. Although the salience of the policy area did 
expose the ambiguity of the rules and roles demanded by the new arrangements, 
this is not the reason for the problematic start that both agencies had. The 
difficulties in implementing government goals through the agency concept was 
related to how the networks managed their new relationships. In particular, a closely 
integrated network was better able to deal with the tension in the agency concept 
created by adherence to the constitutional concept of ministerial responsibility 
alongside the autonomy agencies were supposed to have over operational matters. 
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or 
Theoretical and Normative Implications of this Research 
Viewing department-agency relationships as power dependent networks arising 
from the exchange of resources raises both theoretical and normative issues which 
will be discussed in the final part of this chapter. The next section begins with 
theoretical questions about the concept of policy networks. 
A theoretical focus on the concept of networks 
The idea of policy networks has been subject to criticism of the explanatory value of 
the concept and questions about the nature of such networks. Fieldwork for this 
thesis provides an empirical testing ground to examine these questions. 
Descfiptive or explanatory 
The most detailed theoretical critique of the concept of policy networks argues that 
networks are descriptive and not explanatory (Dowding, 1995b). The thesis 
attempted to address this criticism by using a multiple case study seeking literal and 
theoretical replications for a hypothesis based on network characteristics. This 
tactic did not assist in providing the direct causal relationship between network 
characteristics and outcomes which Dowding would seek. Indeed, the examination 
of department-agency relationships, and why some work better than others could 
have relied on the insights of historical institutionalism, the idea of power 
dependency and what Hall and Taylor (1996) call a 'cultural' approach to the 
actions of individuals operating in the new institutional arrangements, without 
drawing on the concept of policy networks. In this sense, the Marsh and Rhodes 
typology simply choreographs the other components of an explanation. 
However, this is not problematic if it is accepted that direct causal links are difficult 
to identify and test in real life situations (Yin, 1994). The policy process is iterative, 
multi-layered and dynamic. This thesis has suggested the value of a policy 
networks approach. Networks provide the site of interaction for the exchange of 
resources and the power play of actors in arenas created by that exchange of 
resources. Use of the Marsh and Rhodes typology in this instance assisted in 
highlighting that whilst the degree of dependency was related to the resources 
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exchanged, it was the level of integration in the network which related to how well 
the networks managed change. The concept of networks reveals the operation of 
'institutions' within 'institutions' and provides a link between the macro and micro 
level of analysis. 
Institutional or interpersonal networks? 
Network proponents have also sought to problematise the explanation of what 
drives network formation and existence (Marsh and Rhodes 1992,249). Are they 
institutionally based, forming around the exchange of resources and characterised 
by the nature of that exchange, found in Rhodes' investigation of intergovernmental 
relationships (Rhodes, 1988)? Or do they have a more interpersonal, or cultural 
basis, indicated by the intra-state networks in the Whitehall Village identified by 
Heclo and Wildavsky (1974)? This question was addressed to the theoretical work 
on networks generally but has a particular resonance for department-agency 
relationships because of the arm's length nature of these intra-state relationships. 
To address this issue, material from the multiple case study was analysed 
thematically. This enabled analysis of the exchange of resources separately from 
examination of the processes of exchange, the consideration of whether the 
resulting relationships could be considered networks and how these networks have 
affected implementation. This permits consideration of which aspect of the network 
approach contributed to explanation. 
The evidence from the multiple case study does not provide a definitive answer to 
the question of whether networks have an institutional or interpersonal basis. The 
development of agencies introduced a change in the distribution of resources, new 
rules and roles for participants to operate on top of existing rules and roles in new 
networks. In this sense these networks are institutional. Viewing networks in this 
way suggests formation of a network is inevitably thought to follow from the 
changed institutional arrangements. Differences in the networks are linked to 
differences in the institutional arrangements, for example the goals of the agency or 
the resources exchanged. Further, the way in which networks managed their 
relationships was, in part, institutional, set out in formal arrangements and showing 
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a link to the level of dependency arising from the resource exchange. These 
features point to an institutional basis of department-agency networks. 
Yet fieldwork also showed the vital importance of informal and interpersonal 
aspects of departmental agency networks. These came from a shared civil service 
culture, a shared departmental background or a shared understanding of the rules 
of the game and the roles participants were expected to play. These informal 
aspects provided for the transmission of cultural norms. They allowed for the 
development of trust. They informed agents acting within the network of the skills 
and tactics they could bring to bear to resolve policy problems. When asked what 
mattered most in getting department-agency relationships to work, most of those 
interviewed said it was the informal interpersonal factors which were key. As one 
chief executive of a large agency pointed out "You need both [formal and informal 
arrangements] but if you haven't got the latter you're in trouble... that is about 
people having the nous to recognise you operate in a political environment" 
(interview). 
It is not possible to separate the two variables. Without resource exchange the 
network would not need to exist. This was illustrated by the case of the LGC where 
dependency between department and agency was low and the agency was 
privatised. Resource exchange creates a dependency relationship, and this can be 
described as a network. The degree of integration, or consensus and continuity, 
within this network influences how well it can adapt to change. This integration can 
be encouraged by the formal rules of the game but networks rely on informal 
aspects to facilitate their operation and, where necessary, change. The network 
created by power dependency inculcates and transfers values, norms and standard 
operating procedures. 
In this sense, these bureaucratic networks are both institutional and interpersonal in 
nature. The literature which addresses this question (Marsh and Rhodes 1992b) 
presents a false dicotomy between the institutional and interpersonal basis of 
networks. The use of insights from the historical institutionalist literature is helpful 
here in suggesting institutions (such as networks) are based both on formal 'rules of 
the game' (setting out the distribution of resources, roles and operating procedures) 
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and informal rules (or participants) understandings of the rules of the game and 
roles they are required to play). 
How do networks impact on outcomes 
A third central question raised by network theorists is how the existence of a 
network affects outcomes. Whilst the intra-state networks examined in this 
research differed considerably in their institutional construction from other types of 
intergovern mental or. government interest group relationships, the findings of this 
thesis provides support for the central idea of the concept of policy networks that 
the networks impact on policy outcomes. The thesis identified four ways in which 
department-agency networks had impacted on outcomes. Firstly, the creation of 
networks following a change in the institutional arrangements led to agencies 
becoming more powerful in determination of operational goals. Secondly, the 
degree of integration of the network (shared goals, values and institutional support) 
determined how well the concept was implemented which in turn affected the 
delivery of government goals. Thirdly, some networks came to develop policy 
preferences which, in the absence of countervailing authority from ministers, 
determined policy direction. Finally, there was very clear evidence that these 
bureaucratic networks acted to defend themselves and maintain the status quo in 
the face of a threat to their future status. 
This work confirms explanations of how this occurs. Network members have 
interests in both the policy area and the network. The dependency relationship 
found in a 'policy community' type of network (where each member has resources 
to exchange) can lead to the development of shared understandings of the policy 
problems they face and how to resolve them. These understandings can be about 
both the policy questions, or ideological approach to a policy question, or in respect 
of the appropriate administrative procedures. In this way networks can shape 
agendas and can promote stability. The question of networks impacting on 
outcomes has been linked to normative concerns about the influence of networks 
on governance and it is the normative questions about accountability raised by the 
research that will be addressed next. 
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Accountability issues of department-agency relationships and their normative 
implications 
Are department-agency networks self-steefing? 
The existence of policy networks between interest groups and government has 
been associated with the idea of private government, unaccountable and 
conservative in their impact (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992,265). The development of 
agencies has been linked with the 'hollowing out of the state' (Rhodes, 1994,138) 
with negative consequences for accountability and co-ordination of state activity. 
Others have argued that agencification has not led to internal hollowing out and that 
ministers have been granted greater control over agencies and are able to shield 
themselves from operational and policy failures (Saward, 1997,26) and, latterly, 
Rhodes has suggested that "assertions about hollowing out are better recast as 
questions" (Rhodes, 1997,210). The empirical work here permits some reflection 
on these issues. 
This research has suggested two contrary phenomena concerning the bureaucratic 
networks described and ministerial direction. Firstly, it is argued there has been a 
reassertion of ministerial responsibility as a primary 'rule of the game' and a 
consequent retreat from the idea of chief executives as independent figureheads. 
Agencification has resulted in the introduction of clearer lines of managerial 
responsibility and managerialist techniques into government but it has not led to a 
new way of governing. This position has developed over time and has been 
pointed up by several significant events. The first was the turbulent circumstances 
surrounding the resignation of Ros Hepplewhite and the sacking of Derek Lewis. 
This exposed the ambiguity of the administrative understanding that Next Steps 
consisted of and all parties in the networks retreated into tried and tested 
constitutional roles. The second significant event was the election of a Labour 
Government re-inforcing the constitutionalist position. This is partly because 
ministers came into post after years of opposition. Ensuring the accountability of 
agencies to Parliament through ministerial responsibility had been a strong position 
adopted in opposition. Additionally, when ministers came into government with new 
policy directions and policy proposals, civil servants in departments and agencies 
were keen to illustrate how the agency concept could deliver a change in direction. 
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Secondly, the thesis has argued that the development of department-agency 
networks has in some circumstances, it is suggested, led to some influence over 
policy outcomes. Where ministers want change, departments and agencies cannot 
ignore this instruction. However, if the network has a policy preference they can 
utilise skills and tactics (long the preserve of civil servants, if updated by new 
procedures such as tendering or writing contracts) such as delay or using the 
accounting officer provisions to introduce procedural hurdles or to await a change in 
policy direction. If the relationship is seen as a power dependent network, 
ministers' authority is dominant in the exchange relationship but departments and 
agencies can use their resources, of information and organisational skills, to great 
effect. There is a temporal effect in the policy process which assists bureaucratic 
power play. Where ministers are not active in the network, there is even greater 
capacity for self-steering. 
The impact of bureaucratic networks capacity to be self-steering in this way, is not 
thought to be great, however. Ministers will become involved if the policy is salient. 
Even if networks have a policy preference, their influence is restricted largely to 
administrative conduct. In most areas there will be other 'policy networks' 
composed of ministers, departments and interest groups which may or may not 
influence policy outcomes. Nevertheless, the capacity for self-steering in certain 
circumstances can be seen to exist. 
The question is, has agencification introduced this self steering capacity or did it 
always exist within departments operating hierarchically? Sadly, the fieldwork here 
cannot provide any final judgement on this issue. Two propositions are possible, 
firstly, that by introducing a transfer of resources, agencification increases the 
number of participants in the policy process with defined interests to defend and 
gives them institutional access to the network. There is bound to be an agency 
I effect' on how networks mediate the policy process (Gains, 1999). A second 
position, one which is not necessarily contrary to the first, is that an exchange of 
resources will always have taken place leading to intra-state networks within 
hierarchical departments. Therefore bureaucratic networks operating with policy 
preferences will always have existed. In fact, it could be argued that the process of 
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agencification has provided more visibility to development of bureaucratic policy 
preferences through the vastly increased amount of information available to those 
ministers who wish to, and are able to, steer the policy process. 
How can governments steer bureaucratic networks? 
This examination of the operation of intra-state networks does have some 
normative implications for government wishing to improve their capacity to steer 
intra-state networks. In order to steer, governments must maintain control of the 
key resources of authority and finance as well as the political resources which their 
status as majority governing party brings. Loss of these resources diminishes a 
government's power potential. Second in introducing or maintaining a change in 
the institutional framework, government should pay attention to both the formal and 
informal arrangements which support the relationships created. Formal 
arrangements provide the new rules of the game which inform participants' actions 
as policy problems arise. Formal mechanisms for managing new relationships will 
create the physical arena for the development of shared understandings. Informal 
arrangements will support or can undermine the change which is sought. Attention 
should be paid to developing ways of bolstering informal contact. Building 
appropriate formal and informal links assists in the development of trust and 
communication and it is these which bind a network and provide it with the ability to 
cope with change. Finally, if governments want to steer then ministers must have a 
hand on the tiller. If ministers are not interested, distracted by other problems, or 
move on too quickly then bureaucratic networks have the capacity to self-steer and 
their accountability to ministers is diminished. 
The question of whether networks are self-steering and therefore lack accountability 
is relevant not only to questions of how the state can steer the policy process but 
also relates to the broader question of how agencies are accountable to Parliament. 
Questions about the accountability of agencies, as outlined in chapter two, were 
prominent in early discussions of the Next Steps approach. This examination of 
department-agency networks permits some reflection on the implications of this 
perspective for the accountability of agency arrangements. 
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Are agencies property accountable to Parliament? 
The agency arrangements did not fundamentally alter the traditional constitutional 
arrangements for accountability based on the idea of ministerial responsibility to 
Parliament. Yet there were concerns that the establishment of agencies would 
undermine these accountability arrangements through the creation of an 
accountability gap. Concerns centred on two issues. Firstly the separation of 
responsibilities would mean Parliament was be unable to seek information from 
chief executives and hold them to account for their operational responsibilities yet, 
secondly, at the same time ministers would be able to pass the blame for policy 
problems on to agencies and avoid taking responsibility themselves. Following the 
successful demand that agency chief executive replies to Parliamentary questions 
should be printed in Hansard, there were calls for chief executives to be directly 
accountable to select committees. Those urging reform call for statutory 
arrangements to back up the separation of responsibilities and for improvement to 
be made to ministerial responsibility to address these concerns. Again some 
observations on these issues from the perspective of the thesis is possible. 
Information to PaHiament 
The amount of published material available to Parliament has radically improved 
compared to pre-agency days and in this respect, despite the problems of 
measuring and comparing targets, a problem not unique to agency status, 
informatory accountability is vastly improved. Parliament is able to perform its 
scrutiny role better, should it choose to do so. 
Chief executives' accountability to select committees 
There are problems with this mechanism for improving accountability to Parliament. 
As the material in chapter seven indicates, agency chief executives attend and give 
evidence to select committees to a far greater extent than their departmental 
predecessors did previously. Nevertheless, their evidence is offered strictly under 
the term of the Osmotherly Rules and they do not comment on matters which it is 
considered to be properly the domain of ministers. This research suggests that an 
extension of these arrangements to permit agency chief executives to be directly 
accountable to Parliament, or an alteration of the Osmotherly rules to permit chief 
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executives to give 
institutional context. 
evidence on their own behalf, is unlikely in the current 
The rules of the game state that ministers are ultimately responsible and have over- 
riding authority. Mi nisters provide access to finance and legislative change. 
Agencies are dependent upon ministers for these resources. Minister demand 
confidentiality and loyalty from others in the network. The only way for agencies to 
participate in the policy process is to abide by these rules of the game. There is no 
incentive for any of the participants in the network to allow any alteration in the rules 
of the game, given the positive sum power dependency between them. Networks 
act to preserve the status quo. Change in the rules of the game which would 
involve passing authority (to a certain extent) to select committees is unlikely 
without a significant commitment from those who currently hold legislative and 
authoritative resources, i. e. ministers. Such a change is clearly not in their 
interests and is unlikely to happen. 
This raises the question of whether there are circumstances where such a change 
in the rules of the game might occur. Cortell and Peterson (1999) argue change in 
institutional arrangements follow from a 'window of opportunity', if there is 
commitment from strategic actors and if they have the institutional capacity to see 
the change through despite the constraints of existing state capacities and the 
activities of networks (1999). Incremental change to improve the accountability of 
chief executives to select committees could occur following a critical incident if it 
provoked sufficient parliamentary ire to require the government to be seen to be 
taking action, for example following the kind of problems the Passport Agency is 
currently facing (Guardian, 30 July 1999) which expose a potential accountability 
gap. Or, as with most issues which are high on opposition agendas, change could 
be campaigned for in opposition and sought early in a new Parliament headed by a 
new administration. 
If change were to be achieved, there is room for caution about the improvement it 
would bring to accountability arrangements. There is evidence that permitting chief 
executives to give evidence on their own behalf to select committees would not 
either overcome the accountability gap (Landers, 1999), or lead to a more rational, 
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de-politicised arena for holding officials to account (Polidano, 1999 32). 
Furthermore, if the evidence in this research is correct and the dependency 
between all parties in the agency arrangement leads to networks based on trust and 
shared understandings, then a change in the Osmotherly Rules is not likely to alter 
the informal understandings of the rules of the game held by the network or the 
shared understanding of policy problems and how to deal with them. Select 
committees would only penetrate shared views of a policy problem if relationships in 
the network had broken down. This might ensure scrutiny in one area but would not 
ensure effective scrutiny across government. 
Accountability through ministerial responsibility 
As argued above, over the last five years the concept of ministerial responsibility 
has become increasingly important in defining the rules of the game and the roles of 
those involved in department-agency relationships. Although there has been a vast 
delegation of control over organisational resources to chief executives (as indeed 
there has been throughout government under new Treasury rules), the 
constitutional position is unchanged. Ministers are seen as ultimately accountable 
to Parliament for the work of the whole of their departments, including agencies. In 
this sense, the constitutional arrangements are performing as they have always 
done. The sanction of ministers potentially having to be called to give account and 
face possible calls for resignation is as effective (or not) in guiding the behaviour of 
officials and ministers as it has always been. Fieldwork for this thesis has 
suggested that parliamentary accountability and the importance of keeping 
ministers informed of potentially salient issues strongly guides behaviour in 
agencies. 
It is the case that earlier ambiguity between, the extent of agency autonomy and the 
overriding constitutional rule of ministerial responsibility certainly did allow ministers 
to pass on the blame for problems in the prison service agency and the child 
support agency. The question is whether agency status caused these difficulties in 
applying the doctrine of ministerial responsibility or whether agency status highlights 
a problem with relying on this type of accountability. A reversion to ministerial 
responsibility works well as a way of structuring the rules of the game within 
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department-agency networks. It is less successful in distributing liability for 
problems in the delivery of government goals. 
There is evidence that ministers will seek to avoid taking responsibility whatever the 
institutional arrangements (Woodhouse 1994; Barker 1998). Ministerial 
resignations, as the ultimate expression of ministerial responsibility, are more 
related to the dependency relationships and networks a minister has with his own 
backbenchers and are entirely political events. It is argued here that ensuring 
oversight and accountability of public organisations through ministerial responsibility 
alone is deeply problematic. Firstly, because ministers do not, and never did have, 
knowledge of every area of their responsibilities and secondly, because it is an 
entirely arbitrary mechanism of control. 
There are various suggestions of how ministerial responsibility could be supplanted 
by more pluralist, multi-layered, and more open systems of accountability, such as 
requiring chief executives to be accountable to select committees. The question 
here is not to assess the relative merits of ideas suggested. It is to point to the 
potential constraints on achieving change from a network perspective. 
As with the idea of chief executives giving evidence to select committees, whatever 
the merits of change, changes in the institutional rules of the game such as to the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility will face resistance from networks inside the 
core executive. Unless ministers can see benefits and use their authority to force 
through change in the formal and informal rules of the game which would follow, 
inertia is likely to prevail. In this case especially, change is unlikely because 
Parliament does not wish to lose the convention that it can call ministers to account 
and, where necessary, demand their resignation. 
Conclusion 
This thesis sets out to examine the impact of the introduction of agencies on 
relationships in government, on the policy process and particularly policy 
implementation. It has used historical institutionalism, power dependency and 
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policy networks to explore department-agency relationships. It has been concerned 
to explore why some relationships worked better than others. Department-agency 
relationships were portrayed as bureaucratic networks based on power 
dependency. These networks facilitated change or acted as a constraint on 
change. Implementation problems were found where there was little continuity or 
consensus in the network. In conclusion three implications can be outlined from the 
use of this theoretical Iramework to address these empirical questions. 
Linking historical institutionalism with dependency and networks 
The combination of historical institutionalism with the idea of power dependency 
and the development of networks permitted a helpful link between the macro, meso 
and micro levels of analysis. The use of concepts from the historical institutionalist 
literature provided the opportunity to identify a change in the allocation of resources, 
in roles and in the rules of the game. In particular these concepts enabled the 
analysis to view 'traditional constitutional arrangements' and the 'agency concept' 
as offering different understandings of the rules of the game. Within this 
overarching framework the idea of power dependency leading to the formation of 
networks could be applied to understanding intra-state relationships. Power 
dependency was valuable in explaining why networks formed and the concept of 
policy networks permitted an analysis of how well these relationships worked and 
how they influenced the policy process. 
One criticism of the policy network literature is that the analysis has ignored the 
importance of Parliament and the symbolism of Parliament in understanding the 
policy process (Judge, 1993). The theoretical approach above does acknowledge 
the symbolic importance of Parliament and that parliamentary accountability 
through ministerial responsibility was a central defining feature for the networks 
described. The first implication arising from this research is, it is suggested that the 
above framework could be used to analyse the dependency and networks within 
and between the 'institutions' of party, Parliament and core executive, to obtain a 
more iterative and complete analysis of the policy process. 
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Policy making in the core executive 
The second implication arising from this research relates to policy making in the 
core executive. The analysis here has suggested that intra-state networks played 
an important role in managing the introduction of changes to the way policy making 
was conducted. It has argued that close networks resembling policy communities 
managed tension and introduced change. It has also pointed out the potential for 
intra-state networks to be self-steering if ministers are not actively involved. These 
findings should be illuminating for both researchers and policy makers in 
considering the introduction of other initiatives to improve policy making in the core 
executive such as attempts to ensure 'joined-up government). 
The implication from this research forjoined-up government), is to draw attention to 
the need to promote intra-departmental networks and to ensure formal and informal 
mechanisms to encourage shared understandings between network members. It 
suggests that ministers must become actively involved in networks to ensure 
change and overcome networks' tendency to maintain the status quo. It indicates 
that analysis of 'joined-up government' initiatives would involve examining the 
resources exchanged and resulting dependency between departments within the 
current rules of the game. 
Theoretical insights on normative issues of governance 
Finally, the thesis has highlighted normative concerns about accountability which 
stem from both the introduction of agencies into government and from 
understanding department-agency relationships as bureaucratic networks. It 
describes the capacity for networks to be self-steering and suggests that the 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility is a key 'rule of the game' in asserting 
ministerial control over bureaucratic networks and ensuring accountability to 
ministers. It has also suggested that there is a need to ensure the accountability of 
agencies to Parliament. In concluding, this chapter draws attention to the 
implicatio ns of using theoretical insights to consider these normative issues of 
governance. It is possible to envisage a paradoxical situation whereby measures to 
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ensure the accountability of agencies to ministers and measures to ensure the 
accountability of agencies to Parliament are potentially in conflict. 
To improve openness and democracy in the policy process it will be important to 
seek changes which both improve the accountability of agencies to ministers 
(enabling them to steer policy direction) and which ensures parliamentary ability 
both to demand an account and to hold to account. It is hoped that consideration of 
the development of agencies from a historical institutionalist perspective, together 
with a more theoretical ly-d riven analysis of power relationships between 
departments and agencies will provide insights into the likelihood of achieving 
change and direction of change when considering these normative issues. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Growth of NSAs in Government 
Year No of No of staff Proportion of Privatisations Agencies working in staff working (3) 
at 31 Agencies and in Agencies 
December along Next and along 
each year (i) Steps lines at 1 Next Steps 
April each year lines at 1 
(2) April each 
year (%) (2) 
1988 3 0 0 
1989 10 5,844 1 
1990 34 155,660 27 
1991 57 2061870 37 
1992 78 2911969 51 
1993 94 340,036 61 
1994 104 339,621 63 1 
1995 ill 345,342 67 3 
1996 131 350,408 71 7 
1997 (not shown) 364,563 77 2 
Sources and notes 
(1) Including HM Customs and Excise and Inland Revenue which are departments 
operating fully along Next Steps lines. 
Source: Hansard, Written Parliamentary Answer, 18 June 1997, col 161. 
(2) Source: Hansard, Written Parliamentary Answer, 18 June, 1997, col 161. 
(3) Taken from annual Next Steps Reviews (Cm 2750,1994; Cm 3164,1996; Cm 3579, 
1997; Cm 3889,1998). 
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